What’s Wrong With Kiva’s Portfolio Yield Statistic?

I have criticised Kiva for being non-transparent in a number of ways, but one of my pet-peeves is their insistence upon using the portfolio yield statistic instead of an actual interest rate. Why is this so deceptive a statistic? What could Kiva do better?

First of all, portfolio yield is defined by the MixMarket as the “Interest and Fees on Loan Portfolio/ Loan Portfolio, gross, average”. Kiva get their portfolio yield statistics from the MixMarket, and add further clarity: “The Portfolio Yield is generally based on audited financial information and is a better indication of the cost of borrowing money from a Kiva Field Partner than the simple interest rates reported by our Field Partners because it:  a) Includes any fees associated with loans and,  b) Is expressed in one-year increments (similar to the way an APR works). Please note that Portfolio Yield does not yet include the concept of mandatory savings.”

So, Kiva acknowledge some limitations of this statistic, but let’s look at these limitations more closely.

First, the figures are not always based on audited data. In fact, there is no requirement for audited financials on the MixMarket, and the authenticity of documents and statistics uploaded to the MixMarket is not verified. They are self-reported by the MFIs, and we all know how sensitive the topic of interest rates can be, so there is a strong incentive to massage this figure downwards. Also, the portfolio yield statistics are not always up-to-date. And many MFIs do not report to the MixMarket. In the case of Kiva’s partner Tujijenge, for example, they have not filed data to the MixMarket since 2008. Even when they did bother to file data to the MixMarket, they failed to include the portfolio yield. However, it is fair to say that there may be some flaws with the MixMarket data itself.

Secondly, the figure takes the income over the period (a year), and divides this by the average portfolio. This is questionable, as the implicit assumption is that the portfolio grows linearly over the year. If the portfolio grows exponentially, this figure will be biased downwards (I can provide a mathematical proof if anyone is interested). But this is a relatively minor point.

The next point that Kiva raise is that the yield includes all fees. To correctly report the yield it is correct to include all fees, the question is whether the MFIs do this. It is extremely easy to avoid reporting fees in the audited accounts, and this is not necessarily illegal in the countries in question. One trick is to do a thing called “off-setting”. The MFI takes these fees and nets them off against some of the branch level expenses, before consolidating the accounts. This is not illegal, and the final audited accounts are unchanged, so the auditor doesn’t mind. For example, assume an MFI makes $1.000 in interest and $100 in fees on a constant portfolio of $2.000. Its total operating expenses for the year are $500. This MFI can report this in two ways:

  • Total income is $1.000 + $100 = $1.100, on a portfolio of $2.000, so the portfolio yield is 55%
  • Its operating costs ($500) are 25% of the portfolio, i.e. it costs the MFI $0.25 for every dollar outstanding
  • Total profit is $1.100 – $500 = $600

Or it can off-set the fee income to pay local branch expenses, and report the following:

  • Total income is $1.000, on a portfolio of $2.000, so the portfolio yield is 50%
  • Its operating costs ($500 – $100 = $400) are 20% of the portfolio, i.e. it costs the MFI $0.20 for every dollar outstanding
  • Total profit is $1.000 – $400 = $600

Now, to most people this makes very little difference, the totals are the same. The MFI is not stealing, it is simply moving money from one pocket to another. At the end of the year it still spent $500, got $100 in fees and $1.000 in interest either way, the portfolio was $2.000 in either case, and the profit is the same. By moving from the first method to the second the MFI reduces the portfolio yield and reduces the operating cost ratio – what it gains in one it loses in the other. Essentially a yield of 55% and an operating cost ratio of 25% is the same as a yield of 50% and an operating cost ratio of 20%. So, why would an MFI want to move from the first option to the second?

Simple: the second example appears less expensive to the poor, and more efficient in terms of operating expenses, both of which endear the bank to the investors. The other point to make here is that there is a spectrum of combinations of yields and operating cost ratios which mean the same thing – one of which is reported by the MFI to the MixMarket and reproduced on Kiva. How do we know if this is accurate? Does Kiva go through the account consolidation process? Do any investors? Ask Triple Jump or Blue Orchard if they check for this – if they are reading this blog I expect they are furiously taking notes. Does this happen with Kiva MFIs? Who knows, but it is certainly not illegal in most jurisdictions, and would make complete sense for the MFIs to try to do this. So, let me stress, I am NOT suggesting this is happening with Kiva partners, I am merely suggesting that it is entirely rational for MFIs to do this, and given the broader criticisms I have made elsewhere regarding the due diligence performed by these jokers, I would be extremely surprised if they detect this flaw.

But then we come to the most important part: forced savings. These have a dramatic impact on the cost of capital. The FAQ section of MFTransparency states:

“Security deposits [forced savings usually] are left out of the price calculation in formal regulations of many countries, but is a very serious loophole which can be exploited to dramatically increase the true cost of the loan to the client.” [emphasis added]

This couldn’t be much clearer. The critical fact is that all costs, all cashflows, all fees must be considered. If I have to deposit $20 in order to obtain a $100 loan, I am only actually receiving a net $80. The APR reflects these deposits, and any interest that may be earned on such deposits, to construct the APR to reflect ALL expenses according to microfinance best-practice. Chuck Waterfield, the founder of MFTransparency, is a veteran microfinance practitioner, probably the world expert on microfinance interest rates, a man of great integrity, respected worldwide, honest and hard-working and the data he produces should be taken extremely seriously. He is a staunch advocate for the poor and an example to the sector of genuine transparency. Portfolio yield excludes the effect of forced saving and should therefore NOT be considered a proxy for the APR in any MFI that engages in such practices.

Finally, the portfolio yield, for all its flaws, is simply an average. If an MFI charges rates of 40% to 100%, is it fair to state that the average is 70%? It might be accurate, but do Kiva users want to lend money at 100%? They have no way of knowing. Perhaps the Kiva loans are all lent at 100%, and the MFI’s other loans funded elsewhere are the 40% loans. The average will be the same, but is this transparent?

But, perhaps the weirdest question of all is why the MFI cannot simply state “Kiva loans are lent at xx%”. Why should this be so hard? They have various loan products with various interest rates. The MFIs know precisely how much each client is paying. Why can they not simply say “we will lend Kiva money at xx%?”. I will leave this question open for the time-being, but think about this. If you go to the bank and ask for a loan, would you be a little surprised if the bank replied “sure, the interest rates are usually between 10% and 20%”? Perhaps an approximation as you make an initial enquiry is acceptable, but Kiva state this average after the loan has been disbursed.

So, by way of summary, let’s just compare the stated portfolio yields of a few MFIs that use Kiva and are also reported on the website of MFTransparency – this will give us a feel for how well the portfolio yield stacks up with the actual APRs charged to the poor. The graphs below follow the same format: the black line is the average for the country, and consistently demonstrates that the interest rates are lower on larger loans. The bubbles are the loan products of the specific bank in question, with the APRs recorded on the vertical axis, the loan size on the horizontal axis. I will focus on Africa as this is where the divergences between APRs and portfolio yields tend to be the largest.

Juhudi Kilimo – Kenya, Kiva stated rate: 25.7%

It appears this MFI charges substantially more than the Kiva rate in all cases

Selfina – Tanzania, Kiva stated rate: 25.23%

It’s hard to imagine how an average of only 25% could emerge from this data

Hluvuku Adesma – Mozambique, Kiva stated rate: 42.69%

Although this MFI is cheaper than the average in Mozambique, very few loans appear to be even close to the Kiva stated rate

Christian Rural Aid Network – Ghana, Kiva stated rate: 33.64%

Once again, it appears the actual APRs and the Kiva portfolio yield diverge dramatically

UGAFODE – Uganda, Kiva stated rate: 47.34%

Real APRs are way in excess of the Kiva stated rate

Amasezerano Community Banking – Rwanda, Kiva stated rate: 39.96%

Possibly Kiva loans are the cheap ones, but again, the main loan products cost in excess of 60%

Yehu Microfinance Trust –  Kenya, Kiva stated rate: 37.39%

Is a pattern emerging here?

 Urwego – Rwanda, Kiva stated rate: 50.63%

They have a few cheaper loans, but the main products are above 60% APR

BRAC – Tanzania, Kiva stated rate: 47.44%

Once again, the vast majority of loans are way in excess of the portfolio yield

 Tujijenge – Tanzania, Kiva stated rate: 66.1%

Actually this looks fairly accurate, although some are costing approaching 100%, 66.1% is certainly not a fair average. (This MFI is deeply flawed for other reasons, see my recently blog post)

So, what can we conclude from this? First, it appears that the actual APRs charged to the poor are consistently higher than the portfolio yields stated by Kiva. This lends additional weight to not trusting this statistic as a fair proxy for the interest rate. By extension we can therefore assume that most Kivans are unaware of the actual rates that the poor are paying, as they rely on this flawed statistic. Do we believe that Kiva are unaware of this divergence? This is a double-edged sword, as if they claim they have no idea, one must question their broad knowledge of microfinance. Kiva has channelled hundreds of millions of dollars to the poor via these MFIs, and if they are unaware that the poor may be paying massively more than that stated, we may have a serious problem with Kiva managerial competence. But if they are aware, then why would they continue citing a knowingly flawed statistic?

I do not believe Kiva management are incompetent. I believe they are fully aware of this and chose to use the portfolio yield statistic simply because it presents a rosy impression of interest rates. I am yet to find a case when this does not act in Kiva’s favour, i.e. an MFI that is charging APRs lower than the portfolio yield. Kiva can defend this stance by claiming this is “verified information” from the MixMarket, and that they do not actually state that the portfolio yield is the interest rate, so legally they are protected. But are they protected morally?

Any claim that it is too complicated to calculate the real interest rate is nonsense. MFTransparency seem fairly able to do it. They publish an interest rate calculator on their website for free download. MyC4, another microfinance lending platform who occasionally partner with the same MFIs as Kiva, are able to publish the actual APRs to two decimal places. Calculating APRs is not rocket-science.

Are the MFIs lying to the MixMarket? Perhaps sometimes, but in fact the portfolio yield may in fact be accurate – it just isn’t a proxy for the actual cost of capital to the poor clients. Is Kiva lying to the Kivans? No, it is presenting factual information and the interested reader can find out that Kiva do actually warn (in the small print) about too closely equating portfolio yield with the interest rate. But could Kiva do better? Yes. And are we all turning a convenient blind eye to the rather sensitive topic of extortionate interest rates? Most certainly. Is this transparent? In my opinion, no.

Kivans like to believe they are helping the poor, and in order to achieve this Kiva needs to provide them with minimal, but reassuring information. Some nice photos, a little story, and as favourable an impression of the actual interest rates as possible, as this is an emotive topic that will irritate many Kivans. They can get away with rates of 30%, 40%, even 50%, but they have to avoid rates which will raise too many questions, and by citing a statistic known to be deeply flawed, but reassuring the Kivans, is the best way to do this. Kiva endorsed the SMART Campaign initiative on transparent pricing blah blah… is this transparent? I repeat, again, the quote from Wagane Diouf in his testimony to the House of Representatives:

“I get seriously worried when these institutions [MFIs] start mobilizing funds from institutions that attract capital from individuals in the US and other western countries, such as, um, I won’t mention their name, but institutions that have web-driven mechanisms to attract investments, but the financial reporting of the institutions that are receiving these funds are not up to standard at all, they are very poorly regulated, it’s a very opaque part of the industry.”[emphasis added]

 

 

 

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What Do The Microfinance Sector & Lance Armstrong Have In Common?

  • They’ve both had sponsors abandon them
  • They were both apparently miraculous, and then disgraced
  • They both made promises they couldn’t (honestly) keep
  • They both managed to out-fox regulators for decades
  • They both lied to the world for extended periods
  • They both accumulated vast sums in the process
  • They both masterminded an almost cult-like following

Nike resolutely backed Lance Armstrong while the rumours of doping emerged, but eventually said “ya basta” and abandoned him. Some microfinance investors, funds and even countries have done likewise. Everyone defended the miracle cure for poverty while the first evidence emerged of something wrong in the sector, but some eventually took drastic action. The Norwegian government stopped all microfinance investing (apart from in South Sudan, apparently). Stichting DOEN largely quit the sector. Unitus pulled out some time ago. The focus is now shifting away from microfinance per se to “all inclusive finance” or “social impact investing”, discreet ways to reduce exposure to the ailing sector.

“Due to the seemingly insurmountable evidence that Armstrong participated in doping… we have terminated his contract… Nike does not condone the use of illegal performance enhancing drugs in any manner.” Nike

Or, “Due to the seemingly insurmountable evidence that microfinance is not working… we have decided to cease microfinance investments… we do not condone the use of futile and extortionate lending practices against poor vulnerable women in any manner” [authors pending]

Many, including Armstrong himself, had reluctantly acknowledged isolated cases of doping in the sport. It turned out to be a widespread network spanning dozens of the leading people in the sport, including doctors, regulators and the leading role-models, with Armstrong himself dishing out the candy from a well-stocked fridge. With each successive microfinance scandal we point the finger at the “rogue operators”, the “inept regulator” or the “unfortunate exceptional cases”. In fact the corruption permeates the leading institutions in the sector, the regulators are inert, the self-regulating bodies welcome the worst offenders with open arms, and Yunus himself has some unanswered questions lingering over him. Notice the parallels?

Yunus famously lamented the loan-sharks disguised as microfinance outfits, but failed to acknowledge that his own Grameen Foundation USA was an investor in one of the worst such offending banks. Citibank was behind the most dubious IPOs in the sector’s chequered history. What about the $2m payment to Maria Otero following the rather profitable Compartmos IPO raised on the back of poor Mexicans coughing up interest of 195% a year? Their mutual buddy Hillary Clinton was delighted with Accion, and supports Yunus to this day. Exploitative interest rates? Yes we can!

“We are no longer convinced that the international professional world of cycling can make this a clean and fair sport”Rabobank, cycling sponsors, early pioneers of microfinance

The evidence of microfinance having much impact on poverty is minimal, and the evidence of abuse is chronic. The Dutch parliament is currently investigating cases of misuse of public sector funding in microfinance on two counts: extortionate interest rates and personal enrichment. They can add a third – funds destined to microfinance activities which were discreetly diverted to other purposes, as Triple Jump accidentally admitted recently. But facts do not matter in such cases, politics and spin prevail. Drug testers would tip-off the cyclists regarding visits. Citibank sponsors the so-called industry watchdogs – is there really much difference? Accion host the SMART Campaign, Triple Jump bankroll the MicroCredit Summit Campaign. The conflicts of interest are rampant.

But an important difference between Armstrong and microfinance is worth noting: the US Anti-Doping Agency actually takes doping seriously, investigates claims, publishes results and takes action. Armstrong has had seven Tour de Frances titles stripped. What would the microfinance sector’s self-regulatory SMART Campaign have done:

“The SMART Campaign believes doping is bad, but we don’t mind if our members use dope. When confronted with overwhelming evidence of doping, our strategy is to do absolutely nothing. In fact, our main sponsor is one of the leading dope-manufacturers on the planet, but this doesn’t cloud our judgement, honestly”

Professional cycling is actually regulated, and still abuses occur. Microfinance is almost entirely un-regulated, and the most vocal opponents of regulation are the microfinance banks and investment funds, naturally. Evil, incompetent, aggressive regulators will harm the sector, we are told, best have no regulation whatsoever, and shove some of our buddies into so-called self-regulation to keep up appearances.

Cyclists were under immense pressure to perform, to excel, to break records, to exceed expectations, to woo crowds, to deliver the impossible, to put on a good show… and they resorted to doping to accomplish this. Top cyclists made fortunes and sponsors flooded in. The microfinance community claimed it would banish poverty altogether, future generations would have to visit museums to find out what poverty was. This was a ludicrous claim, and what did we do? We cut corners, we lied, we fiddled the books, we engaged PR companies, we boasted of 200 million poor people reached, without going into too much detail about whether reached meant helped. We turned a convenient blind eye. Armstrong and the microfinance sector lied. He used drugs. We used hype and spin.

“The importance attached to microfinance – presented as the cure-all to eliminate poverty – will raise expectations that cannot be fulfilled. If these expectations are disappointed, the public may be disillusioned and lose interest.”

See the similarity? This is not a bunch of amateurs, this is ProCredit Holding’s business philosophy written years ago. I won’t bore the reader with a history of the warnings about the microfinance hype – the writing was very clearly on the wall a decade ago but too many of us were riding the wave to pause to read it. It didn’t suit us to do so. Duvendack et al publish a report decimating the entire sector – the microfinance sector responds with 100 new photos of women with goats and a nice movie. Heinemann airs a documentary criticising the Godfather of the sector, Yunus himself, and the sector hires Burson Marstellar to do a spin campaign to discredit him. People accuse Armstrong of doping, everyone denies it… until it turned out he was in fact running the sport’s biggest, most sophisticated doping ring in cycling history. Some are screaming about the looming crisis in Mexico regarding chronic client over-indebtedness, most ignore it, until the music stops. Then we’ll blame the “corrupt Mexican regulators” or the “reckless Mexican banks”, or simply “poor peasant Mexicans”, as we did in Nicaragua.

The mantra cannot be broken: we are the saviours of the poor, they need us, without us they are doomed, we provide them with a human right, we will make fortunes in the process, and anyone who gets in our way cannot join our team, come to our conferences, or get our lucrative sponsorship deals. The poor should be grateful for our unwavering generosity, and pay us handsomely in the process. Armstrong didn’t do too badly out of his “services to cycling” I gather, and Otero isn’t complaining.

I warn people repeatedly not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Is anyone suggesting we ban cycling? Is anyone suggesting that everyone who owns a bicycle is a closet narco? Doping appears rampant in the entire professional cycling sector, but so is corruption in the microfinance sector. I take aim very directly at Citi, Deutsche, Triple Jump, Oxfam Novib, responsAbility, Blue Orchard, ASN Bank, Grameen Foundation, Kiva, Calvert Foundation, Standard Chartered, Incofin, World Relief etc. – this is not the entire microfinance investment sector, but it’s a large proportion of it. Armstrong denied the charges to begin with – these microfinance jesters haven’t even denied them – they just sit silently, hoping the latest wave of criticism will pass. Maybe my accusations were complete fantasy and not worth responding to? So why did one of their supposed leaders, the head of the MicroCredit Summit Campaign – Larry Reed – so openly praise the book? Lawyers pored over the book. Reputatble media have supported it. Then again, consider this rather sobering quote by Kim Wilson of Tufts, albeit related to Larry’s predecessor:

“We did not strike at the lies of the Microcredit Summit when we knew they were lies, or at the small fibs perpetuated by MFIs. We did not chip away at the menacing accretions that slowly layered in around the cause [] which in fact diverted us from the cause, one purportedly about women. Nor did we unite when we heard first hand from female borrowers who had been humiliated by loan collectors, their cows taken, their roofs ripped off, their children lent to the landlord. For decades we have girated dumbly inside the spin machine…. We can just stand by, ask meekly that we have social performance indicators, or we really can do something about it.”

It doesn’t matter whether you’re a professional cyclist or a microfinance investment fund manager, the solution is the same: acknowledge the problem, stop the spin, come out the closet, make realistic assurances on how you’ll improve the actual problem. Then solve it. Otherwise professional cycling will die, and so will microfinance. I will regain my faith in the sector when these jokers acknowledge the grave errors they have made. But they refuse to take responsibility for their actions, although they expect others to do so. They insist on transparency for others, but not themselves. Armstrong was a vocal critic of doping – and a user. Our Armstrongs are up to their armpits in the petty cash and have developed an unsavoury habit for doing so, like the junkie on smack. It’s hard to quit.

So, thank you Lance – you have shown us that we are not alone in lying, hypocrisy, deceit and self-interest. You managed to pull the wool over the eyes of Rabobank, Nike and a few million cycling enthusiasts for a decade or so, while we’ve pulled it over the eyes of governments, development organisations, investors, donors and an army of ill-informed Kivans. You deceived your fans, but what actual physical harm did you do – perhaps a little to yourself, but no one committed suicide because of your actions. Some of your fans may be a little disappointed, but you haven’t saddled 200 million people with unaffordable, mostly useless debts.

I personally wish Lance Armstrong all the best. Sure he screwed up, but actually he did nothing compared to the damage we have caused. I wish these microfinance folk would just close shop and shuffle off to some other sector where their victims are not poor vulnerable women desperate for a way out of poverty and willing to sign any contract offered to them – pick on someone your own size for a change. The few remaining good guys, and there are a few, can attempt to fix what is left, but this is impossible while the entire sector is run by an opaque, self-interested, Mafioso voodoo-cult.

Microfinance – on your bike.

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Oxfam Novib Squanders Yet More Tax-payer Money, Others Follow

I have been fairly critical of Kiva, as some of my more sensitive readers may have detected. Another peer-to-peer (P2P) microfinance platform, MyC4, actually endorsed my book. I did a project for MyC4 some years ago, helping them with their back-office system. They are somewhat comparable at the outset to Kiva, with the obvious difference that they are actually P2P (as opposed to peer-to-MFI disguised as P2P). As a result of this subtle distinction MyC4 are able to quote the actual interest rates on the loans, while Kiva cannot. Yesterday I froze my account with MyC4.

I typically lent to the poor via MyC4 at 10%-15%, which I consider reasonable: this covers inflation, the occasional default, some withholding tax and the forex risk. MyC4 charge a fee, about 6%, fair enough – they set up and run the thing. And the MFI that sources the clients and does the actual cash management and monitoring charges a fee (although they do not actually lend their own money of course – they lend mine). But fair enough, they need to cover costs. Despite MyC4 paying a modest return to its investors and being for-profit, the end recipient of the loan may actually pay less via MyC4 than through Kiva, but that’s an irony for another day.

One of the MFIs that MyC4 use is called Tujijenge. I’ve been wary of this outfit for a while. Take a guess at the fee they charge for lending my money to the poor? Yup, 50%. This is not an interest rate. You give me $100 to lend to a poor person, and I will charge that poor person $50 for lending your money. Sound ridiculous. See the MyC4 website (click “cost for business”). This is in addition to the actual interest charged, and all the fees.

So, I wrote to MyC4 to complain. I pointed out that many of their other MFI partners charge a fraction of this. KEEF charges 16% for the same service, for loans of similar sizes. The overall APR on Tujijenge loans clocks in at nearly 90%. Maybe life is just extremely expensive in Tanzania? The well-respected US-based NGO MFTransparency does nothing other than publish the interest rates of MFIs, and fortunately they have reported on Tanzania, including Tujijenge. The full date is visible here, but when we look at effective interest rates for Tujijenge, we see the following:

The black line is the Tanzania average, with smaller loans costing more than larger loans, as usual. The green bubbles are Tujijenge’s rates.

But, bear in mind these are the interest rates for Tujijenge lending its own funds. With MyC4 they’re charging the poor 50% for lending my money. I take the hit if the client doesn’t pay. I take the foreign exchange risk. Tujijenge pocket the 50%.

So, they’re above the national average, which is already eye-wateringly high in most people’s opinions. Ecuador has an interest rate cap of 30.5% APR and has a thriving, profitable microfinance sector and even concerns of over-indebtedness. Is Tanzania really that much more expensive to operate in?

According to MFTransprency (and I trust those guys), Tujijenge’s interest rates range from a relatively modest 67.2% to a stellar 150.6%, in terms of APR (Annual Percentage Rate). In terms of the EIR (Effective Interest Rate) the rates reach as high as 341.4%. Now, without entering into a lengthy debate about what interest rate constitutes extortion and which interest calculation method is better (EIR vs APR), does this seem like “affordable credit”?

What more can we find out about Tujijenge?

Well, they haven’t bothered reporting on the MixMarket since 2008, by which point they were already profitable with only 8.265 clients. They now have over double that. Their website is a little light on information, with no financials, no list of investors, in fact very little information about anything. It’s a private, for-profit company. They are members of the questionable Africa Microfinance Transparency Initiative (AMT), an initiative of limited competence but an uncanny ability to attract sordid institutions under its umbrella. I shall not devote additional space to discussing such futilities other than to demonstrate the broad range of interpretations possible with the word “transparency”. AMT do mention that Tujijenge gets only one transparency diamond according to the MixMarket, the lowest score possible, but they accepted them into AMT anyway.

However, guess who their “partners” are? Yes, that’s right, a profitable African MFI charging extortionate interest rates – Oxfam Novib, proud donors as usual. Yet more Dutch tax-payer money being pumped into a worthless privately-owned for-profit microfinance enterprise. Oxfam Novib aren’t alone in squandering the Dutch tax-payers hard earned Euros into silly practices, the usually ethical Oikocredit let down its guard on this one also. They just can’t spend that tax and donor money quickly enough.

Perhaps Tanzania suffers from high inflation? Er, no, it’s been between 6% and 13% since Tujijenge was formed in 2006. Maybe Tujijenge serves those famous isolated rural Africans who live in forgotten corners of the country necessitating vast travel budgets to reach? Er, no, it appears “61% – 100%” are urban clients. Perhaps the cost of living is high in Tanzania? Apparently it’s the fourth cheapest country in all of Africa.

Or perhaps the loan default rate is so high that Tujijenge has to charge high rates to cover for the non-repaying clients? Its default rate in Tanzania is a mere 0.38%, and in Uganda it is yet to suffer a single default. So, what could possibly be explaining these astronomical rates?

Perhaps the desire to make vast profit from exploiting poor, vulnerable Africans. Wouldn’t be the first, would it?

The plot thickens further. According to the MFTransparency website MyC4 loans on Tujijenge cost 41%, but according to the MyC4 website, loans via Tujijenge cost approaching 90% all up, with Tujijenge taking a 50% fee. In fairness, when the total cost of capital is so high, what’s an additional 9% here and there? Mortgage payers in Europe may disagree, but they have human rights and consumer protection and regulators looking after them. Poor Tanzanians.

I then thought the Tujijenge website might be enlightening. Wrong again. Besides being utterly primitive and devoid of any remotely useful information, it contained some unusual statements:

“Tujijenge recognizes all Tanzanians as its customers. This means apart from our core activity of offering loans to micro and small entrepreneurs, we are also involved in community serving activities. Our staff team dedicate collective efforts to see Tanzanian communities boom bothways financially and socially. This is why we feel responsible in taking care of our society morally and materially by donating blood to the needy and supporting victims of various catastrophies arising in our country.”

So, besides redefining the common spelling of catastrophes and inventing a new word (bothways), they have pioneered a novel incentive plan to lure clients. Free blood. The website does not explain where they get this blood from, however. Perhaps the staff? Or maybe they take blood from non-repaying clients in lieu of penalty interest? And Tujijenge has generously recognized the entire Tanzanian population as its customers. So would I at these rates, were I a blood-sucking moneylender. But they go on. Their mission, in additional to making vast sums of money off the backs of vulnerable poor people, is “to improve the quality of lives of families in Tanzania through [the] provision of micro finance.” This has presumably fuelled the financial and social boom referred to previously, that no economist, sociologist or conscious human being has yet detected. They provide no supporting evidence of this claim, nor do they state how it could ever be measured.

And finally, there are five core values which guide Tujijenge to this astonishing but un-proven result: sustainability (i.e. profitability), integrity (no idea where that comes in), teamwork (work hard making sure these poor folk pay on time and we’ll pay you a reasonable salary, otherwise we’ll fire you), transparency (a cruel joke presumably, but a word that all MFIs have to have on their website somewhere, along with impact, empowerment and values), and respect for humanity (or rather, respect for people who will pay you such high interest when all you do is lend them someone else’s money, aka respect for the goose that lays the golden eggs).

Apart from these nuggets of wisdom, the website is a farce, but of mild nostalgic value to anyone who wishes to recall what a website from the early 1990’s looked like. And the spelling is appalling. Wikipedia suggests English is one of two official languages in the country. I guess the person who dedicated a full 15 minutes to constructing this website must have been proficient in the other one.

Adding insult to injury it transpires that they actually got a social rating, in 2010. It’s an amusing read. The section on “client protection and ethical finance” scores a “1-”. The only grade lower, on the scale from 0 to 5, is 0. What does it actually mean to score a zero on client protection and ethical finance? The report elaborates:

“[1] Despite the fact that over-or cross indebtedness is high amongst the clientele, no specific measures are put in place to limit the risk; [2] Information given to client is not sufficient to guarantee transparency on pricing as clients are not given the effective cost of the loan and documentation of transaction is not given to all members of groups; [3] Current policies and procedures do not sufficiently prevent the occurrence of inappropriate collection practices, which have been noted in the recent past.”

AMT must be delighted – this sits wonderfully with their other proud member, LAPO. So, Tujijenge do absolutely nothing to prevent clients from getting cripplingly over-indebted, lie about the interest rates, and sometimes mistreat non-repaying clients? Does this include a little torture perhaps? Women in India were forced into suicide and prostitution – do we see an early warning sign of comparable debt-collection practices?

But, to reassure anyone who may be a tad concerned about all this, Tujijenge endorsed the SMART Campaign, promoting the virtues of transparent pricing and preventing over-indebtedness, despite Tujijenge scoring almost zero on both these topics. Naturally the SMART Campaign couldn’t care less about this, because they collect endorsements alone, they don’t actually do anything. The sad fact is, the social impact report could have stated “Tujijenge regularly rape and pillage entire villages and torture delinquent clients with blunt, rusty knives while executing defaulting clients with Kalashnikovs obtained from their mafia operations and are the only MFI in Africa to actively insist upon prostitution, drug-trafficking and child-labour as conditions for a loan” and SMART would not bat an eye-lid. It’s called self-regulation by some people. I call it window-dressing. Anyway, we’ll save SMART for another day.

So, returning to the central theme, I wrote to MyC4 and told them I will be pausing all lending pending a response from them regarding their dealings with Tujijenge. I can, of course, simply choose to not lend via Tujijenge, but that is turning a blind-eye. I refuse to have anything to do with such moneylenders, and if this behaviour is deemed acceptable by MyC4, then I no longer find MyC4 acceptable – that is my opinion, I am entitled to it, it is my money, and I will move it elsewhere. The joys of capitalism and a free press – you can vote with your wallet and then write about it. Besides, I’m a campaigner for fair pricing; I can’t turn a blind-eye to this even if I wanted to.

The argument that if MyC4 pulled out the practices would continue regardless, or that the evil moneylenders are more expensive, holds no water with me. This is the famous Grameen Foundation argument in defence of LAPO (144% APR). We’re not screwing you because someone else would screw you slightly more than we are. Some (morons) might buy this argument, it’s yet to persuade me.

But then I discovered another interesting fact. Guess who also lends through Tujijenge? Yes, our friends at Kiva. They have pumped $4.6m to this veritable institution over the last 5 years, at a reported portfolio yield (Kiva’s equivalent of an interest rate, given that it isn’t in fact a P2P this is the best they can do) of 66.1%. They do at least confirm the astonishingly low default rate of a mere 0.08%. Of course, according to the MFTransparency data there is no separate Kiva loan identified, as there is with MyC4, because there is no such a thing as a Kiva loan, a small detail that millions of naive Kivans have failed to notice over the years. The fact that a Kiva loan, provided interest free to Tujijenge, costs more to the poor recipient than a MyC4 loan, is somewhat ironic, but this will be lost on 99% of Kivans.

This, of course, brings us to the question of whether any of this has the slightest impact on the poor. Financial inclusion, triple bottom line, credit as a human right blah blah, the bottom line is that no one has yet come up with any convincing evidence that microfinance has the slightest overall impact on poverty reduction, and it is fair to say that with triple-digit interest rates this is not entirely surprising. This does not mean that all microfinance is bad. It means some is good, some is bad, on average it’s simply useless. The evidence I see here regarding this particular MFI, gathered in an hour online, suggests to me it is pretty clear in which camp Tujijenge sits, and I don’t want to have anything to do with them, or anything to do with people who support such activities.

So, I’m afraid to say, it looks like we have yet another case of an extortionate, money-grabbing MFI dressed up as a beneficial do-good saviour to the poor, sapping money from naive investors once again (and a naive government in the case of Oxfam Novib, although I was surprised to see Oikocredit are involved), screwing poor Africans for the sake of the enriching a few individuals. In short, just another typical MFI.

Obviously this is more intriguing currently, as Oxfam Novib is facing some heat from the Dutch parliament currently over mis-use of public funding. The politicians were rather concerned with tax-payer funds being used for extortionate lending practices, amongst other gripes. Maybe they will tolerate this case on the grounds that the clients got some free blood thrown into the deal? But that Oikocredit also supports this organisation is astonishing.

But, I for one will be removing my money from MyC4 unless they either cease dealing with Tujijenge or oblige them to reduce the fee to under 20%, by the end of this month. Instead I will put my money into Zidisha, a similar outfit that doesn’t exploit poor people. Are they perfect? I doubt it. My wife and I have had a sniff around them and they seem a step-up from the likes of Kiva and MyC4, the interest rates at least are reasonable – double digits, and even under 20% when all costs are considered – a positive bargain. We did $400 so far, seems to have gone ok, the site is pretty easy to use, I spoke to the CEO and she seems to have her head screwed on, which already puts her in the top 1% of this sector. But until we see the full loan process I am not forming an opinion on these folk either, but innocent until proven guilty is a cautious working assumption. The others are just guilty. I won’t earn such a decent return on Zidisha, but who cares? I’m not putting my life savings in there. But I can sleep at night knowing there isn’t some woman slaving away in some “micro-enterprise” desperately trying to boost her income by 90% just to cover the interest rate. Who knows, I might actually help her.

This is all to do with signalling. When Oikocredit or MyC4 invest in Tujijenge, or Grameen Foundation and Triple Jump etc. invest in LAPO, they justify the deals in terms of financial inclusion jargon, but at the end of the day they are rewarding extortionate money-lenders. If these funds had the courage to simply say “no, we will not give you a dime for as long as you keep exploiting the poor”, then they might actually stop exploiting the poor. Put a limit of 60% – it’s hardly a restrictive ceiling. Many (regulated) countries are perfectly able to operate at interest rates far below 60%. But, of course, this reduces profitability, and that is what they’re all after, although few admit it. If it really is impossible to lend at rates under 150% and cover costs, maybe it’s better to simply not lend? Is there really no limit? 500%? 5000%? Why will the microfinance sector not define extortion? We have all these campaigns claiming to prevent it, but they haven’t bothered to define it yet.

What is my advice to other people in this situation?

If you’ve invested in Tujijenge via Kiva, just get out of financial services altogether, they are clearly not for you. If you invested via MyC4, write them a letter threatening to pull your money out, if enough people do so they’ll panic (bad publicity and loss of income are the only two ways to prompt action, remember). If you think that lending money at these interest rates to poor, vulnerable women in Africa is actually helping them, and by implication that the bulk of academic research is incorrect and that you are correct, then good luck in your fantasy world. And if you are simply despairing of the entire sector – join the club. But before you abandon microfinance altogether, write the threatening letter, complain to someone, blog about it, write to your local newspaper, do something, anything. If you just quit nothing will improve. Start shouting loudly, if enough people join you it might actually work.

Oikocredit are being very foolish here in my opinion – they have a reasonable reputation, and currently the Dutch microfinance sector is in turmoil, with politicians sniffing around, and Oxfam Novib/Triple Jump currently the laughing stock of the sector. This is a good moment for Oikocredit to be clean as a whistle, and possibly hoover up some additional funds coming their way if the Dutch government finally acknowledges that Oxfam Novib/Triple Jump are incompetent fund managers. But they look just as questionable now. Oikocredit should immediately withdraw from Tujijenge and apologize to its donors for a minor error and clearly explain the measures they are taking to prevent this from happening again. That’s called transparency.

And finally, the Dutch government should regulate this sector immediately and extend the investigation of mis-use of public funding to Oikocredit also.

Mohammed Yunus, whom I quote frequently, summarised it succinctly.

“I never imagined that one day microcredit would give rise to its own breed of loan sharks.”

You have to laugh a little here. The alternative is to cry. We have created such a ludicrous fascination with debt and capitalism and self-help and teach-a-man-to-fish nonsense that we have actually begun to believe our own spin. Kivans, MyC4 folk and entire investment funds remain absolutely convinced that literally hundreds of millions of poor people are wondering around in developing countries over the moon with joy that they can borrow money at 100% interest a year. The fact that the majority of these imbeciles (I refer to the investors, not the poor) moan about credit card rates of 20% a year, their mortgage at 5% a year, and think that the entire nation of Spain will collapse if it has to pay more than 7% per year is mere detail to these folk. And they have an astonishing ability to ignore the actual evidence in front of them.

Is this what Orwell called “Groupthink”? Or is it what I call “Stupidity”?

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Corrupt Microfinance Players attend Conference

The list of confirmed speakers at the forthcoming Capital Markets Conference reads like a summary of the worst offending parties mentioned in my book. Perhaps not surprisingly, I was not invited to the conference, although I would have rather enjoyed firing some questions at these guys. But, given the multitudes of eager microfinance folk attending, perhaps other people may be curious to hear answers to some of these questions. The conference is managed by the generally ethical and effective Women’s World Bank – a decent bunch of women specifically aiming to promote women’s rights. Cool, of the MFIs I know within the WWB network they are generally pretty good (Xac Bank and Ujjivan are fine example), and this is an institution I largely respect. But, their principal sponsor is Citibank, and everyone dances to the tune the piper plays. Conflicts of interest perhaps?

Confirmed Speakers (and the questions I’d love to ask them)

Bob Annibale, Citi Microfinance

“Your institution has been associated with some of the worst MFIs on Earth, from SKS to Compartamos and LAPO. Your testimony to the House of Representatives suggested that you only invested in legal MFIs, and yet LAPO was very demonstrably and repeatedly described as illegal. Do you believe that by sponsoring these sorts of events that people will somehow ignore these indiscretions?”

Chuck Olson, Blue Orchard Finance

“While you were at Deutsche Bank you managed to invest in LAPO, one of the most dis-credited MFIs on the planet. You then moved to Blue Orchard, where you invested in LAPO again, despite other funds having pulled out of LAPO and the MFI finding itself on the front page of the New York Times. Finally Blue Orchard issued a false press release defending your investment in LAPO. How can we take any claims of ethics, responsible investing or transparency seriously when mentioned in the same sentence as Blue Orchard?”

Elizabeth Littlefield, Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Sandra Callison, Habitat for Humanity:

“You managed to select Triple Jump as your fund manager for the OPIC/Habitat fund. Triple Jump has been heavily criticised in a recent book, been subject of an exposé documentary in Holland, and two politicians have now asked nine questions to the Dutch parliament about mis-use of public funds. Triple Jump has failed to comment on these allegations, and OPIC is also public sector funding. Is OPIC concerned about accusations of mis-used public funding by their selected fund manager, and could you briefly explain your due diligence process that led you to select this fund manager? ”

Laura Foose, Social Performance Task Force

“Could you explain why the SPTF and the SMART Campaign have refused to include the rights of children? Even suggesting that MFIs obey the child labour laws in their countries would be a step in the right direction. Academic research is now emerging regarding the adverse effects of microfinance upon child education. Will you address this rather obvious aspect of client protection?”

Lisa Hall, Calvert Foundation

“You institution was heavily criticised in the book, suggesting with firm evidence that you were deceived by Triple Jump regarding your investment in LAPO, and yet you continue pumping money to Triple Jump. Do you honestly believe LAPO was an isolated incident?”

Mark Berryman, Deutsche Bank Global Social Investment Funds

“Does Deutsche Bank secretly regret investing in LAPO?”

Martin Heimes, responsAbility

“Did your due diligence process of LAPO extend to reading any ratings or the front page of the New York Times?”

Martin Holtmann, International Finance Corporation

“There is a rumour going round that you folk were thinking of investing in LAPO? Can you confirm this?”

Mary Ellen Iskenderian, Women’s World Banking

“WWB is a highly reputable institution. Why did you ask such a medley of institutions with highly questionable reputations to speak at your event? Not a single one of these institutions has refuted any of the charges made in the book, and the book has received support from the very highest levels of the sector. Have you read the book? What do you think of the activities described? In particular, do you believe that your main sponsor, Citi Microfinance, told the truth to the House of Representatives?”

Steve Wright, Grameen Foundation

“When your CEO, Alex Counts, defended LAPO’s interest rates (of up to 144%) on the basis that they were cheaper than a moneylender, many people considered this a farcical response. He denied the interest rates charged by LAPO on camera in the Tom Heinemann documentary, although they were subsequently proved by MFTransparency, the authority in the sector on transparent interest rates. Meanwhile Mohammad Yunus has been lecturing the world on the dangers of high interest rates, and would presumably be deeply disturbed by your open support of LAPO. What is GFUSA’s view of extortionate interest rates?”

Tumendemberel Naidorj, XacBank

“Xac Bank is one of the best MFIs on the planet, and a proud member of the WWB network. How does it feel to be in a conference with some of the worst offenders in the sector?”

Anyway, the website also says they will be Tweeting live apparently (#cmc2012), so perhaps they’ll take questions? If anyone is going to this conference, ask one of these questions, or any tough question. This is how we first put ASN-Novib’s investment in LAPO into the public domain. Try to record the question and the answer, send it to me and I’ll post it here. If these guys have earned such a platform to lecture us from, they can face some tough questions from the audience in the meantime.

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Doomsday

…. is probably how Triple Jump described the day the KRO-Reporter documentary came out. In fact the day I received the attached document (Triple Jump/Incofin letter to LAPO March 2010) was Doomsday. They now face questions in the Dutch parliament. They stand ridiculed in a documentary. The leaders of their beloved sector are abandoning them. Having worked a decade in this sector, only two people I know take Triple Jump seriously, and both work at Triple Jump. Calls for the formal regulation of the microfinance investment sector grow by the day, and Triple Jump find themselves as the central protagonist in the case. And now I hear them groaning, “Not another leaked document”. Yup, another leaked document, and they have no idea from where.

The document has been authenticated by Incofin (Ellen Wouters, Chief Legal Officer: “This morning, I checked internally with my colleagues, and this is indeed a letter that we sent to LAPO”). If it’s false, sue her. It was leaked to me by one of various insiders who have increasingly felt emboldened to speak out. Many are angry at the state of the sector, and if my book has served any purpose at all, it is that people now feel they can express their concerns about what is really happening in microfinance.

Two pages. Five bullet points. One catastrophe.

On March 5th 2010 Incofin and Triple Jump wrote to LAPO. They both knew they were in deep trouble regarding this investment. Let’s save Incofin for another day for the moment. What do they confess, inadvertently, in this document?

The document was written in response to the rating report prepared by Planet Rating. This had been requested in response to the mounting accusations against LAPO by Asad Mahmood of Deutsche Bank, and revealed all manner of problems. LAPO’s investors were desperately hoping that Planet Rating would dispel the myths about LAPO’s appalling behaviour. In fact they added salt to the wound. Interest rates of 144%, savings frauds, illegal operations, nepotism, the report reads like a microfinance crime scene.

  • First, years after their initial investment, Triple Jump pleads with LAPO to get someone other than their brother to do an audit of the company. Yes, these funds had all invested however many millions of dollars on the basis of the audit done by the brother of one of the board directors. In Nigeria. LAPO had apparently promised to get a sensible company to audit them, but had reneged on the promise. Dutch taxpayer money, the funds of Deutsche Bank’s wealthy clients, all those Kivans who had so generously pumped in $5m in $25 chunks to eradicate poverty, the ASN Bank savers and pensioners, and still no meaningful audit. It’s a joke.
  • Second, the interest rate charged. LAPO promised it would go down. But instead increased it. And not by a few basis points as we are accustomed to in Europe, but to a whopping 144%. Ooops. And ASN denied this a few weeks ago in the KRO-Reporter documentary. It’s the ASN Bank funds that Triple Jump is writing about, ASN Bank partially own Triple Jump, for Pete’s sake – at least get your stories straight!
  • Third, LAPO should stop being illegal. Well, that’s a small step in the right direction, but one wonders what the endless investors and donors in ASN Bank, Oxfam Novib, Deutsche Bank, Standard Chartered, Grameen Foundation USA, BlueOrchard, responsAbility, Incofin, Kiva, Calvert Foundation etc. would think of their beloved funds having invested in an illegal operation in the first place. We bang on about client protection principles (LAPO does those too, apparently), but surely a good starting point would be that the institution is at least legal? A minor detail that had evaded their rigorous due diligence processes.

I’m going to skip to the fifth bullet point, because I want to save the fourth for last.

  • Fifth, LAPO was caught sneaking in yet another fee to the poor. The “risk premium”, which had evaded the audit (done by the brother). Yes, as if these interest rates weren’t high enough already, even Triple Jump were alarmed by this new fee for the poor.

But the fourth point is the classic. [Drum roll] LAPO isn’t even investing this money in microfinance. As astonishing as it may sound, Triple Jump was “concerned” that LAPO had been channelling money to “affiliated LAPO organizations”. They amounted to 23% of the equity of the entire organization, and were “not in line with the core business of LAPO”.

So, all those investors in these various funds; those loyal Dutch taxpayers; the ever-generous Dutch government; those hordes of Kivans desperate to save the world from poverty, had all been pumping money to an organisation that wasn’t even doing microfinance! Where was the money going? Who knows? Triple Jump don’t hint at this, and let’s face it, it’s pretty clear they don’t know their **** from their elbow. They were shooting in the dark from the outset on this deal, duped by a rather clever Nigerian family, and ended up looking so ridiculous that it remains a mystery to me that the Dutch police haven’t arrested them yet. Then we have their board chairman, the charismatic Ab Engelsman (also of ASN Bank and Oikocredit, alas), telling KRO-Reporter (only a few weeks ago) that LAPO never deceived them, and if he had his time again, he’d still invest in LAPO. The guy is head of the Netherland Microfinance Platform, and this letter was written by Triple Jump! We have Calvert Foundation stating repeatedly that they “stand by their investment in LAPO”. Grameen Foundation reckons that rates of 144% are perfectly reasonable because some money lender is apparently a little more pricey. Kiva don’t care in the slightest what interest rates are charged to the poor (24%, 126%, it’s all the same to them, the Kivans will never notice). Deutsche , BlueOrchard, Citi and responsAbility are salivating at the sight of such massive operating margins, albeit originating from the hard work of exploited, vulnerable poor folk. Oxfam Novib have no idea what day of the week it is, and openly contradict the tripe spewed by their partner ASN Bank. Incofin are speechless that they managed to make such a catastrophic mistake. Schwaab Foundation handed these jesters (LAPO, not Triple Jump) an award shortly after they suffered the first ever rating withdrawal in microfinance history and landed on the front page of the NYT. And the CEO of LAPO just pocketed 12% of the equity of the company having enslaved the best part of a million people in debt.

These people should go to prison. Mis-use of public funding, deception, fraud, corruption, take your pick.

The problem is endemic. The microfinance investment funds are largely fraudulent. They tarnish the reputation of the few good players remaining. Microfinance may or may not be a flawed concept, but the practice of microfinance facilitated by these funds is totally flawed.

So, if you’re a Dutch tax-payer – refuse to pay your taxes until Triple Jump is closed down and your microfinance sector is regulated by thinking, ethical adults. Holland has a golden opportunity to lead the way here, don’t blow it. If you’re a Kivan, go back to school. If you’re an ASN investor, put your money under the mattress instead. If you accidentally invested in Citi, Deutsche, BlueOrchard, responsAbility, Incofin or Standard Chartered, ask for it back toute suite. If you donated to Oxfam Novib or Grameen Foundation, sue them. And if you’re the Dutch regulator, get out of bed.

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ASN Bank’s “Ethical” Microfinance

ASN Bank was badly implicated in my book. They failed to make a single comment until KRO-Reporter exposed their activities on September 28th 2012. For anyone still labouring under the belief that this is an ethical bank, watch the documentary, read the book, and read their lame response (Dutch available here, English below). Not only do they fail to answer any of the questions sensibly, but they avoid the central claims of the book with painstaking precision. Below I provide a transcript of the Q&A between ASN Bank and KRO-Reporter (my translation) and my comments.

Triple Jump had previously attempted to refute the claims in the book, privately – no public comment to date. Noted Indian microfinance expert Ramesh Arunachalam (author of the definitive text on Indian microfinance) published their response, which I then annihilated. It appears these Dutch players don’t really know how to answer the questions they now face. The documentary has already led to nine questions addressed to the Dutch government, which I will address in a subsequent post. The pressure is mounting on ASN Bank, Triple Jump and Oxfam Novib. They better get used to facing questions.

KRO-Reporter introduction:
ASN Bank, with the ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund that invests in MFIs, chose not to respond to the findings of KRO-Reporter on camera. However, the bank was willing to reply in writing to questions.

KRO-Reporter question:
On 17 April 2009, Godwin Ehigiamusoe from  LAPO [Nigerian microfinance institution] was a guest speaker at a meeting of ASN investment funds in the Beurs van Berlage in Amsterdam. The meeting concluded with a question and answer session. From the audience came the following question:

“The essential battle is to lift the poor out of poverty, and I think everyone in this room trusts their money with the ASN Novib fund is a good cause. Now if you actually look at the actual cost that LAPO is charging poor Nigerian women you will see that this is approximately 110 percent per year when you consider all the costs. (….) So LAPO is basically one of the most expensive MFI’s that there is, and one of the most profitable. So my question to all or you is: Is poverty alleviation really happening at these interest rates?”

The report of this meeting on the website of ASN Bank states that “the meeting ended with a lively question and answer session.” About the question quoted above, however, there is no mention in the report on the website. Why not?

ASN Bank answer:
ASN Bank provides on its website a summary report of the meeting of the ASN Investment Funds. This meeting is attended by relevant and critical investors / participants of the various funds. Also at the meeting of the ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund there are therefore always many critical questions, including on the interest rates that the clients of MFIs pay. This one question is no exception. In addition, all minutes of meetings are retrievable for participants / investors. The report is thus intended to provide a general impression, the minutes to give a full report on all parts and questions discussed.

Hugh comment: The minutes were censored because ASN Bank had been caught red-handed exploiting the poor. The question was extremely embarrassing for ASN Bank at the time – I was there, I know. It remains extremely embarrassing for them to this day. However, this was alas the beginning of the criticisms against Holland’s leading “ethical” bank. The original question can be heard in the documentary, or on my website.

 
KRO-Reporter question:
A little less than three months after the said meeting in the July issue of Spaarmotief [ASN Bank promotional magazine for investors] appears an interview with Mark of Doesburgh, director of Triple Jump, the organization that on behalf of the ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund gave a loan of 1 million to the Nigerian bank LAPO. The question of ASNs Spaarmotief reads: “How much interest do borrowers pay?” To which van Doesburgh answers: “That is quite high, typically 25 to 30 percent.”

ASN Bank holds transparency in high esteem. Spaarmotief is one of the main channels of communication between the bank and its clients. Would it not have been, in light of that which was discussed at the meeting of April 2009, more honest if Spaarmotief had reported that sometimes there are interest rates above 100 percent? Or did ASN Bank have no knowledge of the level of interest that LAPO was charging its borrowers? If ASN Bank was aware of this, when and how, did ASN Bank inform participants in the ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund?

ASN Bank answer:
The ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund is informed about interest rates by Triple Jump, even at that time in the case of LAPO. We understand that Van Doesburgh refers to an average rate here. That average rate at that time was based on a calculation of 555 MFIs. For a balanced picture, as was reported, he has not referred to a lower interest rate or higher interest rate.

Hugh comment: Mark van Doesburgh, CEO of Triple Jump, is yet to produce the original credit committee documents presented to ASN Bank. Nor have ASN Bank. In these documents it is interesting to observe the stated interest rates that they claimed LAPO was charging, which had been confirmed by two previous ratings by an independent rating agency (MicroRate) and were confirmed by two additional ratings performed by a separate rating agency shortly afterwards. The last rating quoted a report by a US-based NGO called MFTransprency, whose sole focus is reporting accurate interest rates. MFTransparency confirmed the interest rates reached as high as 144%. ASN Bank were well aware of these interest rates, as I had informed them in writing. To suggest they were unaware of the interest rates charged by LAPO defies all demonstrable evidence. Oxfam Novib, their partner in the ASN Novib fund, openly acknowledge this. Triple Jump was deliberately attempting to cover up the real interest rates charged by LAPO with full knowledge of senior management at ASN Bank. When the New York Times subsequently investigated LAPO and visited them on-site, their front-page article confirmed a current interest rate of 126%. A number of investors pulled out of LAPO as a consequence of this revelation. Not ASN Bank.

But, are we to interpret from ASN Bank’s answer that they were fully aware of the actual interest rates charged by LAPO? If so, this is perhaps more worrying still. They approved the investment, and invited the LAPO CEO to Holland as a guest speaker, fully aware of the exploitation taking place. If they were fully aware, then this has far-reaching implications for the Dutch government. Presumably Oxfam Novib were also fully aware (they co-formed the fund), and thus Dutch public sector funding was knowingly provided to LAPO despite these interest rates? This is a specific question asked by the politicians.

ASN Bank answer (cont’d):
To participants in the microcredit fund it is explained in every way – from the website of ASN Bank to the customer magazine – that microcredit is not a panacea, but that it can be a first step towards a better life for the poorest. That too high interest rates herewith can be a problem, is then taken and explained. The many critical questions that were raised and are raised at the general meeting of shareholders are a direct result of this.

Hugh comment: nonsense. Where is a single public acknowledgement of the interest rates charged by LAPO? That Triple Jump knew these clearly is well-known. That ASN Bank and Oxfam Novib knew these is well known. When and where did ASN Bank inform their investors that funds were being on-lent to poor Nigerian women at rates of 126%? When and where did Oxfam Novib advise their donors or the Dutch government that their funds were being used in such a manner? Note that these players are all signatories of the SMART Campaign. The third client protection principle relates specifically to transparent pricing, the fourth to affordable credit.

 
KRO-Reporter question:
How does ASN Bank in retrospect judge the loan of 1 million from the ASN-Novib Microcredit Fund to LAPO now that it is clear that this Nigerian MFI gives out loans with interest rates which were calculated as  126 percent (Report Planet Rating 2009) to 144 percent (report MFTransparancy / Chuck Waterfield 2009)?

ASN Bank answer:
Microfinance is a young industry where many actors have learned their lessons. That is the same for ASN Bank as for other investment funds. Triple Jump back in 2009 together with other investors took the initiative to request LAPO in writing to improve a number of things, to which LAPO has responded (including a substantial reduction in the interest rate).

Hugh comment: This is factually false. LAPO did decrease its interest rates, but it increased other costs to the client that led to an overall increase in the cost of capital to the poor. The exact description in the Planet Rating report states: “The decrease in interest rates coupled with the increase in the level of cash collateral, resulted in an increase in the Effective Interest Rate (EIR) for the clients to 125.9 percent from 114.3 percent.” This point is explicitly acknowledged by Oxfam Novib in the documentary, although ASN Bank deny it here, in writing. Or were they unaware of even a publicly rated rating report?

ASN Bank answer (cont’d):

In a broader sense, since then, in collaboration with many other actors, models and principles have been designed to promote transparency and protect customers. This is done by measuring the social performance of MFIs where Triple Jump is one of the forerunners in  (tailoring products to the needs of the customer, the range of women and customers in rural areas, and meeting the “Client Protection Principles “- seven principles to treat clients of MFIs in a transparent, respectful and responsible way). Triple Jump was also one of the co-financiers at the start of MFTransparency, which provides transparency on the effective interest rate to end customers.

Hugh comment: Triple Jump did indeed finance MFTransparency, who are precisely the same institution that ironically proved the elevated interest rates charged by LAPO in 2011 reaching 144%. Regarding the social performance of LAPO, the reports repeatedly mention chronic client desertion and no social impact. It is true that these institutions endorsed the Client Protection Principles. It does not appear true that they enforced them

ASN Bank answer (cont’d):
In this regard, since the end of the loan in 2009 LAPO has changed much, especially because of  the realization that things could be done better. Also at LAPO itself by the way, because they are now regarded as one of the better MFIs in Africa. LAPO from then stood at the beginning of its development, and there were clearly some issues that needed to be improved. But those that want to help the world advance, must show courage, accept that some things turn out differently than one had hoped and draw the right lessons.

Hugh comment: LAPO has not changed much and ASN Bank pulled out of LAPO, despite it now apparently being one of the better MFIs in Africa. The interest rates remain some of the highest on Earth for a regulated bank, and abhorrent to most investors, most likely including ASN Bank investors who were deliberately misled by their bank. LAPO is not considered as one of the best banks in Africa, but as one of the most embarrassing cases of open exploitation the poor. It has been the subject of documentaries, books, featured in numerous articles, and generally considered a disgrace in the sector.

However, moving away from the activities of LAPO, the more interesting questions centres around ASN Bank itself.

ASN Bank was fully aware of the activities of LAPO prior to the AGM, and prior to the disclosures made in the book and documentary. It selected a questionable fund manager, Triple Jump, which remains managed to this day by two former Oxfam Novib staff member. The chairman of the board of Triple Jump is Ab Engelsman, former head of fund management at ASN Bank, chairman of the board of ASN Bank Foundation, as well as other senior posts. ASN Bank is a shareholder of Triple Jump, of course. The person who wrote the questionable Triple Jump credit committee documents presented to the ASN-Novib microfinance fund now works at…. ASN Bank. She also wrote the document presented by Triple Jump to Calvert Foundation successfully encouraging them to also invest in LAPO.

Ironically, if one examines what Oxfam Novib state about the investment in LAPO by the ASN-Novib fund, the picture is more clear. Theo Bouma, CEO of Oxfam Novib, specifically acknowledges that LAPO lied to Oxfam Novib regarding the interest rates, a claim that ASN Bank now deny, despite these being co-owners of the same fund.

The Dutch public have been exploited as much as the Nigerian poor. Oxfam Novib had the courage to admit incompetence, but ASN Bank continue to defend their integrity. The losers of this fraud are the Dutch tax-payer, the investors of ASN Bank, and the Dutch government. These are questionable and deceptive actors that should fall under the full legal scrutiny of the Dutch financial sector regulator, who has so far done nothing to regulate this sector. The future Queen of Holland, Princess Maxima, is the appointed spokesperson for the Dutch microfinance sector and has not made a single comment on this case, despite the activities in question taking place under her watch. It is therefore shameful, but also a source of hope, that two Dutch politicians have had the courage to formally demand answers to these accusations in the Dutch parliament.

According to the 2011 rating report, LAPO converted from an NGO to a private company. It had grown thanks in large part to Dutch public sector funding, provided by the Dutch tax-payer. When it converted to a private company, 12% of the shares were given to the CEO, Godwin Ehigiamusoe, who is a direct beneficiary of the generosity of the Dutch tax-payer. It can be stated no more clearly: Dutch tax-payers have been deceived into contributing to the private wealth of a corrupt Nigerian bank in the full knowledge of ASN Bank and Triple Jump. Well intentioned Dutch savers and pensioners invested in the ASN-Novib fund hoping to alleviate poverty. In fact their funds were used to exploit the poor with extortionate interest rates, enrich individual people, and done so in the full knowledge of the intermediaries they trusted. The Dutch government has remained a passive observer in this process, up until this point. The simple reason why microfinance has failed to produce any tangible impact upon poverty eradication is largely due to the fact that institutions such as ASN Bank and Triple Jump have chosen personal enrichment and exploitation of the poor over their stated developmental goals, and no regulator has cared to look over their shoulder.

My simple advice to any Dutch person reading this blog is as follows:

  1. If you are an investor or account holder at ASN Bank, withdraw your funds immediately, this is an unethical and deceptive institution of questionable integrity. They are willing to deceive you without hesitation, as clearly demonstrated and not actually refuted even by ASN Bank. If you would like to issue a formal complaint to ASN Bank, or demand answers to these claims, this is the link.
  2. If you have ever donated funds to Oxfam Novib, demand a prompt response to these allegations, without evading the obvious questions as ASN Bank has attempted. I could not find a complaints procedure on the Oxfam Novib website (despite this being one of the client protection principles they espouse for their MFI investments).
  3. Withdraw any funds from Triple Jump.
  4. Complain to your local politician, regardless of your political standpoint, about misappropriation of Dutch public sector funding in microfinance and the appalling acceptance of exploitative interest rates charged to the poor.
  5. Demand that you future Queen, Princess Maxima, takes a concerted stance against such activities.
  6. Insist upon full, formal, financial regulation of the Dutch microfinance sector.

A central premise of my book is that there is no means to ensure that the agents we trust to invest funds on our behalf for the benefit of the poor act in either our best interests or those of the poor. There is no practical regulator of microfinance funds in Holland. There is no means to obtain an independent rating of microfinance funds themselves. And yet there is substantial evidence of these funds acting inappropriately. When academics, journalists and practitioners criticize microfinance for “not working”, to what extent is this a problem with the microfinance model, and to what extent is this the fault of the intermediaries standing between us and the poor? This remains an open question, but my opinion is that these funds need to be regulated immediately, and the case of the troika of ASN Bank/Oxfam Novib/Triple Jump presents a clear case of why this is so urgently required.

In the event that ASN Bank and Oxfam Novib wish to continue investing in microfinance, my advice would be to select a better fund manager that does not engage in these activities. Holland has a number of fund managers, and not all should be tainted with the same brush as the troika. As I repeat on numerous occasions in my book, there are good and bad microfinance banks, as there are fund managers and P2P organisations. But as long as we accept an opaque, non-transparent and unregulated sector there is no means for the tax-payer, investor, saver, pensioner or government to distinguish between the good and the bad. And in the meantime the poor will continue to suffer under these practices, and the entire microfinance sector will be discredited by a few rogue operators. That would be a pity.

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Just Another Critical Microfinance Documentary?

Perhaps unsurprisingly I rather enjoyed the KRO-Reporter documentary. I won’t go through it in detail, it speaks for itself. That something is deeply wrong in the sector is beyond dispute. Anyone who still denies this is living in cuckoo land.

That large scale exploitation of the poor is taking place is a pity, but Chuck Waterfield’s comment was quite astounding, from a veteran microfinance practitioner:

“There’s 4 billion people living on less than 2 dollars a day. That’s [] two thirds of the world’s population. And the rich are very small, the very pinnacle of this pyramid. Some of what is happening in microfinance right now is a transfer of wealth, not the old-school ‘help the poor’ send money down to the bottom of the pyramid. We see a transfer of wealth from the bottom of the pyramid up to the very very top 1% of the pyramid. The rich getting richer off the very poorest in the world.”

There we have it, in a nutshell – welcome to commercial microfinance, the salvation of the poor! He’s referring to the the IPOs, the Holy Grail of the sector, what many of these MFIs are striving for, with their investors salivating in the background. This is the direction some are heading in and we all know it. Neither Chuck nor David nor I not anyone credible is suggesting all microfinance is bad, but concern is mounting over that portion which is.

Since the broadcast two Dutch politicians have asked questions to their government about what on Earth is going on in the Dutch microfinance sector, specifically with public funding. A valid question. Why didn’t the Dutch ambassador for microfinance, Princess Maxima, raise this issue? She hasn’t commented on the sorry state of her microfinance sector, with three of the largest institutions, Oxfam Novib, Triple Jump and ASN Bank looking frankly ridiculous, and instead politicians are now intervening. Surely she watched this documentary – it had her name in the title and was widely advertised?

Triple Jump themselves can’t be too pleased with this. I would love to have been a fly on the wall when their posse arrived in Barbados for the ForoMic (Latin America’s principle back-slapping microfinance conference for investors to hob-nob with one another and hatch unsophisticated plans to exploit more people and boost returns). The documentary aired just as things were getting started, publicly exposing a microfinance investment fund to a degree that is, as yet, unprecedented in the sector.

The microfinance funds congregating in Barbados must have been thinking “It’s not great for Triple Jump, but hey, they got caught once, could’ve happened to any of us”. Well, first of all, has it only happened once? Do we think really LAPO was an isolated case? As the Dutch politicians start sniffing around I predict that more dirt will emerge, as people start demanding answers to tough questions. Let’s see where else Triple Jump invested government funds. Let’s ask what other extortionate interest rates are being charged by Triple Jump investments and compare that to the information neatly presented to ASN Bank and Oxfam Novib. This ain’t over yet.

And what do the Americans think of Triple Jump managing their OPIC/Habitat fund? Are they convinced that the Dutch regulator will be keeping a close eye on their capital, catapuling people out of poverty by the dozen, in light of this emerging evidence?

The remainder of the documentary discusses a number of issues raised in my book specifically relevant to Holland. The broad impression is that microfinance is not all bad, but some applications of it are bad, and no one appears to be doing much about it.

So then we come to my favourite bit of the documentary. The producer asks the head of Oxfam Novib what he reckons about LAPO’s interest rates of 144%. Initially he suggests interest rates don’t actually matter. Does this guy not have a mortgage or a credit card? A slightly bizarre stance, but he swiftly changes his mind with the classic argument that if there is someone charging even higher rates, then 144% is ok, a logic pioneered by Grameen Foundation USA. He clearly has no idea what he is talking about. One can only assume that he doesn’t know that LAPO is incredibly profitable and suffers a chronic client desertion rate, as otherwise he is also in the land of the fairies – a serious concern given the amount of Dutch tax-payer money he apparently manages.

But then he begrudginly admits 144% is too high, and that they embarked on a failed attempt to encourage LAPO to reduce rates. LAPO told Oxfam Novib that they had reduced the rates, but this turned out to be a lie. Ooops.

Our friend Bouman fails to address two rather awkward issues. First, they had known about LAPO’s interest rates since at least 2007. Bruno Molijn, another Oxfam Novib veteran, had stormed into Triple Jump furious about these rates amongst other deceptions that Triple Jump had managed to present to him, but which were subsequently covered-up, until recently.

Maybe Bouman was unaware of all this? He should read my book to find out what is actually going on at Oxfam Novib. But what about the fact that his trusted fund manager, Triple Jump, openly stated to its investors in their newsletter that the rates charged by their MFIs were a mere 25% to 30%, shortly after they were revealed openly in the AGM of the ASN-Novib fund? Ooops, he must have missed that also.

Until this point Oxfam Novib simply look incompetenent, but then comes the tour de force, Ab Engelsman. He bounds in like a locomotive train. Apparently one must first look at the income of an MFI prior to the interest rates the poor are paying – debatable, but when LAPO was so visibly profitable, shouldn’t that have rung an alarm bell immediately? Where did he think this profit was coming from?

Then Engelsman changes his mind, in fact the clients’ needs do come first. A slip of the tongue perhaps? Engelsman’s logic runs as follows: because the repayment rates were high, the clients must be benefitting. So why were they fleeing the institution in droves? It’s apparently only us in the west that have an ethical problem with extortionate interest rates. Oxfam Novib had just stated that LAPO had lied to them, as proved fairly succinctly in an independent rating report by Planet Rating that Bouman referred to. So the producer asks Englesman if he feels they were screwed by LAPO?

“No, I personally don’t. As Triple Jump, I also think not. No.”

(KRO-Reporter)

“Would you, with the knowledge you have now, again provide a loan to LAPO?”

(Engelsman)

“Not to the LAPO as it was back then, but yes to the current LAPO.”

There is neither the faintest attempt to get their stories straight, nor to apply logic in his responses. LAPO did not screw Triple Jump apparently, although Oxfam Novib disagree, so why did Triple Jump pull out of LAPO? And if Engelsman is correct, and LAPO had not screwed them, he concedes that he would not invest in “LAPO as it was back then”. Why not?

But now he would invest in LAPO. It’s just non-sensical. There’s no need for any forensic analysis of these comments, they defy the basic laws of logic.

So, an institution that has lied to investors, exploited hundreds of thousands of poor African women, operated illegally for years, is riddled with nepotism and frauds, suffered the first ever rating withdawal in microfinance history, boasts massive client desertion and been the subject of untold controversy blighting the entire microfinance sector is, in Engelsman’s informed opinion, ripe for a Triple Jump investment using public and private sector funding. I am not sure what one can say in response to this. But I am not surprised the politicians are asking questions.

In fact, I have a few suggestions to improve this mess. Firstly, Engelsman should urgently reconsider his position as chairman of the board of Triple Jump. Alas he is also head of the Netherlands Microfinance Platform, a position he should also review. The relatively ethical fund Oikocredit also has him sitting on their board too – they should resolve this immediately. And he sits on the ASN Foundation board also, but that’s of less concern – they only squander their own money.

Hopefully, if the Dutch have the slightest desire to clean up their sector, they need to put sensible people in charge of these institutions who are willing and able to clean up the mess and be a little more transparent in their operations.

But he’s not the only problem. Triple Jump isn’t going to clean up its act simply because it has a new chairman. ASN Bank and Oxfam Novib should review their choice of fund manager as soon as possible, appologise for their previous mistakes, and attempt to re-brand themselves with some actual ethical criteria. ASN Bank has a wide choice of fund managers to chose from in Holland, some of which are actually quite competent. The Dutch government should intervene, and threaten to cut public funding to Oxfam Novib unless they select a competent fund manager. Simple as that.

Engelsman will go, but Triple Jump will stay. It will be carefully brushed under the carpet, perhaps a little slap on the wrist. Of course Maxima is not going to say anything – what can she do? Admit that a major part of the entire Dutch microfinance sector has been operating “opaquely” under her watch? A future queen of Holland cannot make such an admission. The politicians may be able to increase the heat a little, but will they actually prompt change amongst the Triple Jump/ASN Bank/Oxfam Novib clique? I hope so.

Well done KRO-Reporter for rocking the boat.

We’ve created a monster. It has inertia. No one wants to rock the boat any further. So I will.

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Blah-2-Blah

A random traveller from Kiva’s Milepoint team (a group of people who like flying and have lent about $4m through Kiva) contacted me a week ago suggesting I join some online video chat with Kiva and ask them a tricky question. Kiva had refused to join me in a live radio show in their home town, San Francisco, although two other US-based MF networks did call in, Zidisha and Opportunity Network. Respect. It was a fun debate.

Anyway, why not ask Premal a question? I figured I’d keep it simple: why haven’t you guys responded to the allegations in the book? The comedian host (literally) seemed confused initially, but Premal picked up the (not entirely subtle) thread. His response is interesting. The entire thing can be watched here, from minute 50. I warn the listener that the video is pretty tedious, I personally wouldn’t have called it Kiva Insights, so I’ve copied Premal’s response to the question here:

So Hugh it’s good to finally talk to you in person, we reached out to you by email but got no response… Hugh Sinclair is the author of a book that is critical of microfinance and is critical of Kiva, I think there’s a lot of real valuable criticisms in the book, actually, but then I think there’s a lot of things in the book that probably weren’t as well researched and that I don’t agree with, and Hugh, I’d welcome a conversation with you at any point, to basically inform you about some of the things that we think are inaccurate, but also the general spirit of what you are trying to do  which is, um, in microfinance too much of a good thing can be bad, and credit needs to be used responsibly, and there’s a real important role for all of us to not only just be overly-excited, but to be sceptical, and to make sure we are really doing our due diligence, there are times in Kiva’s history where, you know, I think we got it wrong, or we maybe weren’t as careful as we should have been, and as a learning growing organisation that helps basically point out the areas that we need to invest in more. So Hugh, you have a really important role in this sector, because if we are all overly zealous and happy all the time I think we miss opportunities for real improvement, and the stakes are too high, especially with issues like over-indebtedness, which we saw here in the US, so we are starting to screen for that, and starting pull out of certain markets, and that’s what’s categorising the client credit limits. Looking at things like Client Protection and how we can get beyond being just people endorsing things like fair pricing and fair collection practices to actually how do we verify that, and so part of the borrower verification process that Kiva fellows do, which is they randomly sample a group of clients posted on the website in addition to making sure that the data on the website is true that that person exists, that the loan amount is really what was posted on the website, they’re starting to ask questions around about “how do you feel you are treated?” and basically if we start seeing deviations from the norm that’s an opportunity for us to double-click and start asking deeper questions on that partner, and we really want to lead the charge as investors to keep our MFIs accountable. So Hugh, you know, Matt Flannery, my Kiva co-founder and CEO I think reached out to you, we’d love to have a conversation with you to figure out how we can actually start addressing some of the issues that you bring up. Thanks for your question.

So, first of all, hat off to Kiva for taking the question, hat off for actually pretending to answer it. I have little respect for most of those implicated in the book that have made absolutely no comment whatsoever, these guys rose to the challenge. With some caveats.

First of all, neither Premal nor Matt Flannery ever tried to contact me. I am hardly a difficult person to reach, the website is written across the back cover of the book, visible in any Google search, and the email is clearly on the website. The most random people have managed to contact me since the book was published. The publisher is also based in San Francisco and well-known. And I’ve been in touch with these guys over the years, as explained in the book in some fairly graphic detail. So, it’s simply untrue that they’ve tried to contact me. Perhaps a mis-communication?

Suggesting the text was poorly researched is strange. It was peer-reviewed, vetted by two separate sets of lawyers, is heavily annotated, and remains unchallenged to this day.

So, the question was why Kiva hadn’t responded to the issues raised in the book, and my main concern with Premal’s answer is that he didn’t respond to any of the issues raised in the book. So, in terms of answering the question, a low score. What are the issues that remain outstanding?

  • Why did Kiva ignore information about specific Kiva client exploitation at LAPO when presented with firm data demonstrating this to be the case?
  • In spite of this information, which was accepted by Kiva, why did Kiva continue to take funds from the (predominantly US) general public to the tune of $5m, with LAPO becoming the biggest Kiva partner?
  • Why deny the charges of the NYT (“We’ve grown comfortable over time with [LAPOs] approach”) and then pull out of LAPO a fortnight later?
  • How come they can lend to cock-fighting rackets and coca leaf salesman if these activities are illegal under California state law? It’s “traditional” apparently.
  • Any comment on the flawed repayment rates (MFI repayment rates are lower, but MFIs boost them in order to keep Kiva happy and maintain the flow of interest-free capital)? This even made it to the Kiva Wikipedia page.
  • Doubts over whether all the clients actually exist.
  • Kiva is a brutally inefficient way to channel capital to the poor compared to a microfinance fund, which may be excusable if Kiva were a P2P, but is it?
  • What’s with the vast buffer of uninvested Kiva user funds and cash sitting idle generating a tidy income to Kiva ($42m according to latest statements)?
  • Why do Mexican’s pay 10x more for a loan than Americans? Are default rates lower in Mexico than the US, and operating costs higher?

But, I guess my main question relates to Kiva’s refusal to publish the interest rates on the actual loans, and stick doggedly to the portfolio yield, which everyone in the sector knows is a fairly meaningless, easily manipulated and self-reported statistic. Other P2Ps manage to post the interest rate to two decimal places, at the individual loan level, and if Kiva is a P2P, capable of producing all manner of stories, photos and details about the client, why not the interest rate? This question is not simply interesting because the rate might be 85.65% instead of 84%, a mere detail, but because it actually cuts to the heart of the Kiva lending model.

I do not believe Kiva is fundamentally about lending money to poor people, but about giving Americans a nice fluffy feeling that they’re doing something useful. What actually happens in the field to the poor is well documented elsewhere – the overall impact is approximately zero.

But the impact is not zero to the Milepoint folk, Kiva Christians ($5.3m) or Team Europe ($2.7m) – these folk actually believe they are making a difference, and pay Kiva handsomely for the service (via donations and interest earned on idle funds). Hundreds of Kiva volunteers run around the planet apparently eradicating poverty with interest rates to the poor often approaching 100%, and no one has managed to find much supporting evidence for this being particularly helpful to the poor. Many of the MFIs that use Kiva have quit, or been closed down, for some unknown reason, most likely related to the fact that the benefit of obtaining interest-free credit is not sufficient to justify the hassle of dealing with Kiva. Capital may cost 10%, but how much does it cost to go to the field, write the little story, translate it, hire a few people in the MFI, fill out all the forms, have volunteers pestering you the whole time?

But, I applaud the fact that Kiva are attempting to improve this. They need to be careful to do so in such a way as to not render their model entirely unattractive to the MFIs, particularly when the microfinance funds are sitting on piles of uninvested funds that they are desperate to lend at reducing rates. My forays onto Kivafriends proved utterly pointless: as with the over-arching analogy in the book about the microfinance devotees operating with cult-like fanaticism, it is impossible to prompt change at such institutions. I pleaded with Kiva to investigate LAPO because I had seen, first hand, the exploitation that was taking place. I had the original repayment schedules of some Kiva clients proving the rates these poor women were actually paying (versus the 24% cited on Kiva at the time). One of Kiva’s first donors urged them to listen, and all the evidence that emerged since demonstrated beyond doubt that this was entirely valid information, confirmed by the NYT and four rating reports, and Kiva did eventually pull out. Being armed with the truth, with evidence, with facts, is simply not enough, especially with $5m in play. They cannot play the ignorance card – that is their problem – they knew what was going on and turned a blind-eye, simple as that.

I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again, there is a total mis-alignment of interests between the poor, the ultimate investors and the intermediaries employed to bridge the two. Kiva acts in its own best interests, as do all the intermediaries, and there is no reason to suppose these match the interests of the investors or the poor. This is so well documented in finance that it has its own title, the principle-agent problem, which apparently doesn’t apply in microfinance. Gibberish.

The only way to reign in these folk is full, formal regulation. Kiva is an investment fund in all but name. Just because it doesn’t pay interest to lenders and operates under the guise of an NGO and takes deposits as low as $25 doesn’t change the essence of the activity, so why not regulate them? Sure, regulation is not perfect, as US citizens are well aware. But is total lawlessness a solution? For as long as Kiva can take funds from the unwitting general public, pump them to dodgy banks in Nigeria or to cock-fighting rackets in Peru, I remain sceptical of any claims that the US financial sector is remotely sensibly regulated.

My anonymous buddy at Milepoint made an interesting comment: “I am suggesting using more tact in approach, but tact does not seem to be one of your demonstrated strengths (as illustrated by your blog and essentially calling myself and almost a million other Kiva lenders stupid (though not to worry on a personal level, I thought it funny and my skin is pretty think anyway.”

I acknowledge the comment regarding my tact, but I don’t think the Kivans are stupid. I think they are ill-informed, well-meaning, naive, don’t look into matters particularly deeply, don’t understand the often brutal reality of microfinance in the field, are bombarded with nice looking photos and stories and spin, and trust their intermediaries blindly.

So, Kiva, if you want to respond to the claims in the book, do so here. Not to other claims, those in the book. It you want to promote Kiva, please chose a different venue. The book’s available on Amazon if you haven’t read it yet (may as well secure an additional book sale here!).

To the Kivans – start asking just slightly intelligent questions about what is actually happening with your money, and start with demanding what the interest rate is. Plenty of P2Ps can tell you this simple fact, because they are actually doing what they claim, so consider switching platform until Kiva can sort out this gaping hole. Or are you of the mind that the poor don’t care about interest rates, as some claim? If so, I give up. You also might want to pick up the book (bang – another million sales!).

To the armies of volunteers, if you want to learn about microfinance go volunteer at an MFI. It might not be so 21st-century-dot-com-California-cool, but what’s your goal?

And to the regulators: wake up.

I’ll end this post with a quote from the House of Representatives hearing, by a gentleman called Wagane Diouf of Mecene Investments, who was called to testify:

“I get seriously worried when these institutions [MFIs] start mobilizing funds from institutions that attract capital from individuals in the US and other western countries, such as, um, I won’t mention their name, but institutions that have web-driven mechanisms to attract investments, but the financial reporting of the institutions that are receiving these funds are not up to standard at all, they are very poorly regulated, it’s a very opaque part of the industry.”[emphasis added]

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Dutch Chickens Come Home to Roost

On September 28th the Dutch investigative TV show KRO-Reporter broadcast a documentary about the Dutch microfinance investment sector, based loosely around my book. Below I provide an English transcript of the entire documentary. This is not an official translation and has not been approved by KRO. I will post a Spanish translation shortly, and will comment on this in a seperate post.

(Jos Slats)

Once upon a time there was a princess with a big warm heart, she was beautiful AND she understood finance. Princess Maxima wanted to help poor people with small loans. With such a microcredit they could start small businesses and escape their abject poverty. Tireless, the princess travelled the world to promote her ideals. Microcredit became a big success. But then the story takes a turn for the worse. That’s the way it goes in fairytales.

Reporter Theme Music

(Jos)

Spring 2009, in Amsterdam the yearly shareholders meeting is taking place of the ASN Bank investment funds, you know , that socially motivated Bank for the World of Tomorrow that makes such a sharp distinction between good and bad money.

Short Fragment of Dutch Song about money

(Jos)

Guest of honour is Godwin Ehigiamusoe from Nigeria, founder and director of the microfinance institution LAPO.  LAPO gives small loans to hundreds of thousands of poor people. ASN Bank has invested 1 million Euro in his organization. Ehigiamusoe is given ample space to talk about his social engagement and the good work that LAPO is doing. Of course he is given a thunderous applause.

A little bit later, during question time, a young woman in the room stands up and this is what she wants to know from Godwin Ehigiamusoe:

“If you look at the actual cost that LAPO is charging poor Nigerian women, you see that it is approximately 110%  per year when you consider all the costs. So LAPO is basically one of the most expensive MFIs that there is and one of the most profitable. Now my question is to all of you, is poverty alleviation really happening at these interest rates? Thank you.”

More than 100% interest? Oops, they were not anticipating that question….

Hugh Sinclair, a 38 year old British microfinance advisor, is a witness of this embarrassing moment in Amsterdam.

(Hugh Sinclair)

“After the question was asked the CEO attempted to answer the question but was very caught off guard, he didn’t know what to say, he was completely shocked at the question, and tried to explain it but really was unable and at a certain point one the panellists, I forget whether it was Triple Jump or ASN, stood up and called an immediate coffee break. “

(Jos)

Sinclair is more than a coincidental witness. In 2007 the young British banker works for Triple Jump in Amsterdam, a company that manages the microfinance funds of Oxfam Novib and ASN Bank among others. With the money of these organizations, Triple Jump makes large investments in LAPO. From the outset Sinclair tries to convince his employer that LAPO is no good. That LAPO, by charging extremely high interest rates, is guilty of usury. That criticism is internally not much appreciated.

(Hugh)

“I was offered a pay rise to continue working for them as a consultant, on the condition that I signed a series of additional confidentiality clauses, very restrictive confidentiality clauses, preventing me from discussing anything with anyone ever basically. I was also given seven days to sign this letter and return it, otherwise they would seek to fire me by taking me to court in Holland”.

(Jos)

“So Triple Jump wanted to shut you up?”

(Hugh)

“It was pretty clear that they wanted to shut me up.”

(Jos)

But Sinclair does not allow himself to be shut up. He does NOT sign. And that costs him his job at Triple Jump.

(Hugh)

“The bottom line is simply that there is mass exploitation happening and I just eventually tired of this and something had to be done and I’m prepared to suffer the consequences of that because I think that is  what is required to do to clean up this sector.”

(Jos)

And now he has written a book. Confessions of a microfinance heretic.  A kind of anti-fairytale book about how the big bad wolves ran off with princess Maxima’s ideals.

(Hugh)

“I believe that for microfinance to be effective, interest rates charged to the poor have to be much lower than they currently are. They have to be genuinely reasonable in order to give the poor a fighting chance of actually growing their businesses. Now the problem with such interest rates is that low interest rates mean lower profit, lower profit means investors are less willing to invest. The problem with microfinance is if you want to do it well and effectively it’s not super profitable.”

(Jos)

The rise of microfinance starts in the seventies of the previous century. In Bangladesh economist Muhammad Yunus gives out small loans to poor women. We are talking about amounts of 25 to 50 dollars, not more. But that turns out to be enough to start small businesses and to gain an income. Sufficient income to repay the loan, pay a little bit of interest and also some personal gain. That is microfinance in all its simplicity. Soon enough the concept is being copied around the world.

(Chuck Waterfield)

“I remember walking out and giving that first 200 dollars to a shoemaker, a male shoemaker, wondering if and how he might ever return that money and he never missed a payment and all the rest of the clients almost nobody every missed a payment. It was in many ways startling, you know, we expected defaults, we expected people to struggle and instead we found mysteriously almost the exact opposite.”

(Jos)

In Baltimore we visit Chuck Waterfield, a true microfinance veteran from the United States. Thirty years ago he first experimented with small loans financed with money from charity.

(Chuck Waterfield)

“The idea, oh this is the magic bullet, wow, here we were, you know, we are loaning, we are not giving anything, we are making a loan, we are teaching people some training, and we’re getting all the loan money back and that was seen as really exciting because the poor were benefitting by our beliefs and the institution would not need to continue, would not need to depend on grants to stay alive and continue to help more and more of the poor. The poor around the world are almost, the vast majority of them are self-employed, there’s no safety net. If you can’t go and get a salaried job the government doesn’t give you a safety net so your only alternative, the alternative of the poor is to start your own business. Not even start but to have your own business. So we look around and there is self-employed everywhere. You walk through the markets and they are all self-employed, you look at the welders, the carpenters, the shoemakers, the tailors, all self-employed, and what we, sort of the obvious that occurred to us is that these businesses need capital. And so we started, this was the experiment, we would go up to those that already had a business , see what they would do with a little extra money and then they would put that money in their business  generating additional income and that’s how they could pay back the loan plus interest. “

(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“ A loan, we discovered kind of by accident in the last 20 or 30 years, a loan allows many of these people to sort of bring their entrepreneurial talent to the fore and to start producing, to start creating wealth. And that is really the key word: creating wealth. If microcredit doesn’t create wealth, then forget it, it’s for the birds.”

(Jos)

Another veteran, Damian von Stauffenberg, a nephew of Klaus von Stauffenberg, the man who in 1944 bombed Hitler. Damian von Stauffenberg is the founder of MicroRate a bureau in Arlington Virginia that vets and scrutinizes microcredit providers worldwide.

(Jos)

“This is about fighting poverty and making money at the same time, one could say that is asking for trouble.”
(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“Yes, one could say that but you kind of make me think of something Churchill said about democracy, I can’t put it together literally, I can only paraphrase it. I think it is something like, it is a terrible system but it is better than all the alternatives. And then I would say the same when you mix capitalism, which is really what you are alluding to, with microfinance. It is not pretty, it is very hard to have a warm cuddly feeling about it but when you see the alternatives they are worse.”

(Jos)

In the first years microfinance is mainly financed with charity money. Giving loans to poor people? The financial sector is having none of it. With the exception of Triodos Bank.

(Marilou, Triodos Bank)

“Almost 20 years ago we were indeed, yes I think we were the first bank that on a worldwide scale started doing this and at the time this was quite unorthodox. The sector was still in its infancy but we thought it important to do it”.

(Jos)

“And how did the banking sector respond to this at the time?”

(Marilou)

“At that time microfinance was very little known and sometimes people responded with disbelief because it wasn’t clear at all back then that people at the bottom of the pyramid on the one hand were able to repay credits and on the other hand there were sceptical reactions to the fact that people would be interested in saving money. In that period it was quite a new thing.”

(Jos)

“When did this change?”

(Marilou)

“Actually the last 10 years this has changed, the sector  has lived through a huge development, and especially the last 10 years this has really changed.”

(Jos)

The United Nations declare 2005 as the year of Microcredit and in 2006 the inventor of the small loan, Muhammad Yunus from Bangladesh, receives the Nobel Peace Prize.

(Fragment Nobel Ceremony)

“I call upon the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate of 2006, Muhammad Yunus, to come forward to receive the gold medal and the diploma.”

(Jos)

Microcredit becomes a fashion, then the established financial order starts to realize that money can be made with poverty alleviation. A LOT of money.

(Chuck Waterfield)

“The milestone, the event that changed, sort of the earthquake of microfinance was in April of 2007, 5 years ago, Compartamos in Mexico did an IPO. They had already been making very large profits, the figure we used, the return on investment, return on equity was over 50%, every year, year after year after year for about 7 years.  How do you do that? Charging women over 100% and making very large profits, 50% again and so that is what got the attention of the investment world and so a very different kind of money started to flow in, you might even argue, flood into microfinance.”

(Fragment of publicity: Compartamos banco, tu especialista en microfinanzas).

(Hugh)

“Compartamos orginally started off as a charity organization receiving donor funding from a number of institutions but in particular USAID and ACCION, the American microfinance network. And as the institution grew at a certain point it decided to transform, as it is called in the sector, into a for-profit company. This is a common trick used by microfinance institutions that they start off as a small charity serving the poor and presenting themselves as a normal charity and they receive donor funding and when they reach a certain scale they are able to convert, give shares to the various donors or investors or in many cases senior management and become a for-profit company and realize all the gains that they have made as an NGO suddenly effectively becomes privatized and Compartamos is one of the first examples of that. “

(David Roodman)

“The Microfinance Bank in Mexico, called Compartamos went public, and the founders became millionaires and other organizations made millions of dollars, most of the organizations were non-profit, they weren’t  nobody, but it still was very controversial that all this money was being made ultimately off of poor people .”

(Jos)

David Roodman of the Center for Global Development in Washington hits the nail on the head: non-profit organizations that earn large sums of money over poor people’s backs and then change into a normal commercial company. Issuing shares earns the founders and donors of Compartamos 500 million dollars.

(Chuck Waterfield)

“What they did was an IPO and again a secondary IPO means that  instead of doing it to raise money to put into the institution to then have more resources and grow, it was a cash-out IPO, the money went out into the pockets of private individuals and the original stock holders. The total worth of the company the day of the IPO was over 2 billion US dollars. Now, in the year 2000 when they created Compartamos they put in a total of 6 million US dollars of equity.  In 2000, there’s  6 million dollars, in 2007 it went from 6 million to 2 billion. That is over a 300 to 1 return on investment, again a cash-out IPO. So I put in a million dollars, OK, in 2000 and then I wait 7 years and then all of a sudden my million dollars are worth 300 million dollars. That’s the day that microfinance really changed. We drew the attention of a very different audience of funding source, we were barely on the radar prior to that IPO and after the IPO sort of every investment bank was forming a committee to explore and investigate you know, where is the next Compartamos.”

(Jos)

Lending money to the poor… while the established financial order first is having none of it, now everyone wants a slice of the cake.  Banks, investors, pension funds all of a sudden all want to invest. Microcredit is HOT! THE alternative to the traditional, expensive development assistance. In the meantime Muhammad Yunus transforms into a kind of pop star, guest of honour at the festival Roskilde in Denmark where 100.000 delirious concert-goers cheer him on for an extended period.

(Fragment of Yunus at Roskilde saying: “I feel at home completely”). Only after that Coldplay is allowed to take the stage.

(Chuck Waterfield)

“What do we find in country after country  after country is that the market starts to saturate, you end up with a larger and larger number of MFIs who are loaning in the same towns, the same villages, loaning to the same people and you find study after study of clients taking on more, multiple loans, OK, I don’t even, I don’t blame them. We have a growth mentality; we, the institutions all want to double their number of clients each year and the institution across the street and down the street also are looking to double their clients every year. So we tell our loan officers, go out and put more money, put more loans out there.”

(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“Whether you are poor or whether you are rich, if somebody offers you a loan and you are short of money, you are going to take it. Look at the banking crisis here, look at the credit card… bubble you might call it that we have here in Europe, it is not much different. That’s just part of human nature. If lenders are eager to lend to you and sort of push the money down your throat you are not going to close your mouth, you are going to take it.”

(Hugh)

“I would see women coming into the institution often illiterate, they didn’t understand really what they were doing, they would sign the contract with a fingerprint because they couldn’t read and write and they would receive a loan which was apparently going to help them out of poverty but at the interest rates which they were being charged there was very little likelihood of this actually happening in practice unfortunately.”

(David Roodman)

“I do worry with credit because credit as we know is a very dangerous thing. Within one area, you know, say the state of Andhra Pradesh, in India a whole lot of MFIs almost racing each other to see how fast they could grow. Right. And so, I met some villagers outside of the capital of Andhra Pradesh, which is Hyderabad. They told me how a few years ago there was maybe one or two micro lenders in their village. And suddenly that jumped to five.  Because these new people showed up saying “please take our loans”. And so a lot of people were wise enough not to take the loans but some did and some used them in ways that would make it very difficult to pay back, like if they bought a television. Not all but some.  And so there is some percentage of people who made poor choices because of the easy money and then were put under a lot of stress.”

(Interview with woman from Andhra Pradesh)

“That evening I poured kerosene on myself and I was about to light a match, my husband broke the door and stopped me. There was commotion. The neighbours came around and consoled us. They said we shouldn’t have taken so many loans. Dying wouldn’t solve our problems. They told us to think of our two children. That night my husband and I had a big quarrel, we didn’t even have dinner. The next morning he took the buffalo to the field at 6 am and didn’t return for lunch. My father-in-law and I went to look for him. We found him hanged from a tree. He was dead. “

(Chuck Waterfield)

“India is very well documented. You know the stories of the suicides. One of the worst that I have seen details on is that she commits suicide by dousing herself in kerosene lighting on fire, her husband sees her, her husband tries to cover her and put it out and he’s killed too. And the kids loose both parents in a matter of minutes because of over indebtedness.”

(Jos)

Also in other countries the market overheats. Nicaragua is being inundated by micro lenders that all want to try to push on as many loans to the people as possible. Many poor cannot resist the temptation and get credit after credit, often paying high interest rates.  When they can no longer repay their debts and the micro lenders start expropriating them, the shit hits the fan! The population takes to the street to protest.

(Nicaraguan peasant)

“Well, we are here in Rio Blanco with this impasse. Because a law has been approved on microfinance institutions right, which basically ends this problem and we agree with this law because from now on it will regulate the financial system and above all the for-profit organizations. However, the law regulates starting now, but we need to remember that during the past 16 years these financial institutions were not regulated by the state and committed a number of abuses, such as high interest rates,  what we call default, we all know about this, and the eviction from properties.”

(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“It is always very dangerous if there is too much money around. In microfinance at the moment there is too much money. If MFIs have easy access to very cheap money, too much of it, it simply seduces them into becoming less and less cautious in lending.”

(Jos)

At the websites of credit providers we read about the amazing success stories, about a poor woman from Sri Lanka who with a small loan bought a sewing machine and now has her own business. Great, but microcredit also causes casualties.

(David Roodman)

“We shouldn’t just blame MFIs, we also need to blame ourselves. As donors we give money to charities, we are creating an evolutionary environment that rewards certain kinds of storytelling and exaggeration and penalizes realism. Right, and so we need to change how we give money and demand evidence, not just good stories. “

(Jos)

In 2008 The Netherlands’ second pension Fund ‘Zorg en Welzijn’  also joins microfinance. PGGM, the investor of the fund announces in a press release that they plan to make a serious investment.

(Else Bos,  PGGM)

“Originally we had planned to invest around 200 million”.

(Jos)

“We are now talking about 2008?”

(Else Bos)

“We are talking about 2008. In the end we were able to invest 40 million. By now we have taken out a big chunk of those investments, only about 10 million now remains.”

(Jos)

“Why so little?”

(Else Bos)

“That is because we struggled to find sufficient good investment opportunities. To find those players that showed sufficient stability, transparency, clarity in their processes which gave us the sense of trust that we were finding the kinds of investments that we were looking for in such a way that we wanted.”

(Jos)

“So initially PGGM started off feeling very confident but in practice it turned out to be a bit more tricky?”

(Else Bos)

“Yes, we started off full of confidence and ambition, and this ambition moreover we still have, but it was, we found it very tricky, yes.”

(Jos)

Not only PGGM is treading water, stichting DOEN, the charity vehicle of the Postcode Lottery among others, also hits the breaks.

(N Tellegen, DOEN)

“We are leaving the market of the smallest loans. We are retreating from it and we will no longer be giving out loans below 2000 dollars but we are really focusing on the next level up because there is another misconception within microfinance that everyone is an entrepreneur, and of course that is not the case. It is not the case here and it is also not the case there. And the consequence is thus that there are also people who have been given loans who are not able to set up their business and therefore you also get the serious over indebtedness and so we have chosen to focus on the slightly larger segment where you do often find true entrepreneurs. People with employees that offer work to precisely the poorest of the poor and you thus create a situation where you can contribute, in our eyes,  in a bigger way to economic development and this means that we have retreated from the smallest loans.”

(Jos)

“Stichting Doen also subsidizes Chuck Waterfield’s  ‘Microfinance Transparency’.  Why do you that?”

(N Tellegen, DOEN)

“Yes. Chuck Waterfield is a kind of gadfly, he is someone who publishes the details on loans, on what all the microfinance institutions are doing and with this he plays a very important role as a kind of whistle blower. The abuses in the sector are known but he makes sure that the whole world knows about this and with that investors will retreat from those parties that are operating in microfinance in an unethical way. In 2008 he contacted us and we subsidize him especially because we find it extremely important that microfinance and the provision of financial services remains a clean/unadulterated business, a sector in which you contribute to development with people’s best interests at heart and you make sure that those parties who have joined to earn lots of money are dealt with.”

(Chuck Waterfield)

“There’s 4 billion people living on less than 2 dollars a day. That’s the vast, that’s two thirds of the world’s population. And the rich are very small, the very pinnacle of this pyramid. Some of what is happening in microfinance right now is a transfer of wealth, not the old-school ‘help the poor’ send money down to the bottom of the pyramid. We see a transfer of wealth from the bottom of the pyramid up to the very very top 1% of the pyramid. The rich getting richer off the very poorest in the world.”

(Jos)

“Is it ethical to make profit on helping the poor?”

(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“Absolutely, yeah. I have no doubt about that. Because the emphasis here is on helping the poor, as long as you help them. Then it’s a win-win situation. The essential thing is that it be a win-win situation. That it’s not one person exploiting another for his own benefit.”

(Jos)

“When does it become unethical? Where do you draw the line?”

(Damian von Stauffenberg)

“It is not a line. It’s a broad, sort of grey band. Which is fairly, quite hard to draw. I can’t draw it. But I can intuitively say: look, if the interest rates go way up there into the three digits then we have probably crossed the line.”

(N Tellegen, DOEN)

“You see that parties have appeared on the market that charge 120/130% interest on loans.”

(Jos)

“What do you think of that?”

(N Tellegen, DOEN)

“Yes, I find that disgraceful. That is of course not the way in which we want to contribute to economic development and helping people to further develop their entrepreneurship. So we take a critical look at the interest rates and we also take a critical look at what the most important goal is to be operating therein, so what kind of attitude do the people behind the MFI have, are the investors only on board for the money? Because those are the people that want to make huge profits and therefore will charge such interest rates. “

(Chuck Waterfield)

“We can’t keep the loan sharks away from the poor. Can we keep the loan sharks away from what we call microfinance? If we don’t set really clear standards, and watch that like a hawk and watch it with transparency and rate everyone by objective criteria, and state really clearly who is in and who is out, we don’t certify, we’re dead. Then microfinance will just be sort of a little blip on the screen, on the timeline of history and money lending  to the poor which has been around since money was invented will continue actually in larger scale, larger scale then it was before.”

(Jos)

Hugh Sinclair has worked as an advisor for MFIs in Mexico, Ecuador, Mozambique and Mongolia. In 2006 he starts working for Triple Jump in Amsterdam, the manager of the microcredit funds of Oxfam Novib and ASN Bank among others. At the beginning of 2007 Triple Jump sends him on an assignment to LAPO in Nigeria, Godwin Ehigiamusoe’s club in which Oxfam Novib at that point had already invested 400.000 Euros. Triple Jump is about to provide new loans to LAPO.

(Hugh)

“So I flew down to Nigeria and discovered an institution which was charging extremely high interest rates, it was suffering a very high level of client desertion, clients were simply just leaving the institution after one, maybe two loans. The institution was in a complete chaos and had no internal control, no governance, it was run by a small group of family members all from that region of Nigeria. The computer systems that are designed to cope with the high volume of transactions and retain some sort of order within the institution, for all practical purposes, did not really exist. It was a completely chaotic institution. And with very little poverty impact.”

(Jos)

LAPO charges costs that can go up to no less than 144%. A poor Nigerian that borrows 100 Euro one year later has thus paid 244 Euro in interest and repayments. How can you even begin to explain that?, we ask Theo Bouma of Oxfam Novib, the charity organization that between 2005 and 2010 did business with LAPO.

(Theo Bouma, Oxfam Novib)

“When we start doing business with an organization that wants to give out loans to poor clients the first thing we look at is the height of interest rates.  And it doesn’t actually really matter if that is 60 or 80 or 100 or 140…

(Jos)

“Well, for the client that DOES matter.”

(Theo Bouma, Oxfam Novib)

“It has to go down. Wait, let me finish my story. Of course this is an important factor. If you look at Nigeria, because that is where this discussion is taking place, also back then it was a big discussion, try to put yourself in the shoes of a poor client. Say he wants to invest in a business, in his own business, he has several options, he can go to the loan sharks where he will pay 200/250%, then he goes to a national bank and he discovers that they keep their doors closed to poor clients, and when he does manage to get in he will pay much more than what LAPO is charging. This is not a justification for high interest rates but it does place it into context because in a lot of situations a poor client’s only option is to go to an MFI when he wants “affordable” credit.”

(Jos)

“Also when the MFI is acting like a loan shark?”

(Theo Bouma, Oxfam Novib)

“Well, what I just tried to say is that a loan shark charges 180, 200, 250% interest. Compared to that LAPO is relatively favorable, but don’t forget what I just said, 144% we also think is too high. We have told LAPO from the beginning and certainly from 2007 that we were adamant that they change their ways.”

(Jos)

“They didn’t.”

(Theo Bouma, Oxfam Novib)

“Well, uh, yes, the opinions on this subject differ, depending on who you talk to. They told us that they did. And later, after a new rating, I think at the beginning of 2010 from the top of my head, it turned out that they didn’t.”

(Jos)

LAPO has now been branded as an untrustworthy partner. Triple Jump, the fund manager of Oxfam Novib, however already knew back in 2007 that things were not right in Nigeria. But despite the alarming findings of employee Hugh Sinclair, Triple Jump that same year invested 1million Euro in LAPO on behalf of ASN Bank. And later another loan followed on behalf of the American organization Calvert.  ASN Bank is not willing to comment in front of the camera. The chairman of the board of directors of Triple Jump, Ab Engelsman, now acknowledges that his organization in the past did not pay sufficient attention to the interests of loan takers.

(Ab Engelsman)

“First one would look at the income for the MFI. Then the focus shifted to what the client is actually paying when you take all costs into consideration.”

(Jos)

“But isn’t that the very first question you should be asking: How does this help the client?”

(Ab Engelsman)

“Yes, but…. yes of course, but the client was helped, the client didn’t… it is more our problem than the client’s problem, because as I said the repayment rates were 95% and above. So the client didn’t have any problems with the high interest rates. It is more an ethical problem we have that we find that strange.”

(Jos)

And this is how it could happen in this fairytale that the provider of small credits changed into a large profit maker, a mega jackpot machine, with financial support from The Netherlands. Well intentioned, yes, but well spent??

(Jos)

“Do you feel screwed by LAPO?”

(Ab Engelsman)

“No, I personally don’t. As Triple Jump, I also think not. No.”

(Jos)

“Would you, with the knowledge you have now, again provide a loan to LAPO?”

(Ab Engelsman)

“Not to the LAPO as it was back then, but yes to the current LAPO.”

(Closing notes: written)

LAPO has grown into one of the biggest credit providers in Nigeria and has now obtained an official banking license.

LAPO is now a commercial company.

Founder/Director Godwin Ehigiamusoe owns 12% of the shares of the company.

(Sound fragment of loud applause).

(Jos)

If you would like to know more about this program, visit kro.nl/reporter

 

 

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Silence Interrupted

Larry Reed’s recent press release took me by surprise and flooded my inbox. A fundamental shift has occurred in the sector. Support is emerging from all sides now. The Dutch microfinance investment sector is abuzz with the news as it prepares for a rather critical documentary to be aired on September 28th. Ok, so Larry wrote something that didn’t entirely criticize the book, is that really something to bother blogging about? There are three reasons to think it may be. Firstly, for whom this guy is. Secondly, for what he implies. And thirdly, for what this may mean for the future of microfinance.

Who is Larry Reed?

He’s the head of the MicroCredit Summit Campaign, a fairly large lobby-group/watchdog/summit-organising body. He’s a well-educated Christian, and spent decades with Opportunity, 5 years as head of their Africa operations, 8 years as CEO. He taught at the Boulder Institute, and authored a few books, one of which was co-written with our friends Rhyne and Otero of Accion. He knows just about everyone in the sector according to Linked In. I’ve never met him, but mutual friends speak highly of him. Nor have I worked with Opportunity, but they didn’t earn a place in the book, and while I can’t claim to know much about them, I’ve not heard their name involved in any scandals or shady activities that I can recall. Basically, as far as I can discern this is a qualified, well-respected, senior and decent guy. In the book there’s a minor dig at the Summit Campaign event held in Halifax in 2008 – “narcissism in its purest form” (page 129), but otherwise neither Larry, Opportunity nor the Summit Campaign are directly mentioned. So, he perhaps had less reason to formally comment on the book other than in his role as something of a figurehead in the sector, which makes this all the more interesting….

The press release and its implications

What does he actually say? “Learning from a Heretic” – the title suggests he doesn’t think I’m a complete idiot, which is reassuring. He concedes a “huge vulnerability” in the sector, albeit presented in a one-sided fashion. But here’s the critical point: he doesn’t suggest that anything I say is incorrect. None of those implicated have dared speak out (except a minor tit-for-tat with Smart, and a private communication from Triple Jump which was published unintentionally, and utterly flawed). The evidence in the book is well documented and they remain silent simply because they are unable to refute the claims and dare not draw more attention to their guilt. And now a senior figure is apparently supporting my premise, albeit in a veiled manner, making it hard to shrug-off. Would Larry thank me at the end; suggest we “address this problem directly”; and offer partial solutions to the claims I make, if the claims were invalid?

One almost has to feel a little sorry for the guilty parties. Triple Jump must be sweating, and one must wonder what the innocent, capable employees of this MIV are thinking as this unfolds before their eyes. They claim to be saving the world, and a quarter of a million Dutch people are about to watch a documentary on a leading investigative TV-show directly challenging this claim. And now one of the leaders of the microfinance sector has abandoned them. Sure, Larry will issue reassuring words about strengthening the sector and working on weaknesses blah blah, but he isn’t going to lead an attack against me now, nor offer them much public support. He has to actually do something now, or he risks looking ridiculous. It is becoming increasingly hard for the guilty parties to dismiss the claims in the book as mere scaremongering when the media disagree, most in the sector disagree, and the head of their Olympics Summit disagrees. Nope, they’re on their own now.

I could launch into a critique of Larry’s press release, but he’s in a tough spot, and what would be gained? Of course my book is one-sided, it’s a memoir, not a text-book. Of course there are omitted institutions – how could I have worked at every MFI and every MIV in every country? And whether the self-regulatory bodies, most of whom are up to their armpits in conflicts of interest, are the suitable parties to address the issues at stake is seriously questionable, but let’s leave these minor points aside. They are over-shadowed by the courage it must have taken to write that release – my hat goes off to Larry.

Now, a more disturbing concern is his proposed solution. It is flawed in two key ways. First, it does not consider regulation of the intermediaries, but rather focuses on the MFIs. This is required, for sure, but who is going to regulate the likes of Citi and Grameen Foundation USA, Triple Jump and Accion (all of whom sponsor the MicroCredit Summit Campaign)? Does this not present an immediate conflict of interest? Look who sits on the steering committee of the magic seal of excellence award:

  • Asad Mahmood (Deutsche Bank, cover-up of LAPO case, sloppy due diligence etc.)
  • Alex Counts (CEO GFUSA, turned a blind eye to LAPO’s interest rates of 144% while Yunus sits on their board, denies LAPO’s interest rates while everyone else confirms them, then begrudgingly defends them because they’re cheaper than loan sharks)
  • Susy Cheston (Accion, I don’t know Susy, but Accion are behind the definitive loan sharks disguised as microfinance – Compartamos)

These are some of the worst offending individuals or institutions in the sector in my opinion. Is Bernie Madoff working at the SEC? Or the wolf guarding the sheep? Was this was masterful infiltration of the “regulator” – slip them some sponsorship and weasel your way onto the steering committee? How much does a seat on the steering committee actually cost I wonder?

My principle claim in the book is that it is precisely these folk who are the problem, and Larry seems light on suggestions about what to do about that. The text is clear: Smart, the Seal of Excellence and the SPTF are aimed principally at MFIs. MFTransparency, the transparency initiative not mentioned by Larry, does likewise: it reveals the interest rates of the MFIs. None have anything to say about the MIVs. By deflecting attention repeatedly towards the MFIs, local standards, treatment of the poor – all of which are important – Larry is deflecting attention away from where it is most required. It’s not immediately obvious at first glance, but this appears to be a claim to tackle the problem directly, when it is possibly a red-herring. It’s easy to get support for a campaign to “help protect the poor”; it’s harder to get support to reign in the real villains – especially when they are funding the sector and the campaigns.

The second issue is that he crystallizes my concern into the principal-agent problem alone. In the broadest sense he is right. The outstanding issues are very serious, encompass a large part of the sector, stretch to the top, and include frauds, deceptions, turning convenient blind-eyes, ignoring evidence of abuse, lying, cover-up up wrong-doings, and one could debatably add bribery to the list of accusations. The scope, size and magnitude of the institutions mentioned is immense – Deutsche Bank, Accion, Citibank, Triple Jump, BlueOrchard, responsAbility, Kiva, Grameen Foundation USA, Calvert Foundation, Incofin etc., this is a large part of the entire sector, implicated severely. Are we to believe Larry, armed with his Seal of Excellence and the Smart Campaign, is going to reign in these guys?

Within 24 hours of Larry’s announcement, including an acknowledgement of our collective guilt in over-hyping microfinance, a board member of Opportunity, Larry’s old stomping ground, was singing the miraculous claims of microfinance once again and scared stiff of the idea of the “R” word – Regulation. I blogged about this here. How can Larry dismantle the spin that he acknowledges exists, but which forms the very bedrock of microfinance? Microfinance without spin is like a car without fuel – it grinds to a halt. Microfinance spin is relentless and institutionalized. The Friends of Grameen got none other than Burson-Marsteller to help them out recently!

And what authority does Larry actually have? Minimal, and less so beyond the confines of the USA. A microfinance summit without those implicated in the book would be thin on the ground, and fail to serve its key function as dating agency for the supply and demand of capital and a bit of self-congratulatory back-slapping funded by donors’ money. I do NOT actually doubt Larry’s intention. I just wonder whether he has the tools available to solve this problem.

I shan’t go through all the flaws pointed out previously, but here’s a summary:

  • The evidence that microfinance is working to anything approaching the naive claims we have made for two decades to justify our own existence simply doesn’t exist. The debate fluctuates between whether it is marginally useful, marginally harmful, or merely useless. The sector can produce endless heart-warming videos, but no widespread, rigorous, independent, credible evidence of poverty reduction. So they moved the goalposts to suggest that poverty wasn’t the focus – it was “financial inclusion”. Next stop – “Doing stuff”.
  • Some of the major MIVs and P2Ps have knowingly lied to their investors, covered-up their actual activities using questionable techniques, have presented a deliberately and knowingly false impression of their activities, while, in some cases, extracting vast sums from the sector for personal gain. At times such behaviour can be explained by naiveté, laziness and incompetence, but these are generally the best cases.
  • A few MIVs have come to dominate the sector in a quasi-monopolistic cartel, with employees and management bouncing from one to the next, and increasingly to and from the public sector bodies (including the US administration in the case of Maria Otero) in a massive revolving door of like-minded insiders, investing in overlapping MFIs (the “herd instinct”) and making ludicrous claims about poverty reduction from air-conditioned offices in Geneva, Amsterdam and DC. They increasingly fund the self-regulators.
  • The sector has persuaded celebrities, high-ranking officials, donors, investors and entire governments into believing they are eradicating poverty when in fact the data suggests otherwise.

How is Larry going to dismantle this mess? When Accion sniffed a $270 million return on their meagre $200.000 investment would it really have made much difference if someone like Larry had whispered in their ear “hey guys, that’s not entirely ethical, I’m not going to invite you to my Summit if you do that”? And look at the supposedly effective self-regulatory bodies in the sector – The Summit Campaign, Smart, MFTransparency, etc. Who funds them and sits on their various committees and management teams? The usual names keep re-appearing, and many of these names are precisely the investing institutions that need to be scrutinized and regulated. Sponsors of these campaigns badly implicated in the book include:

  • SMART: Accion, Deutsche Bank, IFC
  • Summit Campaign: Citibank, various Grameen bodies including Grameen Foundation, Triple Jump, Blue Orchard, Accion.
  • MFTransparency: Triple Jump, Deutsche, Citibank, Oxfam Novib

I have explained in detail why none of these jokers should be trusted, and none of them have publicly commented, let alone denied the claims made in the book. Can Larry clean this up, funded as he is by some of the worst offenders? If people learn only one thing from my book, let it be this: “follow the money”. This is certainly not Larry’s fault, he led one of the better microfinance networks (or, rather, one of the least implicated) before inheriting a total mess of a sector from Sam Daley-Harris.

I am afraid to say that my faith that precisely the same people who have led us into this mess are going to lead us out of it, including many who have made vast financial returns specifically from the mess, is precisely zero. I do not use the term “hi-jacked” to describe this sector arbitrarily, this is precisely the correct word.

Microfinance needs external, governmental regulation for both MFIs and MIVs. The sector will be up in arms about this. “Oh, it’s so anti free-market”, “the regulators will interfere to the detriment of the poor”, “this will drive investors out of the market”, “that’s protectionism”, blah blah. A classic from the horse’s mouth (referenced above):

“If the microfinance industry and its members fail to self-police, to exercise due prudence and restraint in the conduct of their operations, to serve and treat their clients fairly, and to rigorously comply with the laws of host countries in letter and in spirit, then we are inviting tight and perhaps detrimental regulatory oversight and public scrutiny.” [emphasis added]

Kadita Tshibaka, Board Director of Opportunity, 33 years at Citibank

God forbid, not just regulatory oversight, but public scrutiny also! I can hear the sector shuddering. There is no middle ground – it is the evil regulator or self-regulation. The very idea of a sensible and effective regulator is an anathema to these guys. They are free market devotees let loose, alas, on the poor. No, Larry’s job now is to appease the heretics and the media, maintain the Campaign’s funding, and avoid at all costs the dreaded regulator. He can’t actually do much. Sufficient appeasement to keep the sector ticking over may his only option (and function).

What does this say regarding the future of microfinance?

Alas I must revert to pessimism here. The MIVs are a little nervous now that this is attracting media and regulatory attention, and there will be a push to prevent this at all costs. So, the ways they will do this will likely include the following:

  • Lots of press releases and media coverage promoting the miracle cure. Maybe a documentary. Expect some mild confessions of “scope for improvement”, but no actual admissions of guilt: “Yes, we lied to our investors deliberately in our newsletters and knowingly screwed the poor in the meantime” – this just won’t happen, there’s no point hoping for it. Maybe they can recruit a new celebrity or come up with a new catchphrase? Quadruple bottom line mega-inclusive holistic financial integration has a ring to it.
  • Slightly beefing up the likes of Smart Campaign to give a tiny appearance of it having some teeth, and doing so with heavy marketing. They might single out a few “rogue operator” MFIs, sacrificial lambs involved in particularly unpleasant aspects of exploitation, but they will avoid any scrutiny that could damage the inner-club, particularly the MIVs.
  • Dinners and meetings and discreet conversations with regulators to put them off the scent. The usual arguments to keep the regulators at bay usually involve a combination of “you are not informed enough to know how to regulate this niche sector”, and “if you regulate it badly you will drive investors away and this will be so detrimental to the poor”. Larry suggested the general public are unable to understand the massive complexities of microfinance, which I found slightly insulting, but the regulators are generally treated with utter disdain by the microfinance community.

Larry, to some extent, represents the sector. His hands are tied with conflicts of interest over funding and lack of ammunition, but his intentions may be pure. He seems to be relying on the self-regulatory bodies to an unhealthy degree, a faith I do not share, but perhaps he’s correct. He better be, as he is betting his career on them. At the end of the day he has little to lose – the sector is in turmoil, and if he messes this up he might not be the only one looking for a job. In the meantime he is not directly beholden to any MIV or party or institution, and would Citi actually cut funding because he didn’t play ball with them? They would face (even more) severe reputation damage. They already look a little questionable, and perhaps, ironically, Larry is their lifeline to restoring them to some semblance of decency. Right now one could be forgiven for considering them some mafia cartel with discreet fingers in all pies – they even fund the Banana Skins reports. Robert Annibale may have delivered a questionable testimony in front of the House of Representatives, and his poverty credentials are equally dubious, but he is no fool. He has his own career on the line, and already looks a little guilty, which may provide Larry with negotiating power. But Larry’s statement needs to be supplemented with a plan, in due course, and unless this is extremely far-reaching, I maintain my call for a genuine solution to the crisis facing the embattled sector:

Full, formal, external, independent regulation of the MIVs and P2Ps. Microfinance affects poor, vulnerable, and at times desperate citizens, they deserve at least the same regulatory protection that we take for granted in developed countries. Investors in MIVs likewise deserve the same regulatory protection and oversight as any other fund. If this results in the culling of a few unscrupulous players who are no longer willing to play on a level playing field by some clearly defined rules, so be it.

Some suggestions to inject credulity into the Summit Campaign and the likes of Smart could include, inter alia, defining a level at which real interest rates charged to the poor are labelled extortionate; adding the rights of children to the CPPs and equipping the self-regulatory bodies with teeth; and demanding public responses from those implicated in the book.

Parallel to formal regulation the sector requires an independent rating agency for the MIVs. Just as we sang the praises of the rating agencies for MFIs, now it’s time to move a rung up the ladder, but that’s a post for another day.

So, Larry, thanks for the muted praise, I appreciate it and respect you for being so bold, but what are you going to actually do? Are you going to address the issue of corruption within the MIVs? Are you going to put a wolf in charge of the sheep? And what are you going to do about the rampant conflicts of interest in the sector, including within your own institution?

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