Corrupt Microfinance Players attend Conference

The list of confirmed speakers at the forthcoming Capital Markets Conference reads like a summary of the worst offending parties mentioned in my book. Perhaps not surprisingly, I was not invited to the conference, although I would have rather enjoyed firing some questions at these guys. But, given the multitudes of eager microfinance folk attending, perhaps other people may be curious to hear answers to some of these questions. The conference is managed by the generally ethical and effective Women’s World Bank – a decent bunch of women specifically aiming to promote women’s rights. Cool, of the MFIs I know within the WWB network they are generally pretty good (Xac Bank and Ujjivan are fine example), and this is an institution I largely respect. But, their principal sponsor is Citibank, and everyone dances to the tune the piper plays. Conflicts of interest perhaps?

Confirmed Speakers (and the questions I’d love to ask them)

Bob Annibale, Citi Microfinance

“Your institution has been associated with some of the worst MFIs on Earth, from SKS to Compartamos and LAPO. Your testimony to the House of Representatives suggested that you only invested in legal MFIs, and yet LAPO was very demonstrably and repeatedly described as illegal. Do you believe that by sponsoring these sorts of events that people will somehow ignore these indiscretions?”

Chuck Olson, Blue Orchard Finance

“While you were at Deutsche Bank you managed to invest in LAPO, one of the most dis-credited MFIs on the planet. You then moved to Blue Orchard, where you invested in LAPO again, despite other funds having pulled out of LAPO and the MFI finding itself on the front page of the New York Times. Finally Blue Orchard issued a false press release defending your investment in LAPO. How can we take any claims of ethics, responsible investing or transparency seriously when mentioned in the same sentence as Blue Orchard?”

Elizabeth Littlefield, Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Sandra Callison, Habitat for Humanity:

“You managed to select Triple Jump as your fund manager for the OPIC/Habitat fund. Triple Jump has been heavily criticised in a recent book, been subject of an exposé documentary in Holland, and two politicians have now asked nine questions to the Dutch parliament about mis-use of public funds. Triple Jump has failed to comment on these allegations, and OPIC is also public sector funding. Is OPIC concerned about accusations of mis-used public funding by their selected fund manager, and could you briefly explain your due diligence process that led you to select this fund manager? ”

Laura Foose, Social Performance Task Force

“Could you explain why the SPTF and the SMART Campaign have refused to include the rights of children? Even suggesting that MFIs obey the child labour laws in their countries would be a step in the right direction. Academic research is now emerging regarding the adverse effects of microfinance upon child education. Will you address this rather obvious aspect of client protection?”

Lisa Hall, Calvert Foundation

“You institution was heavily criticised in the book, suggesting with firm evidence that you were deceived by Triple Jump regarding your investment in LAPO, and yet you continue pumping money to Triple Jump. Do you honestly believe LAPO was an isolated incident?”

Mark Berryman, Deutsche Bank Global Social Investment Funds

“Does Deutsche Bank secretly regret investing in LAPO?”

Martin Heimes, responsAbility

“Did your due diligence process of LAPO extend to reading any ratings or the front page of the New York Times?”

Martin Holtmann, International Finance Corporation

“There is a rumour going round that you folk were thinking of investing in LAPO? Can you confirm this?”

Mary Ellen Iskenderian, Women’s World Banking

“WWB is a highly reputable institution. Why did you ask such a medley of institutions with highly questionable reputations to speak at your event? Not a single one of these institutions has refuted any of the charges made in the book, and the book has received support from the very highest levels of the sector. Have you read the book? What do you think of the activities described? In particular, do you believe that your main sponsor, Citi Microfinance, told the truth to the House of Representatives?”

Steve Wright, Grameen Foundation

“When your CEO, Alex Counts, defended LAPO’s interest rates (of up to 144%) on the basis that they were cheaper than a moneylender, many people considered this a farcical response. He denied the interest rates charged by LAPO on camera in the Tom Heinemann documentary, although they were subsequently proved by MFTransparency, the authority in the sector on transparent interest rates. Meanwhile Mohammad Yunus has been lecturing the world on the dangers of high interest rates, and would presumably be deeply disturbed by your open support of LAPO. What is GFUSA’s view of extortionate interest rates?”

Tumendemberel Naidorj, XacBank

“Xac Bank is one of the best MFIs on the planet, and a proud member of the WWB network. How does it feel to be in a conference with some of the worst offenders in the sector?”

Anyway, the website also says they will be Tweeting live apparently (#cmc2012), so perhaps they’ll take questions? If anyone is going to this conference, ask one of these questions, or any tough question. This is how we first put ASN-Novib’s investment in LAPO into the public domain. Try to record the question and the answer, send it to me and I’ll post it here. If these guys have earned such a platform to lecture us from, they can face some tough questions from the audience in the meantime.

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Doomsday

…. is probably how Triple Jump described the day the KRO-Reporter documentary came out. In fact the day I received the attached document (Triple Jump/Incofin letter to LAPO March 2010) was Doomsday. They now face questions in the Dutch parliament. They stand ridiculed in a documentary. The leaders of their beloved sector are abandoning them. Having worked a decade in this sector, only two people I know take Triple Jump seriously, and both work at Triple Jump. Calls for the formal regulation of the microfinance investment sector grow by the day, and Triple Jump find themselves as the central protagonist in the case. And now I hear them groaning, “Not another leaked document”. Yup, another leaked document, and they have no idea from where.

The document has been authenticated by Incofin (Ellen Wouters, Chief Legal Officer: “This morning, I checked internally with my colleagues, and this is indeed a letter that we sent to LAPO”). If it’s false, sue her. It was leaked to me by one of various insiders who have increasingly felt emboldened to speak out. Many are angry at the state of the sector, and if my book has served any purpose at all, it is that people now feel they can express their concerns about what is really happening in microfinance.

Two pages. Five bullet points. One catastrophe.

On March 5th 2010 Incofin and Triple Jump wrote to LAPO. They both knew they were in deep trouble regarding this investment. Let’s save Incofin for another day for the moment. What do they confess, inadvertently, in this document?

The document was written in response to the rating report prepared by Planet Rating. This had been requested in response to the mounting accusations against LAPO by Asad Mahmood of Deutsche Bank, and revealed all manner of problems. LAPO’s investors were desperately hoping that Planet Rating would dispel the myths about LAPO’s appalling behaviour. In fact they added salt to the wound. Interest rates of 144%, savings frauds, illegal operations, nepotism, the report reads like a microfinance crime scene.

  • First, years after their initial investment, Triple Jump pleads with LAPO to get someone other than their brother to do an audit of the company. Yes, these funds had all invested however many millions of dollars on the basis of the audit done by the brother of one of the board directors. In Nigeria. LAPO had apparently promised to get a sensible company to audit them, but had reneged on the promise. Dutch taxpayer money, the funds of Deutsche Bank’s wealthy clients, all those Kivans who had so generously pumped in $5m in $25 chunks to eradicate poverty, the ASN Bank savers and pensioners, and still no meaningful audit. It’s a joke.
  • Second, the interest rate charged. LAPO promised it would go down. But instead increased it. And not by a few basis points as we are accustomed to in Europe, but to a whopping 144%. Ooops. And ASN denied this a few weeks ago in the KRO-Reporter documentary. It’s the ASN Bank funds that Triple Jump is writing about, ASN Bank partially own Triple Jump, for Pete’s sake – at least get your stories straight!
  • Third, LAPO should stop being illegal. Well, that’s a small step in the right direction, but one wonders what the endless investors and donors in ASN Bank, Oxfam Novib, Deutsche Bank, Standard Chartered, Grameen Foundation USA, BlueOrchard, responsAbility, Incofin, Kiva, Calvert Foundation etc. would think of their beloved funds having invested in an illegal operation in the first place. We bang on about client protection principles (LAPO does those too, apparently), but surely a good starting point would be that the institution is at least legal? A minor detail that had evaded their rigorous due diligence processes.

I’m going to skip to the fifth bullet point, because I want to save the fourth for last.

  • Fifth, LAPO was caught sneaking in yet another fee to the poor. The “risk premium”, which had evaded the audit (done by the brother). Yes, as if these interest rates weren’t high enough already, even Triple Jump were alarmed by this new fee for the poor.

But the fourth point is the classic. [Drum roll] LAPO isn’t even investing this money in microfinance. As astonishing as it may sound, Triple Jump was “concerned” that LAPO had been channelling money to “affiliated LAPO organizations”. They amounted to 23% of the equity of the entire organization, and were “not in line with the core business of LAPO”.

So, all those investors in these various funds; those loyal Dutch taxpayers; the ever-generous Dutch government; those hordes of Kivans desperate to save the world from poverty, had all been pumping money to an organisation that wasn’t even doing microfinance! Where was the money going? Who knows? Triple Jump don’t hint at this, and let’s face it, it’s pretty clear they don’t know their **** from their elbow. They were shooting in the dark from the outset on this deal, duped by a rather clever Nigerian family, and ended up looking so ridiculous that it remains a mystery to me that the Dutch police haven’t arrested them yet. Then we have their board chairman, the charismatic Ab Engelsman (also of ASN Bank and Oikocredit, alas), telling KRO-Reporter (only a few weeks ago) that LAPO never deceived them, and if he had his time again, he’d still invest in LAPO. The guy is head of the Netherland Microfinance Platform, and this letter was written by Triple Jump! We have Calvert Foundation stating repeatedly that they “stand by their investment in LAPO”. Grameen Foundation reckons that rates of 144% are perfectly reasonable because some money lender is apparently a little more pricey. Kiva don’t care in the slightest what interest rates are charged to the poor (24%, 126%, it’s all the same to them, the Kivans will never notice). Deutsche , BlueOrchard, Citi and responsAbility are salivating at the sight of such massive operating margins, albeit originating from the hard work of exploited, vulnerable poor folk. Oxfam Novib have no idea what day of the week it is, and openly contradict the tripe spewed by their partner ASN Bank. Incofin are speechless that they managed to make such a catastrophic mistake. Schwaab Foundation handed these jesters (LAPO, not Triple Jump) an award shortly after they suffered the first ever rating withdrawal in microfinance history and landed on the front page of the NYT. And the CEO of LAPO just pocketed 12% of the equity of the company having enslaved the best part of a million people in debt.

These people should go to prison. Mis-use of public funding, deception, fraud, corruption, take your pick.

The problem is endemic. The microfinance investment funds are largely fraudulent. They tarnish the reputation of the few good players remaining. Microfinance may or may not be a flawed concept, but the practice of microfinance facilitated by these funds is totally flawed.

So, if you’re a Dutch tax-payer – refuse to pay your taxes until Triple Jump is closed down and your microfinance sector is regulated by thinking, ethical adults. Holland has a golden opportunity to lead the way here, don’t blow it. If you’re a Kivan, go back to school. If you’re an ASN investor, put your money under the mattress instead. If you accidentally invested in Citi, Deutsche, BlueOrchard, responsAbility, Incofin or Standard Chartered, ask for it back toute suite. If you donated to Oxfam Novib or Grameen Foundation, sue them. And if you’re the Dutch regulator, get out of bed.

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ASN Bank’s “Ethical” Microfinance

ASN Bank was badly implicated in my book. They failed to make a single comment until KRO-Reporter exposed their activities on September 28th 2012. For anyone still labouring under the belief that this is an ethical bank, watch the documentary, read the book, and read their lame response (Dutch available here, English below). Not only do they fail to answer any of the questions sensibly, but they avoid the central claims of the book with painstaking precision. Below I provide a transcript of the Q&A between ASN Bank and KRO-Reporter (my translation) and my comments.

Triple Jump had previously attempted to refute the claims in the book, privately – no public comment to date. Noted Indian microfinance expert Ramesh Arunachalam (author of the definitive text on Indian microfinance) published their response, which I then annihilated. It appears these Dutch players don’t really know how to answer the questions they now face. The documentary has already led to nine questions addressed to the Dutch government, which I will address in a subsequent post. The pressure is mounting on ASN Bank, Triple Jump and Oxfam Novib. They better get used to facing questions.

KRO-Reporter introduction:
ASN Bank, with the ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund that invests in MFIs, chose not to respond to the findings of KRO-Reporter on camera. However, the bank was willing to reply in writing to questions.

KRO-Reporter question:
On 17 April 2009, Godwin Ehigiamusoe from  LAPO [Nigerian microfinance institution] was a guest speaker at a meeting of ASN investment funds in the Beurs van Berlage in Amsterdam. The meeting concluded with a question and answer session. From the audience came the following question:

“The essential battle is to lift the poor out of poverty, and I think everyone in this room trusts their money with the ASN Novib fund is a good cause. Now if you actually look at the actual cost that LAPO is charging poor Nigerian women you will see that this is approximately 110 percent per year when you consider all the costs. (….) So LAPO is basically one of the most expensive MFI’s that there is, and one of the most profitable. So my question to all or you is: Is poverty alleviation really happening at these interest rates?”

The report of this meeting on the website of ASN Bank states that “the meeting ended with a lively question and answer session.” About the question quoted above, however, there is no mention in the report on the website. Why not?

ASN Bank answer:
ASN Bank provides on its website a summary report of the meeting of the ASN Investment Funds. This meeting is attended by relevant and critical investors / participants of the various funds. Also at the meeting of the ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund there are therefore always many critical questions, including on the interest rates that the clients of MFIs pay. This one question is no exception. In addition, all minutes of meetings are retrievable for participants / investors. The report is thus intended to provide a general impression, the minutes to give a full report on all parts and questions discussed.

Hugh comment: The minutes were censored because ASN Bank had been caught red-handed exploiting the poor. The question was extremely embarrassing for ASN Bank at the time – I was there, I know. It remains extremely embarrassing for them to this day. However, this was alas the beginning of the criticisms against Holland’s leading “ethical” bank. The original question can be heard in the documentary, or on my website.

 
KRO-Reporter question:
A little less than three months after the said meeting in the July issue of Spaarmotief [ASN Bank promotional magazine for investors] appears an interview with Mark of Doesburgh, director of Triple Jump, the organization that on behalf of the ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund gave a loan of 1 million to the Nigerian bank LAPO. The question of ASNs Spaarmotief reads: “How much interest do borrowers pay?” To which van Doesburgh answers: “That is quite high, typically 25 to 30 percent.”

ASN Bank holds transparency in high esteem. Spaarmotief is one of the main channels of communication between the bank and its clients. Would it not have been, in light of that which was discussed at the meeting of April 2009, more honest if Spaarmotief had reported that sometimes there are interest rates above 100 percent? Or did ASN Bank have no knowledge of the level of interest that LAPO was charging its borrowers? If ASN Bank was aware of this, when and how, did ASN Bank inform participants in the ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund?

ASN Bank answer:
The ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund is informed about interest rates by Triple Jump, even at that time in the case of LAPO. We understand that Van Doesburgh refers to an average rate here. That average rate at that time was based on a calculation of 555 MFIs. For a balanced picture, as was reported, he has not referred to a lower interest rate or higher interest rate.

Hugh comment: Mark van Doesburgh, CEO of Triple Jump, is yet to produce the original credit committee documents presented to ASN Bank. Nor have ASN Bank. In these documents it is interesting to observe the stated interest rates that they claimed LAPO was charging, which had been confirmed by two previous ratings by an independent rating agency (MicroRate) and were confirmed by two additional ratings performed by a separate rating agency shortly afterwards. The last rating quoted a report by a US-based NGO called MFTransprency, whose sole focus is reporting accurate interest rates. MFTransparency confirmed the interest rates reached as high as 144%. ASN Bank were well aware of these interest rates, as I had informed them in writing. To suggest they were unaware of the interest rates charged by LAPO defies all demonstrable evidence. Oxfam Novib, their partner in the ASN Novib fund, openly acknowledge this. Triple Jump was deliberately attempting to cover up the real interest rates charged by LAPO with full knowledge of senior management at ASN Bank. When the New York Times subsequently investigated LAPO and visited them on-site, their front-page article confirmed a current interest rate of 126%. A number of investors pulled out of LAPO as a consequence of this revelation. Not ASN Bank.

But, are we to interpret from ASN Bank’s answer that they were fully aware of the actual interest rates charged by LAPO? If so, this is perhaps more worrying still. They approved the investment, and invited the LAPO CEO to Holland as a guest speaker, fully aware of the exploitation taking place. If they were fully aware, then this has far-reaching implications for the Dutch government. Presumably Oxfam Novib were also fully aware (they co-formed the fund), and thus Dutch public sector funding was knowingly provided to LAPO despite these interest rates? This is a specific question asked by the politicians.

ASN Bank answer (cont’d):
To participants in the microcredit fund it is explained in every way – from the website of ASN Bank to the customer magazine – that microcredit is not a panacea, but that it can be a first step towards a better life for the poorest. That too high interest rates herewith can be a problem, is then taken and explained. The many critical questions that were raised and are raised at the general meeting of shareholders are a direct result of this.

Hugh comment: nonsense. Where is a single public acknowledgement of the interest rates charged by LAPO? That Triple Jump knew these clearly is well-known. That ASN Bank and Oxfam Novib knew these is well known. When and where did ASN Bank inform their investors that funds were being on-lent to poor Nigerian women at rates of 126%? When and where did Oxfam Novib advise their donors or the Dutch government that their funds were being used in such a manner? Note that these players are all signatories of the SMART Campaign. The third client protection principle relates specifically to transparent pricing, the fourth to affordable credit.

 
KRO-Reporter question:
How does ASN Bank in retrospect judge the loan of 1 million from the ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund to LAPO now that it is clear that this Nigerian MFI gives out loans with interest rates which were calculated as  126 percent (Report Planet Rating 2009) to 144 percent (report MFTransparancy / Chuck Waterfield 2009)?

ASN Bank answer:
Microfinance is a young industry where many actors have learned their lessons. That is the same for ASN Bank as for other investment funds. Triple Jump back in 2009 together with other investors took the initiative to request LAPO in writing to improve a number of things, to which LAPO has responded (including a substantial reduction in the interest rate).

Hugh comment: This is factually false. LAPO did decrease its interest rates, but it increased other costs to the client that led to an overall increase in the cost of capital to the poor. The exact description in the Planet Rating report states: “The decrease in interest rates coupled with the increase in the level of cash collateral, resulted in an increase in the Effective Interest Rate (EIR) for the clients to 125.9 percent from 114.3 percent.” This point is explicitly acknowledged by Oxfam Novib in the documentary, although ASN Bank deny it here, in writing. Or were they unaware of even a publicly rated rating report?

ASN Bank answer (cont’d):

In a broader sense, since then, in collaboration with many other actors, models and principles have been designed to promote transparency and protect customers. This is done by measuring the social performance of MFIs where Triple Jump is one of the forerunners in  (tailoring products to the needs of the customer, the range of women and customers in rural areas, and meeting the “Client Protection Principles “- seven principles to treat clients of MFIs in a transparent, respectful and responsible way). Triple Jump was also one of the co-financiers at the start of MFTransparency, which provides transparency on the effective interest rate to end customers.

Hugh comment: Triple Jump did indeed finance MFTransparency, who are precisely the same institution that ironically proved the elevated interest rates charged by LAPO in 2011 reaching 144%. Regarding the social performance of LAPO, the reports repeatedly mention chronic client desertion and no social impact. It is true that these institutions endorsed the Client Protection Principles. It does not appear true that they enforced them

ASN Bank answer (cont’d):
In this regard, since the end of the loan in 2009 LAPO has changed much, especially because of  the realization that things could be done better. Also at LAPO itself by the way, because they are now regarded as one of the better MFIs in Africa. LAPO from then stood at the beginning of its development, and there were clearly some issues that needed to be improved. But those that want to help the world advance, must show courage, accept that some things turn out differently than one had hoped and draw the right lessons.

Hugh comment: LAPO has not changed much and ASN Bank pulled out of LAPO, despite it now apparently being one of the better MFIs in Africa. The interest rates remain some of the highest on Earth for a regulated bank, and abhorrent to most investors, most likely including ASN Bank investors who were deliberately misled by their bank. LAPO is not considered as one of the best banks in Africa, but as one of the most embarrassing cases of open exploitation the poor. It has been the subject of documentaries, books, featured in numerous articles, and generally considered a disgrace in the sector.

However, moving away from the activities of LAPO, the more interesting questions centres around ASN Bank itself.

ASN Bank was fully aware of the activities of LAPO prior to the AGM, and prior to the disclosures made in the book and documentary. It selected a questionable fund manager, Triple Jump, which remains managed to this day by two former Oxfam Novib staff member. The chairman of the board of Triple Jump is Ab Engelsman, former head of fund management at ASN Bank, chairman of the board of ASN Bank Foundation, as well as other senior posts. ASN Bank is a shareholder of Triple Jump, of course. The person who wrote the questionable Triple Jump credit committee documents presented to the ASN-Novib microfinance fund now works at…. ASN Bank. She also wrote the document presented by Triple Jump to Calvert Foundation successfully encouraging them to also invest in LAPO.

Ironically, if one examines what Oxfam Novib state about the investment in LAPO by the ASN-Novib fund, the picture is more clear. Theo Bouma, CEO of Oxfam Novib, specifically acknowledges that LAPO lied to Oxfam Novib regarding the interest rates, a claim that ASN Bank now deny, despite these being co-owners of the same fund.

The Dutch public have been exploited as much as the Nigerian poor. Oxfam Novib had the courage to admit incompetence, but ASN Bank continue to defend their integrity. The losers of this fraud are the Dutch tax-payer, the investors of ASN Bank, and the Dutch government. These are questionable and deceptive actors that should fall under the full legal scrutiny of the Dutch financial sector regulator, who has so far done nothing to regulate this sector. The future Queen of Holland, Princess Maxima, is the appointed spokesperson for the Dutch microfinance sector and has not made a single comment on this case, despite the activities in question taking place under her watch. It is therefore shameful, but also a source of hope, that two Dutch politicians have had the courage to formally demand answers to these accusations in the Dutch parliament.

According to the 2011 rating report, LAPO converted from an NGO to a private company. It had grown thanks in large part to Dutch public sector funding, provided by the Dutch tax-payer. When it converted to a private company, 12% of the shares were given to the CEO, Godwin Ehigiamusoe, who is a direct beneficiary of the generosity of the Dutch tax-payer. It can be stated no more clearly: Dutch tax-payers have been deceived into contributing to the private wealth of a corrupt Nigerian bank in the full knowledge of ASN Bank and Triple Jump. Well intentioned Dutch savers and pensioners invested in the ASN-Novib fund hoping to alleviate poverty. In fact their funds were used to exploit the poor with extortionate interest rates, enrich individual people, and done so in the full knowledge of the intermediaries they trusted. The Dutch government has remained a passive observer in this process, up until this point. The simple reason why microfinance has failed to produce any tangible impact upon poverty eradication is largely due to the fact that institutions such as ASN Bank and Triple Jump have chosen personal enrichment and exploitation of the poor over their stated developmental goals, and no regulator has cared to look over their shoulder.

My simple advice to any Dutch person reading this blog is as follows:

  1. If you are an investor or account holder at ASN Bank, withdraw your funds immediately, this is an unethical and deceptive institution of questionable integrity. They are willing to deceive you without hesitation, as clearly demonstrated and not actually refuted even by ASN Bank. If you would like to issue a formal complaint to ASN Bank, or demand answers to these claims, this is the link.
  2. If you have ever donated funds to Oxfam Novib, demand a prompt response to these allegations, without evading the obvious questions as ASN Bank has attempted. I could not find a complaints procedure on the Oxfam Novib website (despite this being one of the client protection principles they espouse for their MFI investments).
  3. Withdraw any funds from Triple Jump.
  4. Complain to your local politician, regardless of your political standpoint, about misappropriation of Dutch public sector funding in microfinance and the appalling acceptance of exploitative interest rates charged to the poor.
  5. Demand that you future Queen, Princess Maxima, takes a concerted stance against such activities.
  6. Insist upon full, formal, financial regulation of the Dutch microfinance sector.

A central premise of my book is that there is no means to ensure that the agents we trust to invest funds on our behalf for the benefit of the poor act in either our best interests or those of the poor. There is no practical regulator of microfinance funds in Holland. There is no means to obtain an independent rating of microfinance funds themselves. And yet there is substantial evidence of these funds acting inappropriately. When academics, journalists and practitioners criticize microfinance for “not working”, to what extent is this a problem with the microfinance model, and to what extent is this the fault of the intermediaries standing between us and the poor? This remains an open question, but my opinion is that these funds need to be regulated immediately, and the case of the troika of ASN Bank/Oxfam Novib/Triple Jump presents a clear case of why this is so urgently required.

In the event that ASN Bank and Oxfam Novib wish to continue investing in microfinance, my advice would be to select a better fund manager that does not engage in these activities. Holland has a number of fund managers, and not all should be tainted with the same brush as the troika. As I repeat on numerous occasions in my book, there are good and bad microfinance banks, as there are fund managers and P2P organisations. But as long as we accept an opaque, non-transparent and unregulated sector there is no means for the tax-payer, investor, saver, pensioner or government to distinguish between the good and the bad. And in the meantime the poor will continue to suffer under these practices, and the entire microfinance sector will be discredited by a few rogue operators. That would be a pity.

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Just Another Critical Microfinance Documentary?

Perhaps unsurprisingly I rather enjoyed the KRO-Reporter documentary. I won’t go through it in detail, it speaks for itself. That something is deeply wrong in the sector is beyond dispute. Anyone who still denies this is living in cuckoo land.

That large scale exploitation of the poor is taking place is a pity, but Chuck Waterfield’s comment was quite astounding, from a veteran microfinance practitioner:

“There’s 4 billion people living on less than 2 dollars a day. That’s [] two thirds of the world’s population. And the rich are very small, the very pinnacle of this pyramid. Some of what is happening in microfinance right now is a transfer of wealth, not the old-school ‘help the poor’ send money down to the bottom of the pyramid. We see a transfer of wealth from the bottom of the pyramid up to the very very top 1% of the pyramid. The rich getting richer off the very poorest in the world.”

There we have it, in a nutshell – welcome to commercial microfinance, the salvation of the poor! He’s referring to the the IPOs, the Holy Grail of the sector, what many of these MFIs are striving for, with their investors salivating in the background. This is the direction some are heading in and we all know it. Neither Chuck nor David nor I not anyone credible is suggesting all microfinance is bad, but concern is mounting over that portion which is.

Since the broadcast two Dutch politicians have asked questions to their government about what on Earth is going on in the Dutch microfinance sector, specifically with public funding. A valid question. Why didn’t the Dutch ambassador for microfinance, Princess Maxima, raise this issue? She hasn’t commented on the sorry state of her microfinance sector, with three of the largest institutions, Oxfam Novib, Triple Jump and ASN Bank looking frankly ridiculous, and instead politicians are now intervening. Surely she watched this documentary – it had her name in the title and was widely advertised?

Triple Jump themselves can’t be too pleased with this. I would love to have been a fly on the wall when their posse arrived in Barbados for the ForoMic (Latin America’s principle back-slapping microfinance conference for investors to hob-nob with one another and hatch unsophisticated plans to exploit more people and boost returns). The documentary aired just as things were getting started, publicly exposing a microfinance investment fund to a degree that is, as yet, unprecedented in the sector.

The microfinance funds congregating in Barbados must have been thinking “It’s not great for Triple Jump, but hey, they got caught once, could’ve happened to any of us”. Well, first of all, has it only happened once? Do we think really LAPO was an isolated case? As the Dutch politicians start sniffing around I predict that more dirt will emerge, as people start demanding answers to tough questions. Let’s see where else Triple Jump invested government funds. Let’s ask what other extortionate interest rates are being charged by Triple Jump investments and compare that to the information neatly presented to ASN Bank and Oxfam Novib. This ain’t over yet.

And what do the Americans think of Triple Jump managing their OPIC/Habitat fund? Are they convinced that the Dutch regulator will be keeping a close eye on their capital, catapuling people out of poverty by the dozen, in light of this emerging evidence?

The remainder of the documentary discusses a number of issues raised in my book specifically relevant to Holland. The broad impression is that microfinance is not all bad, but some applications of it are bad, and no one appears to be doing much about it.

So then we come to my favourite bit of the documentary. The producer asks the head of Oxfam Novib what he reckons about LAPO’s interest rates of 144%. Initially he suggests interest rates don’t actually matter. Does this guy not have a mortgage or a credit card? A slightly bizarre stance, but he swiftly changes his mind with the classic argument that if there is someone charging even higher rates, then 144% is ok, a logic pioneered by Grameen Foundation USA. He clearly has no idea what he is talking about. One can only assume that he doesn’t know that LAPO is incredibly profitable and suffers a chronic client desertion rate, as otherwise he is also in the land of the fairies – a serious concern given the amount of Dutch tax-payer money he apparently manages.

But then he begrudginly admits 144% is too high, and that they embarked on a failed attempt to encourage LAPO to reduce rates. LAPO told Oxfam Novib that they had reduced the rates, but this turned out to be a lie. Ooops.

Our friend Bouman fails to address two rather awkward issues. First, they had known about LAPO’s interest rates since at least 2007. Bruno Molijn, another Oxfam Novib veteran, had stormed into Triple Jump furious about these rates amongst other deceptions that Triple Jump had managed to present to him, but which were subsequently covered-up, until recently.

Maybe Bouman was unaware of all this? He should read my book to find out what is actually going on at Oxfam Novib. But what about the fact that his trusted fund manager, Triple Jump, openly stated to its investors in their newsletter that the rates charged by their MFIs were a mere 25% to 30%, shortly after they were revealed openly in the AGM of the ASN-Novib fund? Ooops, he must have missed that also.

Until this point Oxfam Novib simply look incompetenent, but then comes the tour de force, Ab Engelsman. He bounds in like a locomotive train. Apparently one must first look at the income of an MFI prior to the interest rates the poor are paying – debatable, but when LAPO was so visibly profitable, shouldn’t that have rung an alarm bell immediately? Where did he think this profit was coming from?

Then Engelsman changes his mind, in fact the clients’ needs do come first. A slip of the tongue perhaps? Engelsman’s logic runs as follows: because the repayment rates were high, the clients must be benefitting. So why were they fleeing the institution in droves? It’s apparently only us in the west that have an ethical problem with extortionate interest rates. Oxfam Novib had just stated that LAPO had lied to them, as proved fairly succinctly in an independent rating report by Planet Rating that Bouman referred to. So the producer asks Englesman if he feels they were screwed by LAPO?

“No, I personally don’t. As Triple Jump, I also think not. No.”

(KRO-Reporter)

“Would you, with the knowledge you have now, again provide a loan to LAPO?”

(Engelsman)

“Not to the LAPO as it was back then, but yes to the current LAPO.”

There is neither the faintest attempt to get their stories straight, nor to apply logic in his responses. LAPO did not screw Triple Jump apparently, although Oxfam Novib disagree, so why did Triple Jump pull out of LAPO? And if Engelsman is correct, and LAPO had not screwed them, he concedes that he would not invest in “LAPO as it was back then”. Why not?

But now he would invest in LAPO. It’s just non-sensical. There’s no need for any forensic analysis of these comments, they defy the basic laws of logic.

So, an institution that has lied to investors, exploited hundreds of thousands of poor African women, operated illegally for years, is riddled with nepotism and frauds, suffered the first ever rating withdawal in microfinance history, boasts massive client desertion and been the subject of untold controversy blighting the entire microfinance sector is, in Engelsman’s informed opinion, ripe for a Triple Jump investment using public and private sector funding. I am not sure what one can say in response to this. But I am not surprised the politicians are asking questions.

In fact, I have a few suggestions to improve this mess. Firstly, Engelsman should urgently reconsider his position as chairman of the board of Triple Jump. Alas he is also head of the Netherlands Microfinance Platform, a position he should also review. The relatively ethical fund Oikocredit also has him sitting on their board too – they should resolve this immediately. And he sits on the ASN Foundation board also, but that’s of less concern – they only squander their own money.

Hopefully, if the Dutch have the slightest desire to clean up their sector, they need to put sensible people in charge of these institutions who are willing and able to clean up the mess and be a little more transparent in their operations.

But he’s not the only problem. Triple Jump isn’t going to clean up its act simply because it has a new chairman. ASN Bank and Oxfam Novib should review their choice of fund manager as soon as possible, appologise for their previous mistakes, and attempt to re-brand themselves with some actual ethical criteria. ASN Bank has a wide choice of fund managers to chose from in Holland, some of which are actually quite competent. The Dutch government should intervene, and threaten to cut public funding to Oxfam Novib unless they select a competent fund manager. Simple as that.

Engelsman will go, but Triple Jump will stay. It will be carefully brushed under the carpet, perhaps a little slap on the wrist. Of course Maxima is not going to say anything – what can she do? Admit that a major part of the entire Dutch microfinance sector has been operating “opaquely” under her watch? A future queen of Holland cannot make such an admission. The politicians may be able to increase the heat a little, but will they actually prompt change amongst the Triple Jump/ASN Bank/Oxfam Novib clique? I hope so.

Well done KRO-Reporter for rocking the boat.

We’ve created a monster. It has inertia. No one wants to rock the boat any further. So I will.

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Blah-2-Blah

A random traveller from Kiva’s Milepoint team (a group of people who like flying and have lent about $4m through Kiva) contacted me a week ago suggesting I join some online video chat with Kiva and ask them a tricky question. Kiva had refused to join me in a live radio show in their home town, San Francisco, although two other US-based MF networks did call in, Zidisha and Opportunity Network. Respect. It was a fun debate.

Anyway, why not ask Premal a question? I figured I’d keep it simple: why haven’t you guys responded to the allegations in the book? The comedian host (literally) seemed confused initially, but Premal picked up the (not entirely subtle) thread. His response is interesting. The entire thing can be watched here, from minute 50. I warn the listener that the video is pretty tedious, I personally wouldn’t have called it Kiva Insights, so I’ve copied Premal’s response to the question here:

So Hugh it’s good to finally talk to you in person, we reached out to you by email but got no response… Hugh Sinclair is the author of a book that is critical of microfinance and is critical of Kiva, I think there’s a lot of real valuable criticisms in the book, actually, but then I think there’s a lot of things in the book that probably weren’t as well researched and that I don’t agree with, and Hugh, I’d welcome a conversation with you at any point, to basically inform you about some of the things that we think are inaccurate, but also the general spirit of what you are trying to do  which is, um, in microfinance too much of a good thing can be bad, and credit needs to be used responsibly, and there’s a real important role for all of us to not only just be overly-excited, but to be sceptical, and to make sure we are really doing our due diligence, there are times in Kiva’s history where, you know, I think we got it wrong, or we maybe weren’t as careful as we should have been, and as a learning growing organisation that helps basically point out the areas that we need to invest in more. So Hugh, you have a really important role in this sector, because if we are all overly zealous and happy all the time I think we miss opportunities for real improvement, and the stakes are too high, especially with issues like over-indebtedness, which we saw here in the US, so we are starting to screen for that, and starting pull out of certain markets, and that’s what’s categorising the client credit limits. Looking at things like Client Protection and how we can get beyond being just people endorsing things like fair pricing and fair collection practices to actually how do we verify that, and so part of the borrower verification process that Kiva fellows do, which is they randomly sample a group of clients posted on the website in addition to making sure that the data on the website is true that that person exists, that the loan amount is really what was posted on the website, they’re starting to ask questions around about “how do you feel you are treated?” and basically if we start seeing deviations from the norm that’s an opportunity for us to double-click and start asking deeper questions on that partner, and we really want to lead the charge as investors to keep our MFIs accountable. So Hugh, you know, Matt Flannery, my Kiva co-founder and CEO I think reached out to you, we’d love to have a conversation with you to figure out how we can actually start addressing some of the issues that you bring up. Thanks for your question.

So, first of all, hat off to Kiva for taking the question, hat off for actually pretending to answer it. I have little respect for most of those implicated in the book that have made absolutely no comment whatsoever, these guys rose to the challenge. With some caveats.

First of all, neither Premal nor Matt Flannery ever tried to contact me. I am hardly a difficult person to reach, the website is written across the back cover of the book, visible in any Google search, and the email is clearly on the website. The most random people have managed to contact me since the book was published. The publisher is also based in San Francisco and well-known. And I’ve been in touch with these guys over the years, as explained in the book in some fairly graphic detail. So, it’s simply untrue that they’ve tried to contact me. Perhaps a mis-communication?

Suggesting the text was poorly researched is strange. It was peer-reviewed, vetted by two separate sets of lawyers, is heavily annotated, and remains unchallenged to this day.

So, the question was why Kiva hadn’t responded to the issues raised in the book, and my main concern with Premal’s answer is that he didn’t respond to any of the issues raised in the book. So, in terms of answering the question, a low score. What are the issues that remain outstanding?

  • Why did Kiva ignore information about specific Kiva client exploitation at LAPO when presented with firm data demonstrating this to be the case?
  • In spite of this information, which was accepted by Kiva, why did Kiva continue to take funds from the (predominantly US) general public to the tune of $5m, with LAPO becoming the biggest Kiva partner?
  • Why deny the charges of the NYT (“We’ve grown comfortable over time with [LAPOs] approach”) and then pull out of LAPO a fortnight later?
  • How come they can lend to cock-fighting rackets and coca leaf salesman if these activities are illegal under California state law? It’s “traditional” apparently.
  • Any comment on the flawed repayment rates (MFI repayment rates are lower, but MFIs boost them in order to keep Kiva happy and maintain the flow of interest-free capital)? This even made it to the Kiva Wikipedia page.
  • Doubts over whether all the clients actually exist.
  • Kiva is a brutally inefficient way to channel capital to the poor compared to a microfinance fund, which may be excusable if Kiva were a P2P, but is it?
  • What’s with the vast buffer of uninvested Kiva user funds and cash sitting idle generating a tidy income to Kiva ($42m according to latest statements)?
  • Why do Mexican’s pay 10x more for a loan than Americans? Are default rates lower in Mexico than the US, and operating costs higher?

But, I guess my main question relates to Kiva’s refusal to publish the interest rates on the actual loans, and stick doggedly to the portfolio yield, which everyone in the sector knows is a fairly meaningless, easily manipulated and self-reported statistic. Other P2Ps manage to post the interest rate to two decimal places, at the individual loan level, and if Kiva is a P2P, capable of producing all manner of stories, photos and details about the client, why not the interest rate? This question is not simply interesting because the rate might be 85.65% instead of 84%, a mere detail, but because it actually cuts to the heart of the Kiva lending model.

I do not believe Kiva is fundamentally about lending money to poor people, but about giving Americans a nice fluffy feeling that they’re doing something useful. What actually happens in the field to the poor is well documented elsewhere – the overall impact is approximately zero.

But the impact is not zero to the Milepoint folk, Kiva Christians ($5.3m) or Team Europe ($2.7m) – these folk actually believe they are making a difference, and pay Kiva handsomely for the service (via donations and interest earned on idle funds). Hundreds of Kiva volunteers run around the planet apparently eradicating poverty with interest rates to the poor often approaching 100%, and no one has managed to find much supporting evidence for this being particularly helpful to the poor. Many of the MFIs that use Kiva have quit, or been closed down, for some unknown reason, most likely related to the fact that the benefit of obtaining interest-free credit is not sufficient to justify the hassle of dealing with Kiva. Capital may cost 10%, but how much does it cost to go to the field, write the little story, translate it, hire a few people in the MFI, fill out all the forms, have volunteers pestering you the whole time?

But, I applaud the fact that Kiva are attempting to improve this. They need to be careful to do so in such a way as to not render their model entirely unattractive to the MFIs, particularly when the microfinance funds are sitting on piles of uninvested funds that they are desperate to lend at reducing rates. My forays onto Kivafriends proved utterly pointless: as with the over-arching analogy in the book about the microfinance devotees operating with cult-like fanaticism, it is impossible to prompt change at such institutions. I pleaded with Kiva to investigate LAPO because I had seen, first hand, the exploitation that was taking place. I had the original repayment schedules of some Kiva clients proving the rates these poor women were actually paying (versus the 24% cited on Kiva at the time). One of Kiva’s first donors urged them to listen, and all the evidence that emerged since demonstrated beyond doubt that this was entirely valid information, confirmed by the NYT and four rating reports, and Kiva did eventually pull out. Being armed with the truth, with evidence, with facts, is simply not enough, especially with $5m in play. They cannot play the ignorance card – that is their problem – they knew what was going on and turned a blind-eye, simple as that.

I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again, there is a total mis-alignment of interests between the poor, the ultimate investors and the intermediaries employed to bridge the two. Kiva acts in its own best interests, as do all the intermediaries, and there is no reason to suppose these match the interests of the investors or the poor. This is so well documented in finance that it has its own title, the principle-agent problem, which apparently doesn’t apply in microfinance. Gibberish.

The only way to reign in these folk is full, formal regulation. Kiva is an investment fund in all but name. Just because it doesn’t pay interest to lenders and operates under the guise of an NGO and takes deposits as low as $25 doesn’t change the essence of the activity, so why not regulate them? Sure, regulation is not perfect, as US citizens are well aware. But is total lawlessness a solution? For as long as Kiva can take funds from the unwitting general public, pump them to dodgy banks in Nigeria or to cock-fighting rackets in Peru, I remain sceptical of any claims that the US financial sector is remotely sensibly regulated.

My anonymous buddy at Milepoint made an interesting comment: “I am suggesting using more tact in approach, but tact does not seem to be one of your demonstrated strengths (as illustrated by your blog and essentially calling myself and almost a million other Kiva lenders stupid (though not to worry on a personal level, I thought it funny and my skin is pretty think anyway.”

I acknowledge the comment regarding my tact, but I don’t think the Kivans are stupid. I think they are ill-informed, well-meaning, naive, don’t look into matters particularly deeply, don’t understand the often brutal reality of microfinance in the field, are bombarded with nice looking photos and stories and spin, and trust their intermediaries blindly.

So, Kiva, if you want to respond to the claims in the book, do so here. Not to other claims, those in the book. It you want to promote Kiva, please chose a different venue. The book’s available on Amazon if you haven’t read it yet (may as well secure an additional book sale here!).

To the Kivans – start asking just slightly intelligent questions about what is actually happening with your money, and start with demanding what the interest rate is. Plenty of P2Ps can tell you this simple fact, because they are actually doing what they claim, so consider switching platform until Kiva can sort out this gaping hole. Or are you of the mind that the poor don’t care about interest rates, as some claim? If so, I give up. You also might want to pick up the book (bang – another million sales!).

To the armies of volunteers, if you want to learn about microfinance go volunteer at an MFI. It might not be so 21st-century-dot-com-California-cool, but what’s your goal?

And to the regulators: wake up.

I’ll end this post with a quote from the House of Representatives hearing, by a gentleman called Wagane Diouf of Mecene Investments, who was called to testify:

“I get seriously worried when these institutions [MFIs] start mobilizing funds from institutions that attract capital from individuals in the US and other western countries, such as, um, I won’t mention their name, but institutions that have web-driven mechanisms to attract investments, but the financial reporting of the institutions that are receiving these funds are not up to standard at all, they are very poorly regulated, it’s a very opaque part of the industry.”[emphasis added]

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Dutch Chickens Come Home to Roost

On September 28th the Dutch investigative TV show KRO-Reporter broadcast a documentary about the Dutch microfinance investment sector, based loosely around my book. Below I provide an English transcript of the entire documentary. This is not an official translation and has not been approved by KRO. I will post a Spanish translation shortly, and will comment on this in a seperate post.

(Jos Slats)

Once upon a time there was a princess with a big warm heart, she was beautiful AND she understood finance. Princess Maxima wanted to help poor people with small loans. With such a microcredit they could start small businesses and escape their abject poverty. Tireless, the princess travelled the world to promote her ideals. Microcredit became a big success. But then the story takes a turn for the worse. That’s the way it goes in fairytales.

Reporter Theme Music

(Jos)

Spring 2009, in Amsterdam the yearly shareholders meeting is taking place of the ASN Bank investment funds, you know , that socially motivated Bank for the World of Tomorrow that makes such a sharp distinction between good and bad money.

Short Fragment of Dutch Song about money

(Jos)

Guest of honour is Godwin Ehigiamusoe from Nigeria, founder and director of the microfinance institution LAPO.  LAPO gives small loans to hundreds of thousands of poor people. ASN Bank has invested 1 million Euro in his organization. Ehigiamusoe is given ample space to talk about his social engagement and the good work that LAPO is doing. Of course he is given a thunderous applause.

A little bit later, during question time, a young woman in the room stands up and this is what she wants to know from Godwin Ehigiamusoe:

“If you look at the actual cost that LAPO is charging poor Nigerian women, you see that it is approximately 110%  per year when you consider all the costs. So LAPO is basically one of the most expensive MFIs that there is and one of the most profitable. Now my question is to all of you, is poverty alleviation really happening at these interest rates? Thank you.”

More than 100% interest? Oops, they were not anticipating that question….

Hugh Sinclair, a 38 year old British microfinance advisor, is a witness of this embarrassing moment in Amsterdam.

(Hugh Sinclair)

“After the question was asked the CEO attempted to answer the question but was very caught off guard, he didn’t know what to say, he was completely shocked at the question, and tried to explain it but really was unable and at a certain point one the panellists, I forget whether it was Triple Jump or ASN, stood up and called an immediate coffee break. “

(Jos)

Sinclair is more than a coincidental witness. In 2007 the young British banker works for Triple Jump in Amsterdam, a company that manages the microfinance funds of Oxfam Novib and ASN Bank among others. With the money of these organizations, Triple Jump makes large investments in LAPO. From the outset Sinclair tries to convince his employer that LAPO is no good. That LAPO, by charging extremely high interest rates, is guilty of usury. That criticism is internally not much appreciated.

(Hugh)

“I was offered a pay rise to continue working for them as a consultant, on the condition that I signed a series of additional confidentiality clauses, very restrictive confidentiality clauses, preventing me from discussing anything with anyone ever basically. I was also given seven days to sign this letter and return it, otherwise they would seek to fire me by taking me to court in Holland”.

(Jos)

“So Triple Jump wanted to shut you up?”

(Hugh)

“It was pretty clear that they wanted to shut me up.”

(Jos)

But Sinclair does not allow himself to be shut up. He does NOT sign. And that costs him his job at Triple Jump.

(Hugh)

“The bottom line is simply that there is mass exploitation happening and I just eventually tired of this and something had to be done and I’m prepared to suffer the consequences of that because I think that is  what is required to do to clean up this sector.”

(Jos)

And now he has written a book. Confessions of a microfinance heretic.  A kind of anti-fairytale book about how the big bad wolves ran off with princess Maxima’s ideals.

(Hugh)

“I believe that for microfinance to be effective, interest rates charged to the poor have to be much lower than they currently are. They have to be genuinely reasonable in order to give the poor a fighting chance of actually growing their businesses. Now the problem with such interest rates is that low interest rates mean lower profit, lower profit means investors are less willing to invest. The problem with microfinance is if you want to do it well and effectively it’s not super profitable.”

(Jos)

The rise of microfinance starts in the seventies of the previous century. In Bangladesh economist Muhammad Yunus gives out small loans to poor women. We are talking about amounts of 25 to 50 dollars, not more. But that turns out to be enough to start small businesses and to gain an income. Sufficient income to repay the loan, pay a little bit of interest and also some personal gain. That is microfinance in all its simplicity. Soon enough the concept is being copied around the world.

(Chuck Waterfield)

“I remember walking out and giving that first 200 dollars to a shoemaker, a male shoemaker, wondering if and how he might ever return that money and he never missed a payment and all the rest of the clients almost nobody every missed a payment. It was in many ways startling, you know, we expected defaults, we expected people to struggle and instead we found mysteriously almost the exact opposite.”

(Jos)

In Baltimore we visit Chuck Waterfield, a true microfinance veteran from the United States. Thirty years ago he first experimented with small loans financed with money from charity.

(Chuck Waterfield)

“The idea, oh this is the magic bullet, wow, here we were, you know, we are loaning, we are not giving anything, we are making a loan, we are teaching people some training, and we’re getting all the loan money back and that was seen as really exciting because the poor were benefitting by our beliefs and the institution would not need to continue, would not need to depend on grants to stay alive and continue to help more and more of the poor. The poor around the world are almost, the vast majority of them are self-employed, there’s no safety net. If you can’t go and get a salaried job the government doesn’t give you a safety net so your only alternative, the alternative of the poor is to start your own business. Not even start but to have your own business. So we look around and there is self-employed everywhere. You walk through the markets and they are all self-employed, you look at the welders, the carpenters, the shoemakers, the tailors, all self-employed, and what we, sort of the obvious that occurred to us is that these businesses need capital. And so we started, this was the experiment, we would go up to those that already had a business , see what they would do with a little extra money and then they would put that money in their business  generating additional income and that’s how they could pay back the loan plus interest. “

(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“ A loan, we discovered kind of by accident in the last 20 or 30 years, a loan allows many of these people to sort of bring their entrepreneurial talent to the fore and to start producing, to start creating wealth. And that is really the key word: creating wealth. If microcredit doesn’t create wealth, then forget it, it’s for the birds.”

(Jos)

Another veteran, Damian von Stauffenberg, a nephew of Klaus von Stauffenberg, the man who in 1944 bombed Hitler. Damian von Stauffenberg is the founder of MicroRate a bureau in Arlington Virginia that vets and scrutinizes microcredit providers worldwide.

(Jos)

“This is about fighting poverty and making money at the same time, one could say that is asking for trouble.”
(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“Yes, one could say that but you kind of make me think of something Churchill said about democracy, I can’t put it together literally, I can only paraphrase it. I think it is something like, it is a terrible system but it is better than all the alternatives. And then I would say the same when you mix capitalism, which is really what you are alluding to, with microfinance. It is not pretty, it is very hard to have a warm cuddly feeling about it but when you see the alternatives they are worse.”

(Jos)

In the first years microfinance is mainly financed with charity money. Giving loans to poor people? The financial sector is having none of it. With the exception of Triodos Bank.

(Marilou, Triodos Bank)

“Almost 20 years ago we were indeed, yes I think we were the first bank that on a worldwide scale started doing this and at the time this was quite unorthodox. The sector was still in its infancy but we thought it important to do it”.

(Jos)

“And how did the banking sector respond to this at the time?”

(Marilou)

“At that time microfinance was very little known and sometimes people responded with disbelief because it wasn’t clear at all back then that people at the bottom of the pyramid on the one hand were able to repay credits and on the other hand there were sceptical reactions to the fact that people would be interested in saving money. In that period it was quite a new thing.”

(Jos)

“When did this change?”

(Marilou)

“Actually the last 10 years this has changed, the sector  has lived through a huge development, and especially the last 10 years this has really changed.”

(Jos)

The United Nations declare 2005 as the year of Microcredit and in 2006 the inventor of the small loan, Muhammad Yunus from Bangladesh, receives the Nobel Peace Prize.

(Fragment Nobel Ceremony)

“I call upon the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate of 2006, Muhammad Yunus, to come forward to receive the gold medal and the diploma.”

(Jos)

Microcredit becomes a fashion, then the established financial order starts to realize that money can be made with poverty alleviation. A LOT of money.

(Chuck Waterfield)

“The milestone, the event that changed, sort of the earthquake of microfinance was in April of 2007, 5 years ago, Compartamos in Mexico did an IPO. They had already been making very large profits, the figure we used, the return on investment, return on equity was over 50%, every year, year after year after year for about 7 years.  How do you do that? Charging women over 100% and making very large profits, 50% again and so that is what got the attention of the investment world and so a very different kind of money started to flow in, you might even argue, flood into microfinance.”

(Fragment of publicity: Compartamos banco, tu especialista en microfinanzas).

(Hugh)

“Compartamos orginally started off as a charity organization receiving donor funding from a number of institutions but in particular USAID and ACCION, the American microfinance network. And as the institution grew at a certain point it decided to transform, as it is called in the sector, into a for-profit company. This is a common trick used by microfinance institutions that they start off as a small charity serving the poor and presenting themselves as a normal charity and they receive donor funding and when they reach a certain scale they are able to convert, give shares to the various donors or investors or in many cases senior management and become a for-profit company and realize all the gains that they have made as an NGO suddenly effectively becomes privatized and Compartamos is one of the first examples of that. “

(David Roodman)

“The Microfinance Bank in Mexico, called Compartamos went public, and the founders became millionaires and other organizations made millions of dollars, most of the organizations were non-profit, they weren’t  nobody, but it still was very controversial that all this money was being made ultimately off of poor people .”

(Jos)

David Roodman of the Center for Global Development in Washington hits the nail on the head: non-profit organizations that earn large sums of money over poor people’s backs and then change into a normal commercial company. Issuing shares earns the founders and donors of Compartamos 500 million dollars.

(Chuck Waterfield)

“What they did was an IPO and again a secondary IPO means that  instead of doing it to raise money to put into the institution to then have more resources and grow, it was a cash-out IPO, the money went out into the pockets of private individuals and the original stock holders. The total worth of the company the day of the IPO was over 2 billion US dollars. Now, in the year 2000 when they created Compartamos they put in a total of 6 million US dollars of equity.  In 2000, there’s  6 million dollars, in 2007 it went from 6 million to 2 billion. That is over a 300 to 1 return on investment, again a cash-out IPO. So I put in a million dollars, OK, in 2000 and then I wait 7 years and then all of a sudden my million dollars are worth 300 million dollars. That’s the day that microfinance really changed. We drew the attention of a very different audience of funding source, we were barely on the radar prior to that IPO and after the IPO sort of every investment bank was forming a committee to explore and investigate you know, where is the next Compartamos.”

(Jos)

Lending money to the poor… while the established financial order first is having none of it, now everyone wants a slice of the cake.  Banks, investors, pension funds all of a sudden all want to invest. Microcredit is HOT! THE alternative to the traditional, expensive development assistance. In the meantime Muhammad Yunus transforms into a kind of pop star, guest of honour at the festival Roskilde in Denmark where 100.000 delirious concert-goers cheer him on for an extended period.

(Fragment of Yunus at Roskilde saying: “I feel at home completely”). Only after that Coldplay is allowed to take the stage.

(Chuck Waterfield)

“What do we find in country after country  after country is that the market starts to saturate, you end up with a larger and larger number of MFIs who are loaning in the same towns, the same villages, loaning to the same people and you find study after study of clients taking on more, multiple loans, OK, I don’t even, I don’t blame them. We have a growth mentality; we, the institutions all want to double their number of clients each year and the institution across the street and down the street also are looking to double their clients every year. So we tell our loan officers, go out and put more money, put more loans out there.”

(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“Whether you are poor or whether you are rich, if somebody offers you a loan and you are short of money, you are going to take it. Look at the banking crisis here, look at the credit card… bubble you might call it that we have here in Europe, it is not much different. That’s just part of human nature. If lenders are eager to lend to you and sort of push the money down your throat you are not going to close your mouth, you are going to take it.”

(Hugh)

“I would see women coming into the institution often illiterate, they didn’t understand really what they were doing, they would sign the contract with a fingerprint because they couldn’t read and write and they would receive a loan which was apparently going to help them out of poverty but at the interest rates which they were being charged there was very little likelihood of this actually happening in practice unfortunately.”

(David Roodman)

“I do worry with credit because credit as we know is a very dangerous thing. Within one area, you know, say the state of Andhra Pradesh, in India a whole lot of MFIs almost racing each other to see how fast they could grow. Right. And so, I met some villagers outside of the capital of Andhra Pradesh, which is Hyderabad. They told me how a few years ago there was maybe one or two micro lenders in their village. And suddenly that jumped to five.  Because these new people showed up saying “please take our loans”. And so a lot of people were wise enough not to take the loans but some did and some used them in ways that would make it very difficult to pay back, like if they bought a television. Not all but some.  And so there is some percentage of people who made poor choices because of the easy money and then were put under a lot of stress.”

(Interview with woman from Andhra Pradesh)

“That evening I poured kerosene on myself and I was about to light a match, my husband broke the door and stopped me. There was commotion. The neighbours came around and consoled us. They said we shouldn’t have taken so many loans. Dying wouldn’t solve our problems. They told us to think of our two children. That night my husband and I had a big quarrel, we didn’t even have dinner. The next morning he took the buffalo to the field at 6 am and didn’t return for lunch. My father-in-law and I went to look for him. We found him hanged from a tree. He was dead. “

(Chuck Waterfield)

“India is very well documented. You know the stories of the suicides. One of the worst that I have seen details on is that she commits suicide by dousing herself in kerosene lighting on fire, her husband sees her, her husband tries to cover her and put it out and he’s killed too. And the kids loose both parents in a matter of minutes because of over indebtedness.”

(Jos)

Also in other countries the market overheats. Nicaragua is being inundated by micro lenders that all want to try to push on as many loans to the people as possible. Many poor cannot resist the temptation and get credit after credit, often paying high interest rates.  When they can no longer repay their debts and the micro lenders start expropriating them, the shit hits the fan! The population takes to the street to protest.

(Nicaraguan peasant)

“Well, we are here in Rio Blanco with this impasse. Because a law has been approved on microfinance institutions right, which basically ends this problem and we agree with this law because from now on it will regulate the financial system and above all the for-profit organizations. However, the law regulates starting now, but we need to remember that during the past 16 years these financial institutions were not regulated by the state and committed a number of abuses, such as high interest rates,  what we call default, we all know about this, and the eviction from properties.”

(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“It is always very dangerous if there is too much money around. In microfinance at the moment there is too much money. If MFIs have easy access to very cheap money, too much of it, it simply seduces them into becoming less and less cautious in lending.”

(Jos)

At the websites of credit providers we read about the amazing success stories, about a poor woman from Sri Lanka who with a small loan bought a sewing machine and now has her own business. Great, but microcredit also causes casualties.

(David Roodman)

“We shouldn’t just blame MFIs, we also need to blame ourselves. As donors we give money to charities, we are creating an evolutionary environment that rewards certain kinds of storytelling and exaggeration and penalizes realism. Right, and so we need to change how we give money and demand evidence, not just good stories. “

(Jos)

In 2008 The Netherlands’ second pension Fund ‘Zorg en Welzijn’  also joins microfinance. PGGM, the investor of the fund announces in a press release that they plan to make a serious investment.

(Else Bos,  PGGM)

“Originally we had planned to invest around 200 million”.

(Jos)

“We are now talking about 2008?”

(Else Bos)

“We are talking about 2008. In the end we were able to invest 40 million. By now we have taken out a big chunk of those investments, only about 10 million now remains.”

(Jos)

“Why so little?”

(Else Bos)

“That is because we struggled to find sufficient good investment opportunities. To find those players that showed sufficient stability, transparency, clarity in their processes which gave us the sense of trust that we were finding the kinds of investments that we were looking for in such a way that we wanted.”

(Jos)

“So initially PGGM started off feeling very confident but in practice it turned out to be a bit more tricky?”

(Else Bos)

“Yes, we started off full of confidence and ambition, and this ambition moreover we still have, but it was, we found it very tricky, yes.”

(Jos)

Not only PGGM is treading water, stichting DOEN, the charity vehicle of the Postcode Lottery among others, also hits the breaks.

(N Tellegen, DOEN)

“We are leaving the market of the smallest loans. We are retreating from it and we will no longer be giving out loans below 2000 dollars but we are really focusing on the next level up because there is another misconception within microfinance that everyone is an entrepreneur, and of course that is not the case. It is not the case here and it is also not the case there. And the consequence is thus that there are also people who have been given loans who are not able to set up their business and therefore you also get the serious over indebtedness and so we have chosen to focus on the slightly larger segment where you do often find true entrepreneurs. People with employees that offer work to precisely the poorest of the poor and you thus create a situation where you can contribute, in our eyes,  in a bigger way to economic development and this means that we have retreated from the smallest loans.”

(Jos)

“Stichting Doen also subsidizes Chuck Waterfield’s  ‘Microfinance Transparency’.  Why do you that?”

(N Tellegen, DOEN)

“Yes. Chuck Waterfield is a kind of gadfly, he is someone who publishes the details on loans, on what all the microfinance institutions are doing and with this he plays a very important role as a kind of whistle blower. The abuses in the sector are known but he makes sure that the whole world knows about this and with that investors will retreat from those parties that are operating in microfinance in an unethical way. In 2008 he contacted us and we subsidize him especially because we find it extremely important that microfinance and the provision of financial services remains a clean/unadulterated business, a sector in which you contribute to development with people’s best interests at heart and you make sure that those parties who have joined to earn lots of money are dealt with.”

(Chuck Waterfield)

“There’s 4 billion people living on less than 2 dollars a day. That’s the vast, that’s two thirds of the world’s population. And the rich are very small, the very pinnacle of this pyramid. Some of what is happening in microfinance right now is a transfer of wealth, not the old-school ‘help the poor’ send money down to the bottom of the pyramid. We see a transfer of wealth from the bottom of the pyramid up to the very very top 1% of the pyramid. The rich getting richer off the very poorest in the world.”

(Jos)

“Is it ethical to make profit on helping the poor?”

(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“Absolutely, yeah. I have no doubt about that. Because the emphasis here is on helping the poor, as long as you help them. Then it’s a win-win situation. The essential thing is that it be a win-win situation. That it’s not one person exploiting another for his own benefit.”

(Jos)

“When does it become unethical? Where do you draw the line?”

(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“It is not a line. It’s a broad, sort of grey band. Which is fairly, quite hard to draw. I can’t draw it. But I can intuitively say: look, if the interest rates go way up there into the three digits then we have probably crossed the line.”

(N Tellegen, DOEN)

“You see that parties have appeared on the market that charge 120/130% interest on loans.”

(Jos)

“What do you think of that?”

(N Tellegen, DOEN)

“Yes, I find that disgraceful. That is of course not the way in which we want to contribute to economic development and helping people to further develop their entrepreneurship. So we take a critical look at the interest rates and we also take a critical look at what the most important goal is to be operating therein, so what kind of attitude do the people behind the MFI have, are the investors only on board for the money? Because those are the people that want to make huge profits and therefore will charge such interest rates. “

(Chuck Waterfield)

“We can’t keep the loan sharks away from the poor. Can we keep the loan sharks away from what we call microfinance? If we don’t set really clear standards, and watch that like a hawk and watch it with transparency and rate everyone by objective criteria, and state really clearly who is in and who is out, we don’t certify, we’re dead. Then microfinance will just be sort of a little blip on the screen, on the timeline of history and money lending  to the poor which has been around since money was invented will continue actually in larger scale, larger scale then it was before.”

(Jos)

Hugh Sinclair has worked as an advisor for MFIs in Mexico, Ecuador, Mozambique and Mongolia. In 2006 he starts working for Triple Jump in Amsterdam, the manager of the microcredit funds of Oxfam Novib and ASN Bank among others. At the beginning of 2007 Triple Jump sends him on an assignment to LAPO in Nigeria, Godwin Ehigiamusoe’s club in which Oxfam Novib at that point had already invested 400.000 Euros. Triple Jump is about to provide new loans to LAPO.

(Hugh)

“So I flew down to Nigeria and discovered an institution which was charging extremely high interest rates, it was suffering a very high level of client desertion, clients were simply just leaving the institution after one, maybe two loans. The institution was in a complete chaos and had no internal control, no governance, it was run by a small group of family members all from that region of Nigeria. The computer systems that are designed to cope with the high volume of transactions and retain some sort of order within the institution, for all practical purposes, did not really exist. It was a completely chaotic institution. And with very little poverty impact.”

(Jos)

LAPO charges costs that can go up to no less than 144%. A poor Nigerian that borrows 100 Euro one year later has thus paid 244 Euro in interest and repayments. How can you even begin to explain that?, we ask Theo Bouma of Oxfam Novib, the charity organization that between 2005 and 2010 did business with LAPO.

(Theo Bouma, Oxfam Novib)

“When we start doing business with an organization that wants to give out loans to poor clients the first thing we look at is the height of interest rates.  And it doesn’t actually really matter if that is 60 or 80 or 100 or 140…

(Jos)

“Well, for the client that DOES matter.”

(Theo Bouma, Oxfam Novib)

“It has to go down. Wait, let me finish my story. Of course this is an important factor. If you look at Nigeria, because that is where this discussion is taking place, also back then it was a big discussion, try to put yourself in the shoes of a poor client. Say he wants to invest in a business, in his own business, he has several options, he can go to the loan sharks where he will pay 200/250%, then he goes to a national bank and he discovers that they keep their doors closed to poor clients, and when he does manage to get in he will pay much more than what LAPO is charging. This is not a justification for high interest rates but it does place it into context because in a lot of situations a poor client’s only option is to go to an MFI when he wants “affordable” credit.”

(Jos)

“Also when the MFI is acting like a loan shark?”

(Theo Bouma, Oxfam Novib)

“Well, what I just tried to say is that a loan shark charges 180, 200, 250% interest. Compared to that LAPO is relatively favorable, but don’t forget what I just said, 144% we also think is too high. We have told LAPO from the beginning and certainly from 2007 that we were adamant that they change their ways.”

(Jos)

“They didn’t.”

(Theo Bouma, Oxfam Novib)

“Well, uh, yes, the opinions on this subject differ, depending on who you talk to. They told us that they did. And later, after a new rating, I think at the beginning of 2010 from the top of my head, it turned out that they didn’t.”

(Jos)

LAPO has now been branded as an untrustworthy partner. Triple Jump, the fund manager of Oxfam Novib, however already knew back in 2007 that things were not right in Nigeria. But despite the alarming findings of employee Hugh Sinclair, Triple Jump that same year invested 1million Euro in LAPO on behalf of ASN Bank. And later another loan followed on behalf of the American organization Calvert.  ASN Bank is not willing to comment in front of the camera. The chairman of the board of directors of Triple Jump, Ab Engelsman, now acknowledges that his organization in the past did not pay sufficient attention to the interests of loan takers.

(Ab Engelsman)

“First one would look at the income for the MFI. Then the focus shifted to what the client is actually paying when you take all costs into consideration.”

(Jos)

“But isn’t that the very first question you should be asking: How does this help the client?”

(Ab Engelsman)

“Yes, but…. yes of course, but the client was helped, the client didn’t… it is more our problem than the client’s problem, because as I said the repayment rates were 95% and above. So the client didn’t have any problems with the high interest rates. It is more an ethical problem we have that we find that strange.”

(Jos)

And this is how it could happen in this fairytale that the provider of small credits changed into a large profit maker, a mega jackpot machine, with financial support from The Netherlands. Well intentioned, yes, but well spent??

(Jos)

“Do you feel screwed by LAPO?”

(Ab Engelsman)

“No, I personally don’t. As Triple Jump, I also think not. No.”

(Jos)

“Would you, with the knowledge you have now, again provide a loan to LAPO?”

(Ab Engelsman)

“Not to the LAPO as it was back then, but yes to the current LAPO.”

(Closing notes: written)

LAPO has grown into one of the biggest credit providers in Nigeria and has now obtained an official banking license.

LAPO is now a commercial company.

Founder/Director Godwin Ehigiamusoe owns 12% of the shares of the company.

(Sound fragment of loud applause).

(Jos)

If you would like to know more about this program, visit kro.nl/reporter

 

 

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Silence Interrupted

Larry Reed’s recent press release took me by surprise and flooded my inbox. A fundamental shift has occurred in the sector. Support is emerging from all sides now. The Dutch microfinance investment sector is abuzz with the news as it prepares for a rather critical documentary to be aired on September 28th. Ok, so Larry wrote something that didn’t entirely criticize the book, is that really something to bother blogging about? There are three reasons to think it may be. Firstly, for whom this guy is. Secondly, for what he implies. And thirdly, for what this may mean for the future of microfinance.

Who is Larry Reed?

He’s the head of the MicroCredit Summit Campaign, a fairly large lobby-group/watchdog/summit-organising body. He’s a well-educated Christian, and spent decades with Opportunity, 5 years as head of their Africa operations, 8 years as CEO. He taught at the Boulder Institute, and authored a few books, one of which was co-written with our friends Rhyne and Otero of Accion. He knows just about everyone in the sector according to Linked In. I’ve never met him, but mutual friends speak highly of him. Nor have I worked with Opportunity, but they didn’t earn a place in the book, and while I can’t claim to know much about them, I’ve not heard their name involved in any scandals or shady activities that I can recall. Basically, as far as I can discern this is a qualified, well-respected, senior and decent guy. In the book there’s a minor dig at the Summit Campaign event held in Halifax in 2008 – “narcissism in its purest form” (page 129), but otherwise neither Larry, Opportunity nor the Summit Campaign are directly mentioned. So, he perhaps had less reason to formally comment on the book other than in his role as something of a figurehead in the sector, which makes this all the more interesting….

The press release and its implications

What does he actually say? “Learning from a Heretic” – the title suggests he doesn’t think I’m a complete idiot, which is reassuring. He concedes a “huge vulnerability” in the sector, albeit presented in a one-sided fashion. But here’s the critical point: he doesn’t suggest that anything I say is incorrect. None of those implicated have dared speak out (except a minor tit-for-tat with Smart, and a private communication from Triple Jump which was published unintentionally, and utterly flawed). The evidence in the book is well documented and they remain silent simply because they are unable to refute the claims and dare not draw more attention to their guilt. And now a senior figure is apparently supporting my premise, albeit in a veiled manner, making it hard to shrug-off. Would Larry thank me at the end; suggest we “address this problem directly”; and offer partial solutions to the claims I make, if the claims were invalid?

One almost has to feel a little sorry for the guilty parties. Triple Jump must be sweating, and one must wonder what the innocent, capable employees of this MIV are thinking as this unfolds before their eyes. They claim to be saving the world, and a quarter of a million Dutch people are about to watch a documentary on a leading investigative TV-show directly challenging this claim. And now one of the leaders of the microfinance sector has abandoned them. Sure, Larry will issue reassuring words about strengthening the sector and working on weaknesses blah blah, but he isn’t going to lead an attack against me now, nor offer them much public support. He has to actually do something now, or he risks looking ridiculous. It is becoming increasingly hard for the guilty parties to dismiss the claims in the book as mere scaremongering when the media disagree, most in the sector disagree, and the head of their Olympics Summit disagrees. Nope, they’re on their own now.

I could launch into a critique of Larry’s press release, but he’s in a tough spot, and what would be gained? Of course my book is one-sided, it’s a memoir, not a text-book. Of course there are omitted institutions – how could I have worked at every MFI and every MIV in every country? And whether the self-regulatory bodies, most of whom are up to their armpits in conflicts of interest, are the suitable parties to address the issues at stake is seriously questionable, but let’s leave these minor points aside. They are over-shadowed by the courage it must have taken to write that release – my hat goes off to Larry.

Now, a more disturbing concern is his proposed solution. It is flawed in two key ways. First, it does not consider regulation of the intermediaries, but rather focuses on the MFIs. This is required, for sure, but who is going to regulate the likes of Citi and Grameen Foundation USA, Triple Jump and Accion (all of whom sponsor the MicroCredit Summit Campaign)? Does this not present an immediate conflict of interest? Look who sits on the steering committee of the magic seal of excellence award:

  • Asad Mahmood (Deutsche Bank, cover-up of LAPO case, sloppy due diligence etc.)
  • Alex Counts (CEO GFUSA, turned a blind eye to LAPO’s interest rates of 144% while Yunus sits on their board, denies LAPO’s interest rates while everyone else confirms them, then begrudgingly defends them because they’re cheaper than loan sharks)
  • Susy Cheston (Accion, I don’t know Susy, but Accion are behind the definitive loan sharks disguised as microfinance – Compartamos)

These are some of the worst offending individuals or institutions in the sector in my opinion. Is Bernie Madoff working at the SEC? Or the wolf guarding the sheep? Was this was masterful infiltration of the “regulator” – slip them some sponsorship and weasel your way onto the steering committee? How much does a seat on the steering committee actually cost I wonder?

My principle claim in the book is that it is precisely these folk who are the problem, and Larry seems light on suggestions about what to do about that. The text is clear: Smart, the Seal of Excellence and the SPTF are aimed principally at MFIs. MFTransparency, the transparency initiative not mentioned by Larry, does likewise: it reveals the interest rates of the MFIs. None have anything to say about the MIVs. By deflecting attention repeatedly towards the MFIs, local standards, treatment of the poor – all of which are important – Larry is deflecting attention away from where it is most required. It’s not immediately obvious at first glance, but this appears to be a claim to tackle the problem directly, when it is possibly a red-herring. It’s easy to get support for a campaign to “help protect the poor”; it’s harder to get support to reign in the real villains – especially when they are funding the sector and the campaigns.

The second issue is that he crystallizes my concern into the principal-agent problem alone. In the broadest sense he is right. The outstanding issues are very serious, encompass a large part of the sector, stretch to the top, and include frauds, deceptions, turning convenient blind-eyes, ignoring evidence of abuse, lying, cover-up up wrong-doings, and one could debatably add bribery to the list of accusations. The scope, size and magnitude of the institutions mentioned is immense – Deutsche Bank, Accion, Citibank, Triple Jump, BlueOrchard, responsAbility, Kiva, Grameen Foundation USA, Calvert Foundation, Incofin etc., this is a large part of the entire sector, implicated severely. Are we to believe Larry, armed with his Seal of Excellence and the Smart Campaign, is going to reign in these guys?

Within 24 hours of Larry’s announcement, including an acknowledgement of our collective guilt in over-hyping microfinance, a board member of Opportunity, Larry’s old stomping ground, was singing the miraculous claims of microfinance once again and scared stiff of the idea of the “R” word – Regulation. I blogged about this here. How can Larry dismantle the spin that he acknowledges exists, but which forms the very bedrock of microfinance? Microfinance without spin is like a car without fuel – it grinds to a halt. Microfinance spin is relentless and institutionalized. The Friends of Grameen got none other than Burson-Marsteller to help them out recently!

And what authority does Larry actually have? Minimal, and less so beyond the confines of the USA. A microfinance summit without those implicated in the book would be thin on the ground, and fail to serve its key function as dating agency for the supply and demand of capital and a bit of self-congratulatory back-slapping funded by donors’ money. I do NOT actually doubt Larry’s intention. I just wonder whether he has the tools available to solve this problem.

I shan’t go through all the flaws pointed out previously, but here’s a summary:

  • The evidence that microfinance is working to anything approaching the naive claims we have made for two decades to justify our own existence simply doesn’t exist. The debate fluctuates between whether it is marginally useful, marginally harmful, or merely useless. The sector can produce endless heart-warming videos, but no widespread, rigorous, independent, credible evidence of poverty reduction. So they moved the goalposts to suggest that poverty wasn’t the focus – it was “financial inclusion”. Next stop – “Doing stuff”.
  • Some of the major MIVs and P2Ps have knowingly lied to their investors, covered-up their actual activities using questionable techniques, have presented a deliberately and knowingly false impression of their activities, while, in some cases, extracting vast sums from the sector for personal gain. At times such behaviour can be explained by naiveté, laziness and incompetence, but these are generally the best cases.
  • A few MIVs have come to dominate the sector in a quasi-monopolistic cartel, with employees and management bouncing from one to the next, and increasingly to and from the public sector bodies (including the US administration in the case of Maria Otero) in a massive revolving door of like-minded insiders, investing in overlapping MFIs (the “herd instinct”) and making ludicrous claims about poverty reduction from air-conditioned offices in Geneva, Amsterdam and DC. They increasingly fund the self-regulators.
  • The sector has persuaded celebrities, high-ranking officials, donors, investors and entire governments into believing they are eradicating poverty when in fact the data suggests otherwise.

How is Larry going to dismantle this mess? When Accion sniffed a $270 million return on their meagre $200.000 investment would it really have made much difference if someone like Larry had whispered in their ear “hey guys, that’s not entirely ethical, I’m not going to invite you to my Summit if you do that”? And look at the supposedly effective self-regulatory bodies in the sector – The Summit Campaign, Smart, MFTransparency, etc. Who funds them and sits on their various committees and management teams? The usual names keep re-appearing, and many of these names are precisely the investing institutions that need to be scrutinized and regulated. Sponsors of these campaigns badly implicated in the book include:

  • SMART: Accion, Deutsche Bank, IFC
  • Summit Campaign: Citibank, various Grameen bodies including Grameen Foundation, Triple Jump, Blue Orchard, Accion.
  • MFTransparency: Triple Jump, Deutsche, Citibank, Oxfam Novib

I have explained in detail why none of these jokers should be trusted, and none of them have publicly commented, let alone denied the claims made in the book. Can Larry clean this up, funded as he is by some of the worst offenders? If people learn only one thing from my book, let it be this: “follow the money”. This is certainly not Larry’s fault, he led one of the better microfinance networks (or, rather, one of the least implicated) before inheriting a total mess of a sector from Sam Daley-Harris.

I am afraid to say that my faith that precisely the same people who have led us into this mess are going to lead us out of it, including many who have made vast financial returns specifically from the mess, is precisely zero. I do not use the term “hi-jacked” to describe this sector arbitrarily, this is precisely the correct word.

Microfinance needs external, governmental regulation for both MFIs and MIVs. The sector will be up in arms about this. “Oh, it’s so anti free-market”, “the regulators will interfere to the detriment of the poor”, “this will drive investors out of the market”, “that’s protectionism”, blah blah. A classic from the horse’s mouth (referenced above):

“If the microfinance industry and its members fail to self-police, to exercise due prudence and restraint in the conduct of their operations, to serve and treat their clients fairly, and to rigorously comply with the laws of host countries in letter and in spirit, then we are inviting tight and perhaps detrimental regulatory oversight and public scrutiny.” [emphasis added]

Kadita Tshibaka, Board Director of Opportunity, 33 years at Citibank

God forbid, not just regulatory oversight, but public scrutiny also! I can hear the sector shuddering. There is no middle ground – it is the evil regulator or self-regulation. The very idea of a sensible and effective regulator is an anathema to these guys. They are free market devotees let loose, alas, on the poor. No, Larry’s job now is to appease the heretics and the media, maintain the Campaign’s funding, and avoid at all costs the dreaded regulator. He can’t actually do much. Sufficient appeasement to keep the sector ticking over may his only option (and function).

What does this say regarding the future of microfinance?

Alas I must revert to pessimism here. The MIVs are a little nervous now that this is attracting media and regulatory attention, and there will be a push to prevent this at all costs. So, the ways they will do this will likely include the following:

  • Lots of press releases and media coverage promoting the miracle cure. Maybe a documentary. Expect some mild confessions of “scope for improvement”, but no actual admissions of guilt: “Yes, we lied to our investors deliberately in our newsletters and knowingly screwed the poor in the meantime” – this just won’t happen, there’s no point hoping for it. Maybe they can recruit a new celebrity or come up with a new catchphrase? Quadruple bottom line mega-inclusive holistic financial integration has a ring to it.
  • Slightly beefing up the likes of Smart Campaign to give a tiny appearance of it having some teeth, and doing so with heavy marketing. They might single out a few “rogue operator” MFIs, sacrificial lambs involved in particularly unpleasant aspects of exploitation, but they will avoid any scrutiny that could damage the inner-club, particularly the MIVs.
  • Dinners and meetings and discreet conversations with regulators to put them off the scent. The usual arguments to keep the regulators at bay usually involve a combination of “you are not informed enough to know how to regulate this niche sector”, and “if you regulate it badly you will drive investors away and this will be so detrimental to the poor”. Larry suggested the general public are unable to understand the massive complexities of microfinance, which I found slightly insulting, but the regulators are generally treated with utter disdain by the microfinance community.

Larry, to some extent, represents the sector. His hands are tied with conflicts of interest over funding and lack of ammunition, but his intentions may be pure. He seems to be relying on the self-regulatory bodies to an unhealthy degree, a faith I do not share, but perhaps he’s correct. He better be, as he is betting his career on them. At the end of the day he has little to lose – the sector is in turmoil, and if he messes this up he might not be the only one looking for a job. In the meantime he is not directly beholden to any MIV or party or institution, and would Citi actually cut funding because he didn’t play ball with them? They would face (even more) severe reputation damage. They already look a little questionable, and perhaps, ironically, Larry is their lifeline to restoring them to some semblance of decency. Right now one could be forgiven for considering them some mafia cartel with discreet fingers in all pies – they even fund the Banana Skins reports. Robert Annibale may have delivered a questionable testimony in front of the House of Representatives, and his poverty credentials are equally dubious, but he is no fool. He has his own career on the line, and already looks a little guilty, which may provide Larry with negotiating power. But Larry’s statement needs to be supplemented with a plan, in due course, and unless this is extremely far-reaching, I maintain my call for a genuine solution to the crisis facing the embattled sector:

Full, formal, external, independent regulation of the MIVs and P2Ps. Microfinance affects poor, vulnerable, and at times desperate citizens, they deserve at least the same regulatory protection that we take for granted in developed countries. Investors in MIVs likewise deserve the same regulatory protection and oversight as any other fund. If this results in the culling of a few unscrupulous players who are no longer willing to play on a level playing field by some clearly defined rules, so be it.

Some suggestions to inject credulity into the Summit Campaign and the likes of Smart could include, inter alia, defining a level at which real interest rates charged to the poor are labelled extortionate; adding the rights of children to the CPPs and equipping the self-regulatory bodies with teeth; and demanding public responses from those implicated in the book.

Parallel to formal regulation the sector requires an independent rating agency for the MIVs. Just as we sang the praises of the rating agencies for MFIs, now it’s time to move a rung up the ladder, but that’s a post for another day.

So, Larry, thanks for the muted praise, I appreciate it and respect you for being so bold, but what are you going to actually do? Are you going to address the issue of corruption within the MIVs? Are you going to put a wolf in charge of the sheep? And what are you going to do about the rampant conflicts of interest in the sector, including within your own institution?

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Spin Unlimited

The embattled sector is doing what it can to salvage its image. An excellent example was yesterday’s entry on the Huffington Post blog by Kadita Tshibaka. Mr Tshibaka spent 33 years at Citibank, and in 2003 moved to Opportunity International, a large microfinance network, serving on their board since 2008. He is presumably, hopefully, aware of the situation unfolding in the microfinance sector. He is educated at the top US universities and originally from the DRC, thus aware of the realities of poverty.

It is thus a total mystery how he could possibly have written the article appearing in the Huffington Post for any reason other than to present senior-level spin in an attempt to appease the mounting criticism facing the sector. It is also mysterious how the Huffington Post could have published such an entry, failing to verify many of the facts stated. It is a final mystery who actually reads this PR and takes it seriously. This is not someone writing as an outsider, or a man who may reasonably be unaware of the realities of microfinance. This is spin in its purest, most refined form, and a sign of quite how desperate the sector is. Let’s deconstruct his modest effort.

Mr. Tshibaka presents an uplifting vision for an effective microfinance sector, particularly in light of the mounting negative publicity surrounding microfinance currently. However, it gets off to a bad start on factual accuracy. His estimate of 100 million microfinance clients is a gross under-estimate. The MicroCredit Summit Campaign currently boasts 205,314,500 microcredit clients. One or other, or both, are clearly flawed. Obviously multiplying this by five gets us into the billions, which should be music to Mr. Tshibaka’s ears. These folk like to multiply their statistics by five, the estimated number of people in the family, to talk about “people impacted”. This was a missed headline opportunity: “A billion catapulted out poverty”. It will emerge shortly.

However, he then suggests that wherever one looks one will find evidence of the positive impact of microfinance. This suggests Mr. Tshibaka’s research has not extended very far. David Roodman, noted US academic at the Center for Global Development, succinctly summarised the overall impact of microfinance upon poverty as “zero”. A rigorous analysis of nearly 3.000 academic papers spanning 30 years performed by Maren Duvendack at the Overseas Development Institute came to similar findings. Ruth Stewart’s recent paper suggested that there was no conclusive evidence either in favour or against microfinance having any notable impact on poverty. He has presumably missed the writings of noted economists Ha-Joon Chang, Milford Bateman, and extensive articles in the NYT, WSJ and the Huffington Post itself. He’s clearly not read my book either. One cannot help but wonder if perhaps he ought to cast his investigative net a little further before making such bold statements. Or does he simply dismiss this body of evidence as tosh?

This is not to suggest that all microfinance is utterly useless. Good microfinance undoubtedly exists, as I’ve repeated on numerous occasions, but the truth may be a little less rosy than Mr. Tshibaka suggests, and on average the impact is pretty modest. At best.

The reason the microfinance sector is facing such scrutiny currently is not because of the amazing positive impact it is having, as he bizarrely suggests. It is because it is often closely associated with predatory lending; there is mounting evidence of minimal or negative overall impact upon poverty; crises are emerging at an alarming frequency, most recently involving a spate of suicides in Andhra Pradesh amongst over-indebted women being bullied by aggressive microfinance bank staff; the entire microfinance sector of Nicaragua (where Opportunity operate) collapsed under a grass-roots uprising by the poor against the very same MFIs that were apparently lifting them out of poverty; fraud and deception within the microfinance investment funds and the so-called peer-to-peer lending platforms has recently emerged as a very real threat; entire funds and even governments are withdrawing support for microfinance, Norway being a fine example; questions surrounding massive compensation to individuals behind the large IPOs in the sector have been raised (Maria Otero of Accion, Vikram Akula of SKS); and academic evidence is increasingly suggesting that one additional negative side-effect of microfinance is that some so-called entrepreneurs may be removing their children from schools in order to work in what may best be described as “micro sweat-shops”, in direct contradiction to the worthy aim of Millennium Development Goal #2 (detailed blog forthcoming).

This list is not exhaustive, but gives a flavour of additional reasons why the microfinance sector may be under such scrutiny. To suggest the scrutiny originates from the astonishing impact of microfinance is, frankly, preposterous.

Where Mr. Tshibaka and I agree is that MFIs should not engage in predatory lending and charge extortionate interest rates. But, let’s not fail to examine the details of where this occurs. Two topical MFIs charging rates of up to 144% and 195% respectively are LAPO in Nigeria and Compartamos in Mexico. An uncomfortable truth emerges when we examine the source of funding for these entities. They include microfinance household names, such as Deutsche Bank, Accion, Grameen Foundation, IFC, Kiva, Calvert Foundation, Citi etc. So, while we can criticise such exploitation, let’s not ignore who provides the capital, and therefore benefits, from such interest rates, and yet manages to turn a convenient blind eye to such practices. As has Mr. Tshibaka presumably.

“MFIs must be careful not to follow the path taken by the mortgage crisis, with imprudent lending practices involving over-lending to clients”

Mr Tshibaka’s wise advice is, alas, too late. By a number of years. Over-indebtedness has led to the collapse of entire countries’ microfinance sectors, and now holds the number one position as the greatest threat facing the sector, as reported in the 2012 Banana Skins report. Given that Opportunity operates in Mexico, Peru and Colombia, countries with serious over-indebtedness problems, I am surprised Mr Tshibaka is not already aware of this. Opportunity also operates in Nicaragua, so presumably recall the “no pago” uprising, even though they survived.

That not all microfinance clients are entrepreneurs is well understood, particularly when we consider that a substantial amount (no one knows exactly how much, nor cares to find out) of microfinance is not invested in any entrepreneurial activity whatsoever, but on consumption and repaying loans to other microfinance banks. Or is 100% of Opportunity’s capital directed to entrepreneurial activities?

I also applaud the Smart Campaign, in theory. However, that is as far as my applause extends. It is endorsement without enforcement, and many of the worst offenders in the microfinance sector are endorsers of the campaign, which is a self-regulatory body funded by Accion, possessing carrots without sticks. A nice idea poorly implemented. However, apparently they are about to initiate genuine certification which will be a step in the right direction, but will not remove the inherent conflicts of interest within the organisation. Again, follow the money. I’ve discussed the Smart Campaign extensively, with more to follow.

But what is really interesting is his openly stated fear of “detrimental regulatory oversight and public scrutiny”, in favour of placid self-regulation (perhaps also described as window-dressing). The last thing the likes of the investment funds, Opportunity International or the microfinance sector at large want is genuine, independent, rigorous scrutiny of their activities by people not on the microfinance payroll. They prefer “business as usual” with trusted insiders to “self-regulate”, which is precisely what has got us into the current mess. At this point I disagree entirely with Mr Tshibaka. I believe dramatically increased public scrutiny and meaningful regulatory oversight is precisely what the sector needs. Those with nothing to hide have nothing to fear. That he would so brazenly admit his fear of such scrutiny is noteworthy and without doubt an entirely honest admission.

Three months following publication of my book not a single implicated party has issued a press release or even a denial of the claims made. However, this week the former CEO of Opportunity International – Larry Reed, now head of the MicroCredit Summit Campaign, issued a press release which Mr Tshibaka would be well advised to read.

I’m going to dissect this press release in a later post, as its implications are fascinating. But is it a coincidence that Reed’s press release, largely supporting my book (perhaps begrudgingly) is followed by a senior Opportunity Board Director issuing a text of the most refined spin I’ve seen in ages?

Mr Reed suggests I select my (to date un-refuted, rigorously backed-up) facts to present a one-sided viewpoint of microfinance, but he issues a warning: “for those of us who have been working in microfinance a long time and who find ourselves getting angry when we read a book that seems to slant all its facts in one direction, we should ask ourselves to what degree we are guilty of doing the same thing when we have promoted microfinance.”

What on Earth is Mr Tshibaka’s article if not a ludicrously positive attempt to present a rosy image of the sector entirely oblivious of any research, any recent media coverage, or any facts? He is guilty of precisely the admission of the former CEO of his own company. If people actually believe this stuff we have a serious problem. The fanaticism with which such folk can sprout such hype, even when the hype within the sector is so well known, is yet further evidence of the almost religious, cult-like obsession they have with microfinance. Were this backed up by substantial evidence it may still be considered a little over-zealous, but it’s not, and everyone knows it’s not. And that this comes from a relatively well-respected institution (by the standards set within the microfinance sector) is even more disturbing. Meanwhile, those badly implicated not only in my book but also implicitly in Reed’s press release remain totally silent, praying for this whole incident to blow over. But it won’t, and this sort of nonsense campaigning is not going to help.

Mr Tshibaka’s article will resonate only with other members of the cult. To the remaining thinking, reading population of the planet it will serve only to undermine him, the institution he represents, and the sector at large. He may in fact be doing more harm than good. However, I must say, while I expect this from some institutions, I was surprised and disappointed to see Opportunity stoop to this level, even when their own former-CEO has the courage to step up to the plate.

Let’s stop dancing around the issues, pretending microfinance is the miracle cure for poverty reduction, posting endless heart-warming stories with nice photos and engaging in unadulterated spin, and get on with the important job of cleaning up the mess, fraud and corruption that has been allowed to permeate large parts of the sector from the top to the bottom. Microfinance can be fixed, but not with unfounded optimism and naiveté, but by tackling the problem head-on, as Mr Reed suggests.

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The Mouse that Roared – a Response to the Smart Campaign

[This post is in response to a comment posted by Ms. Rhyne of the Smart Campaign on microDINERO regarding my article “Microfinance Awards Itself An Award“]

A curious fact about the book is that none of those implicated have dared to speak out. No press releases, no denials. I didn’t even get my own tab on the Friends of Grameen website alongside other heretics such as Tom Heinemann. Actually, that’s not entirely true: Triple Jump attempted a feeble denial, privately, which was subsequently published. My annihilation of their response was fun to write, so when the Smart Campaign published a critique of my book, at least with the courage of doing so publicly, I felt emboldened to respond.

This is a light-hearted response; I will address some more serious aspects of the Smart Campaign in a subsequent post. I know the author, Ms. Rhyne, we have met and sparred, but her response was simply too juicy to ignore! Forgive the crude journalistic style – I’ll insert her text and then my comment.

I would like to respond on behalf of the Smart Campaign. I would also like to note that I had no role in judging the Philanthropedia awards, so I do not know what that list is all about.

It’s the list of judges who awarded these fantastic awards to the leading non-profit microfinance players in the world, if that wasn’t pretty obvious in the blog post, or the column titles of the list (“Judge” and “Relation to winners”). The point being that they are insiders awarding themselves awards. Thus the title of the blog post, “Microfinance Awards Itself An Award”. I cannot think how I could have made this any clearer, but this is “what that list is all about”. I hope that’s clear. Ms. Rhyne, well aware of Accion, will no doubt be pleased to observe that Accion reached the #3 slot this year.

Comments below refer to critiques found in the book, which are somewhat more extended than the remarks in the blog post.

Yes, the critiques are more extended indeed, the blog post did not actually discuss the book, and Ms. Rhyne fails to address the relevant issues that were in the blog, or the massive payments to the former CEO of Accion which have been the subject of a mini-documentary, and extensive critique within the sector surrounding Accion, all of which failed to rouse a comment from Ms. Rhyne, who is, of course, ex-Accion. I only actually mention the Smart Campaign once in the blog post, although this apparently provided sufficient pretext for Ms. Rhyne to launch a defence of Smart, while evading the core central point of nepotism, or cult-like insider behaviour rampant in the microfinance sector.

Sinclair criticizes the Smart Campaign for allowing organizations he disapproves of to be endorsers, most notably, LAPO and SKS.

It is not whether I disapprove of them. It is whether they violate the Client Protection Principles (CPPs), which I happen to take seriously. Also, am I the only person disapproving of SKS and LAPO? These are severely criticised MFIs worldwide – read the press. However, Ms. Rhyne failed to mention Compartamos, the MFI I actually mention far more frequently than SKS in the book and the blog post she was supposedly responding to, the MFI that famously charges interest rates of up to 195% to the poor. Perhaps this one slipped her mind, which is surprising, as Accion made $270 million in the IPO of Compartamos. Anyway, the main point is that these three MFIs all endorsed Smart, are widely criticized across the sector, and are not merely my personal pet-peeves.

In this, he deliberately misinterprets the nature of endorsement. The Smart Campaign website (www.smartcampaign.org) clearly states that endorsement is a one way street. The endorser endorses the Campaign, not the other way around.

I do not deliberately misinterpret the nature of the endorsement – I think it is pointless. I understand it very well, it is window-dressing. It is ineffective. It is “endorsement without enforcement”, although finally it does appear that Smart has decided to actually do something, as Ms. Rhyne alludes to later. It is free self-labelling as “ethical” without having to actually be ethical, and therefore an open invitation to mislead microfinance investors.

The Campaign does not censor its endorsement list, but accepts all who wish to state their allegiance to the principles (as stated on the website). The Smart Campaign has not conducted any investigation of most of its 3,000 endorsers, although it has conducted on-site assessments of about 40 MFIs.

Great, they’ve broken through the 1% barrier. So, just less than 99% remains totally un-investigated. It’s a very small step in the right direction. Of these 40, was anyone expelled? Anyone discovered to be in serious breach of any CPPs? Compare to this to a fair trade stamp, which Smart appears to resemble – they visit more than 1% of the farmers, and they have standards for joining their campaign and using the logo. Not with Smart. Technically they do not actually state “there is some actual content behind endorsing this campaign”, but the impression is clear – self-regulation is doing something positive. Without defining quite what this is, Smart is an effort to present a rosy picture to the outside world, in my opinion. As long as no one takes an MFIs endorsement of Smart seriously, no harm can come of this, but many people are unaware that an MFIs endorsement of Smart is totally without substance, verification or meaning, and required no more than an email address and a name. The whole purpose of Smart is to be taken seriously, without doing anything serious.

That said, the Smart Campaign’s has been developing standards to assess and ultimately certify that a financial institution does or does not apply adequate standards of care in client protection. It has spent several years developing a public certification program that will be launched by the end of this year.

How can it take several years to develop a program to see whether the CPPs are being violated or not? In the LAPO case all one had to do was read the newspapers and rating reports. The Andhra government went to lengths to publish the list of 54 client suicides as a consequence of aggressive loan practices at MFIs, with the MFIs explicitly named. How hard can it be to see if the MFIs are bullying their clients, deceiving them about interest rates etc? Anyway, that the public certification program will be launched is great news, albeit way over-due.

It is deceptive for Sinclair to criticize endorsement without acknowledging that the Campaign is relying on standard-setting, assessment and certification as the real tools to measure performance.

I hadn’t heard about the certification actually happening, and if that is actually true, that would be interesting. They’ve been talking about it forever. I’m sceptical, the proof will be in the pudding. But Ms. Rhyne apparently fails to get the central point, or is deliberately evading it. What has standard-setting and assessment got to do with my criticism? My criticism is that this is useless, ineffective window-dressing, which, to date, is entirely true. If this changes for the better, great. Smart used to have a discreet waiver on the website warning astute readers that the campaign made no actual assurance about actual behaviour of the MFIs (my suggestion), but they removed it recently.

2. Relationship to Accion. Sinclair implies that the Smart Campaign’s origins and staffing at Accion’s Center for Financial Inclusion make the Campaign a suspect part of some dark purpose. Horrors! A dastardly scheme by Accion to promote client protection practices across the microfinance industry!

I merely point out the irony that Accion is the US-NGO that made vast profit from the IPO of Compartamos, one of the least respected MFIs in the microfinance sector (other than amongst the neo-liberals and profiteers, of course, who rather like such MFIs, especially when they are shareholders). It’s analogous to a billionaire investor writing up the certification criteria for Goldman Sachs to label itself as an ethical institution.

Compartamos could well be accused of predatory lending, with rates reaching 195%. I have not, in over a decade, come across an MFI charging more exploitative rates. Should we ask Mohammad Yunus what he thinks of such rates? What do the general public think of such rates? This is not a loss-making, socially motivated, small, struggling MFI; this is a highly profitable loan-shark, let’s be crystal clear about that. So, if Smart wants to retain any credibility, please explain how 195% is compatible with the Smart CPP on responsible pricing: “Pricing, terms and conditions will be set in a way that is affordable to clients while allowing for financial institutions to be sustainable.”

So, Ms. Rhyne, a public question: what do you think of the interest rates of Compartamos? Compartamos endorsed your little campaign, so they presumably love the idea of responsible interest rates. Is 195% responsible therefore? Mohammed Yunus suggested that interest rates over 25% were too high – what do you think of his opinion on this? Or you dispute the calculation of 195%, done by respected US-academic David Roodman at the Center for Global Development?

The Smart Campaign should be judged by its actions.

There haven’t been any yet, other than gathering endless endorsements. But action is about to start, according to Ms. Rhyne, so watch this space!

The Campaign operates in good faith as exactly what it claims to be, a global effort to embed a set of client protection principles deep within the microfinance industry.

So deep that when you endorse the campaign they offer you a check-box to avoid having to ever hear from them again, just shove your name on the list and forget about it. I wonder how many select this option?

It works with a diverse Steering Committee whose members represent all facets of the industry.

The usual suspects mostly: CGAP, Deutsche, UN, SEEP, Finca, Microcredit Summit, Oikocredit, IFC, and Ms. Rhyne herself from CFI.

It has partnerships with dozens of local and international supporting organizations. The Client Protection Principles have, as a result of the efforts of the Campaign, become widely known, accepted, and understood throughout the industry.

Nonsense – do a test. Next time you’re at an MFI that endorsed Smart, or meet an individual named on the roll of honour of endorsers, ask them to name the CPPs. There are only 7 – hardly a challenge – but they’ll miss things like client privacy (Kiva publish clients loan details and photos on its website – er, is that even legal?) and the one about appropriate loan products. They might remember the one about preventing over-indebtedness, but will mention it sheepishly, as the entire point of microfinance is to indebt the poor. Particularly if you have a chat with a Smart-endorsing MFI in Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia or Peru, ask what they are doing about over-indebtedness, which is rampant in all countries but carefully ignored.

If this is a sinister plot, let’s have more!

It’s not a sinister plot, it’s feeble window-dressing aimed to perk up the ailing reputation of a sector that has increasingly ignored the interests of the poor and eventually, when this reached an embarrassing level of public scrutiny, something had to be done to fix the reputation of the sector. Which, thanks to its massive earnings on Compartamos, Accion was able to spend a little money on, by developing a label to assuage investors while not requiring any changes in MFI behaviour whatsoever.

That said, it is entirely appropriate to scrutinize the Campaign’s relationship with Accion. The Campaign is an initiative of the Center for Financial Inclusion at Accion (CFI), and all Campaign staff are CFI staff. CFI is legally a department of Accion, but it operates with an independent Advisory Council and maintains an industry-facing stance with a high degree of intellectual independence.

Right, well, like I said, there seemed to be something of a link between the two institutions. It’s strange that the entire microfinance sector was unable to come up with something a little more arm’s length or independent than this, no? Wouldn’t an actual independent body have been the obvious solution for an initiative with some token self-regulatory role promoting transparency etc? For example, imagine a body set up to protect the interests of smokers – would the offices of Philip Morris be the first place you would think of to establish such a body? Financed by Philip Morris. With lots of current and former Philip Morris staff. An unusual choice, but a convenient one.

It works on behalf of the microfinance industry as a whole.

What, like an elected government? The interests of the microfinance poor may conflict with the interests of the microfinance banks. For example, poor Mexicans presumably prefer low interest rates, while Compartamos and its investors seem rather fond of high interest rates. Both are part of the microfinance industry presumably, so how does Smart work on behalf of both in such a case? Or does the “industry” refer only to the lenders? Besides, if Smart works for the broad industry, who selected the staff and key positions? Who interviewed Ms. Rhyne herself for this job? Accion had a lot of cash sloshing about after the Compartamos IPO, but faced mounting criticism not only of their goose with the golden egg, but of the sector in general. Smart was a cheap solution, but best kept in-house with trusted insiders to run it. This is no plot, nor is it sinister or dastardly. It is simply fact.

The issue of the connection to Accion has come up several times in Smart Campaign Steering Committee meetings.

That some members of the steering committee had noted the connection between the two institutions is not entirely surprising given that they are housed in the same building.

Each time, the CFI has received praise for its transparency and even-handedness in administering the Campaign.

Praise from whom? Note the original blog title was “Microfinance Awards Itself an Award”. Oh, is this just praise from the club? The CFI praising Smart, and vice versa presumably? Ah, now I see.

There are ongoing discussions about possible long run homes for client protection in the industry, which could involve a migration into some other organizational home or form. Accion has been by far the largest financial contributor to the Campaign, and it continues as anchor funder.

Deutsche Bank is another key funder, no doubt embracing transparent pricing. Ask Deutsche whether they find LAPO’s interest rates to be in line with the CPPs (up to 144%). They just invested in SKS, so will probably soften their stance there also, and not a bad investment – up 40% in a couple of months. Regarding a sensible home for Smart, how about in a developing country run by independent people actually doing something?

It has supported the Campaign because it sees client protection as an integral part of its approach to microfinance.

As long as it doesn’t involve sniffing around the interest rates charged to their Mexican clients.

3. Effectiveness of the Smart Campaign. The broader claim that Sinclair makes is that the Campaign is an ineffective whitewash that will not result in substantially better client protection practices. Here, too, the Smart Campaign should be judged on its actions and their results, which have already been substantial. First result: it is unequivocal that the Smart Campaign has made the microfinance industry far more aware of and committed to client protection principles than it had previously been. This awareness has taken hold among MFIs, their supporting organizations and the investors and funders who supply their capital.

Perhaps not surprisingly, I challenge this unequivocal truth. The Andhra Pradesh suicides were relatively recent – since Smart was formed. The over-indebtedness problem is getting worse each year, this year making it to the sought after #1 spot in the Banana Skins Report despite Smart dedicating a whole CPP to it. But my objection with the comment above is “the Smart Campaign has made the microfinance industry far more aware of and committed to client protection principles”. Nonsense. The media has done this. Most people can’t remember what the CPPs are, let alone analyse in any detail what Smart is all about. But they read newspapers. The journalists have made the microfinance industry far more aware of the risks of not having proper client protection. Read the NYT and the WSJ for decent truth about the microfinance sector. Look at the impact of Heinemann’s documentary – it even prompted the insiders to set up their own useless spin machine in defence – the Friends of Grameen (who no doubt endorse Smart and vice versa). Ms. Rhyne implies causality – that because Smart popped into existence the sector became more aware of the abuses suffered by the poor at the hands of the microfinance sector. Er, perhaps this is putting the cart before the horse: the mounting abuses led to the media attention and the need to rustle up something to counter-act this – welcome Smart. Let’s just keep in the back of our minds that the causality could have been the other way round, and that Accion, of all folk, would be pleased to see the image of the tarnished sector improve.

Second result: the Campaign has developed standards of practice for the implementation of client protection principles. These did not previously exist. They are still young, but they constitute a body of practice that can help put client protection principles into action.

This is farcical. Sure, there may not have been a set of explicit standards that said “don’t screw the poor with extortionate interest rates, don’t encourage them to go bankrupt, don’t design products which actually harm them, try not to leak private client data etc”. There isn’t actually a CPP that says “don’t shoot your non-repaying clients”, or “don’t encourage female clients to become prostitutes if they are struggling to repay their loans” (as occurred in India), or “don’t take your kids out of school to work in some micro-sweat-shop because you think that will help them in the long run” (subject of next blog post). They did exist before, but they were called common sense.

Third result: it has laid the groundwork and will soon introduce certification, which will allow for public recognition of organizations that apply these standards. With certification will come a means to separate those MFIs that take adequate care from those that do not and to incentivize MFIs to improve their practices.

Great, we’ve been waiting a decade, some more, let’s start with the folk on your own list, maybe with the three MFIs mentioned here, SKS, LAPO and Compartamos? And can someone be expelled, or banished, or dis-endorsed? Are there any consequences for violations of the CPPs? Please state them openly.

That said, the Smart Campaign is not the last word on client protection, because incentives at both the client and provider levels that lead to poor client protections are intrinsic to financial systems.

Not entirely sure what is meant here, but something along the lines of Smart not being perfect and regulation of financial services in general is not perfect either. At last we agree on something.

The Campaign acknowledges that regulation of some aspects of client protection, with enforcement, will be necessary. However, microfinance operates around the world in places where regulatory frameworks for securing client protection are far from adequate, and even where they are strong, regulation is often the last line of defense. Far better to also have client protection embedded as norms and transparent standards. Thus, the Smart Campaign does not position itself as a substitute for regulation, or as a complete solution to the problems of client protection. Rather it is as an industry-development effort that will contribute in a substantial way to improved client protection practices.

Or rather, it has been an ineffective window-dressing PR-stunt until now, and is apparently about to actually take action for the first time ever, so watch this space with baited breath. The bear has awoken, stretched, yawned, and is now, ever so slowly, emerging from the cave into the sunlight of the real world. Or is it a mouse?

It is politically incorrect to criticise Smart because it apparently helps the poor. It also helps the sector clean up its image to the non-insiders who assume this has some substantial meaning in practice, which it doesn’t. It is a vain effort at playing on the “seal of approvals” that we have all become accustomed to. But it’s sloppy, ineffective, has no teeth, and may actually do more harm than good. Either beef it up or scrap it. The Diverging Markets review of my book summarised the situation concisely:

The SMART Campaign is actually misnamed—CRAFTY would be more appropriate.

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Norway throws the baby out with the bathwater

NORAD, the Norwegian equivalent of DFID or USAID, recently announced that it has all but ceased microfinance activities. The Norwegian Microfinance Initiative (NMI) is the only remaining large microfinance investor, although it is partially funded from the Norwegian public purse (Norfund). Stromme Foundation, CARE Norway and Kolibri Capital contribute a further NOK 100m ($20m or so); and Telenor has made forays into microfinance. Some smaller operators exist: see the relatively recent survey entitled “Inventory of Microfinance Activities Supported by Norway” (2011).

Two matters concern me. First, does this establish a precedent of entire countries despairing of microfinance and pulling out altogether? Second, is Norway risking throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater? These are major questions, but perhaps I can scratch the surface here.

We are aware of the growing disillusionment with microfinance – there is no need to re-iterate the debate here. The Duvendack report in the UK was hardly complimentary. Roodman’s succinct summary of the overall impact (“zero”) did little to boost credibility. DOEN in Holland have done no new investments in microfinance for years, although the Triodos-DOEN fund ticks over. NOTS reduced its committed capital from €14m to €1m in 2011.

The Norwegians were uniquely and directly embroiled in the recent scandal involving Grameen Bank and Muhammad Yunus. Danish journalist Tom Heinemann splashed the story across the media in his documentary on the subject, so perhaps Norway is particularly sensitive to such adverse media coverage. Heinemann then followed up with a shorter report on huge payouts to the CEO of Accion, one of the early investors in the Mexican Bank, Compartamos, which was discovered charging the poor interest rates up to 195%. The article and accompanying video footage, entitled “Gave Small Loans, Received Big Payments” was unlikely to impress the Norwegian electorate, and NORAD announced their departure from microfinance shortly afterwards.

Other Scandinavian countries may be taking note of Norway’s actions. Sweden and Denmark are both active supporters of microfinance. But perhaps the exiting of public funding for microfinance is actually a sign of success? If private capital is now able to fund the sector, public funds can be better deployed elsewhere. Obviously this line of reasoning avoids the thorny question of whether microfinance works or not. Or whether public funding may be preferable simply because it tends to be less overtly profit-motivated. Also, the distinction between public and private funding is increasingly blurred, as public funds are channelled through MIVs. In the case of NMI  this includes BlueOrchard, Incofin, Symbiotics, Developing World Markets etc. – the usual private sector suspects.

It is hard to read between the lines as to why the Norwegians took this decision, and they have been hesitant to comment on a number of topics related to the Grameen scandals. I tried to contact NORAD for this post, but got no reply. And let’s be realistic, they are unlikely to openly state “we find the entire microfinance sector a waste of time and money with zero supporting evidence that it’s working”, even if that were their opinion. Political correctness will prevail regardless of the internal conversations.

So, speculation of motivations aside, my question is “who’s next”? Remember when Unitus closed all of a sudden in 2010? That sent a small shock through the sector. Pro-Credit distanced itself fairly openly from the microfinance sector. Indeed, Pro-Credit’s comments may have been prophetic and shed some light on Norway’s announcement:

“We fear, however, that the importance attached to microfinance – presented as the cure-all to eliminate poverty – will raise expectations that cannot be fulfilled. If these expectations are disappointed, the public may be disillusioned and lose interest.”

Did Norway simply become disillusioned and lose interest? Ironically the number of criticisms and scandals in microfinance recently may have served to mute the announcement from Norway, most recently the effective take-over of Grameen Bank by the Bangladeshi government. NORAD was a big investor in Grameen Bank stretching back to the 1980s. Now it’s pulled out of the sector altogether. That appears to be big news to me.

USAID, CGAP, Kiva, GFUSA etc. have a well established microfinance following which religiously adheres to the mantra of the miracle cure, but the UK has also expressed some concerns. The All Party Parliamentary Group on Microfinance recently made a call for evidence on regulating the microfinance sector. Indeed, even the private sector microfinance community is shifting away from traditional microfinance, in favour of “all inclusive finance”, or whatever the latest catchphrase is. It appears re-branding away from the embattled bedrock of micro-credit, loans to women to buy goats etc., is underway across the entire sector. Remember when the “P” in CGAP used to stand for “Poorest”, and then changed to “Poor”? Now they prefer to use the broadest of generalisations possible – inclusive finance, debatably reflecting the mother of all mission drifts. Perhaps the Norwegians are simply the first, boldest, most pro-active, most forward-looking folk out there? Again, let’s be honest, it wouldn’t be the first time those Scandinavians have run circles around the rest of us. Bergen has had traffic congestion charging since 1986.

So, Norwegian wisdom aside, who are the casualties in this? There is good and bad microfinance out there, and some of the former will presumably suffer as a result of a lack of public funding. Public funding may be “softer”, and thus directed to more socially motivated microfinance. Relying entirely on the hard-nosed private sector may reduce yet further any genuine glimmer of social focus that remains in the microfinance sector. Return on assets and risk adjusted returns are all fine and good, but start-up MFIs may struggle to raise Norwegian capital. MFIs not seeking profit maximisation but rather to serve an overtly social purpose may struggle. Indeed, could this herald the dawn of a new era, where the distinction between for-profit and socially-motivated MFIs becomes yet wider? The former will raise finance from sources that increasingly resemble any other part of the financial sector. The latter will revert to the traditional NGOs and donor led organisations. Would that necessarily be a bad thing?

Indeed, given that over-indebtedness made it to the number 1 spot in this year’s Banana Skins Report discussing the principle challenges facing the sector, indicative of an excess rather than a scarcity of microfinance (albeit concentrated in certain regions), perhaps a reduction in the availability of capital is precisely what the sector needs? Are the Norwegians simply leading the way in making a wise choice?

The Norwegian announcement raises other interesting questions. Is the “cooperation between the public authorities and private investors in Norway” into NMI, who then direct the funds to a few profit-motivated private sector MIVs, an innovative mechanism to leverage public funds while reaping the efficiency of the private sector. Or is it the height of laziness? We have the interests of the Norwegian tax-payer, private investors, and the poor at stake. The Norwegians entrust this mix of interests to a private sector agent – NMI. What assurance do we have that NMI acts to maximize this complex medley of often conflicting interests, and not simply to maximize their own best interests? Isn’t this a classic case of the principal-agent problem?

Perhaps a more fundamental question is not whether Norwegian tax-payer money should be directed towards microfinance at all, nor whether private-sector MIVs are a viable mechanism for doing so, but rather whether the public sector could better assist MFIs. What other models did they consider? In short – did they throw out the baby with the bathwater in withdrawing from microfinance?

This is all pure speculation prompted by some bureaucrats in Scandinavia. The microfinance sector is in a transitional period and I for one am going to keep a close eye on these northerners. They are more nimble and less encumbered with large development sectors with strong political ties and vested interests, so there may be clues as to what the future holds for the rest of us. Watch this space.

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